Cash Shortage Squeezes Gaza Residents

Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
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Cash Shortage Squeezes Gaza Residents

Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)

Even when food is available, many in Gaza cannot afford to buy it, as the enclave suffers from a severe cash shortage. Israel has blocked the entry of new currency into the territory since October 7, 2023, leaving residents at the mercy of money changers who have hiked exchange rates on remittances to exorbitant levels.

Palestinians in Gaza primarily rely on the Israeli shekel for daily transactions, which used to enter the strip through banks operating under the Palestinian Monetary Authority, supplied by the Bank of Israel.

Banking operations in Gaza have ground to a halt since the start of the war, and no fresh banknotes have entered the enclave, worsening an already dire humanitarian situation. Residents say they have been left at the mercy of traders who exploit the cash shortage to impose arbitrary rules on currency use.

'The Traders’ Game'

Dubbed “the traders’ game” by many in Gaza, the practice began with merchants refusing to accept worn-out banknotes and certain coins, such as the 10-shekel piece (worth about $3), which have all but vanished from local markets. Some vendors now reject older versions of bills - like the brown-hued 100-shekel note (around $28) - insisting instead on the newer yellow ones. The same rules apply to various denominations.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Hani Jahjouh, a resident of al-Shati Camp west of Gaza City, said vendors selling vegetables and essential goods - when available - often refuse worn banknotes or specific coins, claiming they are counterfeit or easily faked.

“This just adds to the burden of people already crushed by impossible living conditions,” said Jahjouh, 59. “We don’t have solutions. We don’t even know where to get the money they’re asking for.”

Only a very small number of traders accept digital payments, and even then, residents say, they impose tough conditions - such as inflated prices or demands for partial payment in cash.

Displaced Gazan Duaa Ismail, originally from Beit Hanoun in the north of the enclave, says even when goods are available, she cannot afford them due to a lack of cash.

“We’re suffering badly from a shortage of money, and that makes it even harder to get basic items like flour and sugar - when they’re even in stock,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat from a shelter in Gaza City’s Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.

Ismail said that during a brief ceasefire, some traders had accepted digital payments through mobile apps. “But once the war resumed, things worsened, and they stopped taking them altogether,” she said.

Salaries They Can’t Spend

The crisis has also hit public-sector employees, private workers, and international aid staff, many of whom receive salaries through bank transfers or mobile wallets but have no way of accessing their funds with banks shuttered. They are forced to rely on currency dealers or traders with access to physical cash.

Amjad Hasballah, an employee with the Palestinian Authority, said he has been cashing his monthly salary through mobile banking apps for over a year and a half, paying a steep commission to money traders in return.

“When I received my last salary in early April, the commission had reached 30%,” he said.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Hasballah explained that at the start of the war, commissions hovered around 5%, but they spiked during Ramadan, peaking at 35% around Eid al-Fitr, before dipping slightly to 30%.

“My salary is just 2,800 shekels. When I pay a 30% fee, there’s barely anything left,” he said bitterly. “At this point, the traders might as well take the whole salary and just give us pocket money.”

Caught in a Trap

Jamal Al-Mashal, a father of six who lost two children in an Israeli airstrike, said he lives off 1,000 shekels (about $280) in monthly international aid. But even that amount is slashed by up to 30% when he exchanges it through local traders.

“People in Gaza have become a cash trap for currency dealers and big traders,” he said. “They’re exploiting our desperation, and it’s like a harvest season for them - raking in profits while we suffer.”

The poorest and most vulnerable are hit hardest. Many international agencies rely on electronic payment platforms to distribute aid to these groups, who often have no access to physical currency.

No Oversight, No Restraint

The Hamas-run government has made attempts to cap commission rates at 5%, but those efforts have largely failed. Officials blame ongoing Israeli targeting of personnel involved in regulating the process.

Money changers defend the high fees, arguing that the lack of currency entering Gaza leaves them with limited options.

“We raise commission rates because there’s simply no new cash coming in,” one trader told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Once money is distributed to the public, we have no way of getting it back. What goes out doesn’t return.”

He added that while ministries and law enforcement have tried to impose limits, traders view the rules as unfair. “There have been attempts to regulate us, but we haven’t complied - they’re asking too much from us under impossible conditions,” he said.

