Alexander Zorin, Putin’s Man for Difficult Missions, in Syria

Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)
Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)
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Alexander Zorin, Putin’s Man for Difficult Missions, in Syria

Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)
Alexander Zorin hands out pizza to journalists in Geneva in 2016. (AFP)

Alexander Zorin is a Russian officer known as the man to turn to for difficult tasks. He is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s envoy to Syria. While deployed at the Hmeimim air base in recent years