Some municipal leaders and community elders in Gaza have recently appealed to the Palestinian Monetary Authority in Ramallah to intervene in what they describe as unchecked profiteering by traders controlling access to scarce cash.

They have called for greater oversight, including monitoring and freezing the traders’ bank accounts.

The authority has repeatedly warned against exploitation of civilians and threatened to take action. But in practice, traders continue to charge hefty commissions on money transfers with little deterrence.

The Authority has urged residents to use its Instant Payment System available through mobile banking apps, which it says offers a practical alternative to cash, promotes digital payments, and enables real-time transactions.

Cash Squeeze Tightens Further

Despite the hardship, Israel is considering new measures that could further tighten the financial stranglehold on Gaza. One proposal involves withdrawing the 200-shekel banknote (worth about $55) from circulation, on the grounds that Hamas allegedly uses it to pay salaries to its fighters.

The suggestion was reportedly made by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Bank of Israel Governor Amir Yaron, who rejected the move. Other proposals include voiding the serial numbers of banknotes believed to be inside Gaza, effectively rendering them worthless, a step that could deliver a significant financial blow to Hamas.

According to a report published Tuesday by the Israeli daily Maariv, the proposal has backing from several ministers and economists both within and outside the central bank.

The report estimated that around 10 billion shekels in high-denomination bills - 100 and 200 shekels - remain in circulation within Gaza. These notes entered the enclave over the years through official banking channels supplied by the Bank of Israel.

Economists told Maariv that Gaza residents receive an estimated 150 to 200 million shekels each month through digital transfers from aid organizations and the Palestinian Authority. That money is then converted into cash within markets dominated by Hamas and supported by a network of money changers.

Israeli security sources estimate that Hamas has accumulated up to five billion shekels since the war began and has spent nearly one billion shekels on salaries for fighters and new recruits. The sources claim Hamas has profited significantly by reselling aid and fuel at inflated prices during the conflict.



What Do We Know About the 1968 Pact on ‘Hormuz’ Shipping Routes that Iran is Rejecting?

A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 
A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 
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What Do We Know About the 1968 Pact on ‘Hormuz’ Shipping Routes that Iran is Rejecting?

A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 
A boy balances on a tire at the water's edge as ships are seen in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, Tuesday, June 30, 2026 (AP) 

By John Yoon

One of Iran’s negotiators in talks with the United States, Kazem Gharibabadi, reasserted claims this week of permanent Iranian control over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and rejected internationally recognized shipping routes established in 1968.

Tensions over the strait, a crucial path for oil and gas shipments, have threatened a fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Iran has insisted it has authority over the strait and threatened ships that don’t travel on its mandated routes.

Here’s a closer look at the decades-old agreement that established the shipping routes and why Iran is opposed to it.

What was the agreement?

Nearly six decades ago, Omani and Iranian officials negotiated an agreement, ratified by the UN International Maritime Organization, that established the official way to transit the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial waterway for global energy supplies.

The framework, called the Traffic Separation Scheme, was largely a technical solution to prevent collisions between supertankers passing through the waterway, which is just 24 miles wide. It was also a legal solution to the fact that there are no neutral international waters in the middle of the strait where ships transit because the sovereign waters of Iran and Oman overlap.

Why is Iran rejecting it?

At the time, Iran was a dominant military power in the region and did not need to use its geography as leverage, Ali Vaez, the Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, said.

Today, in Iranian officials’ view, the traditional transit routes have allowed warships to pass through the strait, threatening Iran’s security, Vaez said.

Gharibabadi, the deputy foreign minister, noted on Monday that the agreement predated the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the shah and brought an authoritarian clerical regime to power.

“Today we told the Omani side that those routes must definitely change,” he said. “We decided that we would also begin expert and technical talks on changing the routes.”

What does Iran want?

Gharibabadi’s remarks solidified Iran’s intention to move away from that framework in favor of negotiating a new system that gives them more control over the waters. Iran has already placed naval mines in the strait, effectively blocking those established 1968 routes.

“They are refining their argument to sound more legalistic,” said Jennifer Parker, a former naval officer now at the University of Western Australia’s Defense and Security Institute. She said the argument was designed to maximize Tehran’s leverage at the negotiating table.

To bypass Iran’s territorial waters, the United States and Oman recently attempted to establish an alternative corridor along the strait’s southern side in Omani waters under a US military escort mission. Gharibabadi reiterated on Monday that Iran would refuse to recognize any such parallel routes.

*The New York Times


Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say

An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
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Lebanon-Israel Deal May Entrench Stalemate Rather Than End War, Analysts Say

An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)
An Israeli helicopter flies on patrol near the Israel-Lebanon border, 23 June 2026, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. (EPA)

A security deal between Lebanon and Israel risks entrenching a stalemate rather than resolving Israel's underlying conflict with Hezbollah by tying Israel's pullout from southern Lebanon to the Iran-aligned group's disarmament, a condition regional analysts and politicians say is unattainable.

At its core is a bargain few see as workable: Hezbollah has flatly rejected disarmament, and no Lebanese government has the power to enforce it.

With Hezbollah unlikely to disarm, analysts say Israel has political cover to keep an open-ended military presence in southern Lebanon, which it invaded after Hezbollah fired at Israel on March 2 in solidarity with Tehran over the war in Iran.

The deal leaves the Lebanese state trapped between obligations it cannot meet and sovereignty it cannot fully reclaim, the analysts say.

The framework deal also collides with Lebanon’s political realities, asking a fragile sectarian state to confront the most powerful armed faction in the country despite a post–civil war system built on power-sharing rather than coercion.

"This is not an agreement, it is an imposed settlement," said a senior Lebanese politician who ‌declined to be ‌named, according to Reuters.

The Lebanese army, he said, was neither structured nor equipped to disarm Hezbollah, and expecting it ‌to do ⁠so ignored both the ⁠group’s entrenched military capacity and the fragile sectarian balance on which Lebanon's stability rests.

'BURDEN' PLACED ON LEBANON

Political analysts say the imbalance is built into the agreement’s design, with sweeping obligations placed on Lebanon but no reciprocal guarantee of Israeli withdrawal.

"This agreement has put all the burden on Lebanon," said Michael Young, a Beirut-based analyst, adding that it "creates a structure that allows the Israelis to remain (in southern Lebanon) indefinitely."

Fawaz Gerges, a Lebanese scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science, said the deal was "born dead" and is structurally flawed, hinging on a condition that is impossible to meet in practice.

Gerges said Israel had already occupied a buffer zone in southern Lebanon about eight to 10 km (five to six miles) deep while tying any future withdrawal to Hezbollah’s ⁠disarmament.

The terms of the deal risk the buffer zone becoming long-term and giving it diplomatic legitimacy, he ‌said, describing it as a political "gift" to Israel.

The conflict in Lebanon has been a ‌central part of diplomacy towards ending the wider US-Iran war.

Gerges said Washington’s deliberate decoupling of the conflicts gave Israel greater freedom of action in Lebanon.

FEAR OF ‌CIVIL CONFLICT

The framework agreement signed in Washington affirms that Israel has no claim to Lebanese territory and makes Lebanese army authority in the ‌south contingent on the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu portrays the deal as a historic achievement that could lead to broader peace, while Israeli troops remain deployed in a so-called security zone which Israel says is designed to protect its north from potential attack.

"We will continue to hold it (territory in the security zone) until Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations are disarmed, and until no further threat to Israel is posed from Lebanon," Netanyahu said on Saturday.

Three senior Israeli ‌officials said Israel has little faith in Lebanon's ability to disarm Hezbollah but sees the deal as a vital diplomatic step towards building peace with Lebanon in the long run.

About 4,000 people have been ⁠killed in Lebanon and a ⁠million displaced during Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun welcomed the agreement as a first step towards restoring Lebanon's sovereignty, saying it should allow Lebanese people to return to fully liberated land.

Parliament Speaker and key Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri said it amounted to an "agreement of dictates, not one that preserves Lebanon's rights" and said it would not be implemented.

Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem declared the deal "null and void" and a "surrender" and said his group would keep fighting until Israel is forced to leave. Hezbollah lawmaker Hassan Fadlallah warned of "internal conflict" in Lebanon.

Any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah would risk deepening sectarian tensions.

Young said the deal "won't lead us anywhere except to civil conflict, and maybe an insurrection by the Shiite community."

DEAL'S IMPLEMENTATION IN QUESTION

Danny Citrinowicz, a regional analyst and former Israeli military intelligence officer, said Hezbollah's dismantlement was "something that would never happen" and the deal in effect legitimized an open-ended Israeli military presence.

"Nothing will happen. Israel won't withdraw, and Hezbollah won't dismantle," he said.

Citrinowicz said no Israeli prime minister has the domestic political space to withdraw while Hezbollah is still armed and northern Israeli communities remain displaced.

A narrower pact focused on Hezbollah's pullout from south of the Litani River, an expanded Lebanese army deployment and an extension of state authority, would have stood a better chance of success, he said.

Pro-Hezbollah analyst Mohammed Obeid also said the deal was unlikely to be implemented, adding that its provisions were "like explosives", capable of detonating Lebanon's internal stability, as they hinge on state action to disarm Hezbollah.


13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks

The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
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13 Years Since 'June 30' in Egypt... The Muslim Brotherhood Has Suffered Severe Setbacks

The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)
The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters burning in Cairo in summer 2013 (Getty)

Thirteen years after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule in Egypt during the events of "June 30" 2013, the group has suffered major setbacks locally and internationally.
The group, whose rule lasted for one year since its member Mohamed Morsi ascended to the presidency in 2012, is now experiencing a domestic blow amidst judicial and security prosecutions.

Its international presence has also shrunk due to decisions by Western countries to pursue and label it as terrorist, with observers and analysts predicting that "the organization and its ideology will soon disappear.”

A Pivotal Day

June 30, 2013, is considered a pivotal day in modern Egyptian history. One year after Morsi assumed the presidency, massive demonstrations erupted across Egypt's governorates demanding the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power and Morsi's ouster. On July 3 of that year, his removal was announced in response to these demands.

In the same year, Egyptian authorities banned the Muslim Brotherhood and placed it on the list of "terrorist entities." Now, hundreds of its leaders and supporters are imprisoned, headed by its Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie.

Some have received sentences of execution, harsh imprisonment, and life in prison. The group's presence is now only known in cyberspace through platforms abroad, mainly in Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

Disappearance Domestically

Egyptian researcher specializing in extremist groups Munir Adib states that when discussing the disappearance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the thirteenth anniversary of the June 30 events, "it is necessary to differentiate between two things: the disappearance of the organization and the disappearance of the ideology."

"In both cases, the Egyptian state and its security agencies have succeeded over 13 years in dismantling, neutralizing the organization, and refuting many of its ideas to the extent that it no longer has the influence it had before 2013 or even before 2011,” he adds in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat.

He predicted that the organization would disappear soon, saying: "The organization, which is now 98 years old, has only two more years left, for its hundredth year to be its last... to become merely a line in history books."

Ahmed Ban, an analyst specializing in religious and extremist groups, states that the group has shifted from a tangible existence to a mere presence on media platforms, specifically non-traditional media such as social media platforms, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence technologies to spread messages of frustration and chaos.

International Moves

Internationally, the organization's situation is no different than in Egypt, with official movements in Austria, Germany, France, and the Netherlands witnessing radical shifts in their stances over the past years, moving from a phase of monitoring and caution to prosecution.

In May 2026, the administration of US President Donald Trump unveiled a new national counter-terrorism strategy, which at its core focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as the ideological source of modern "militant terrorism."

This was preceded last January by Washington's designation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as its branches in Jordan and Lebanon, as "terrorist organizations." This was followed in March by placing its Sudanese branch on the same list.

Moreover, a majority in the French Parliament agreed last January to call on the European Commission to add the Brotherhood and its leaders to the list of terrorist organizations. This was followed in March by the Dutch Parliament's approval of a proposal calling for a ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations, though it has not yet been implemented.

Adib believes that these international moves are "an essential part of the confrontation that will lead to the disappearance of the organization, especially since the international community, Europe, and the United States represented the lifeline it breathed from."

He noted that the situation has now changed with the European move to re-evaluate the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its institutions, which has tightened the noose on the group, contributed to its neutralization, and consolidated predictions of its complete disappearance, along with its ideology, within the coming years.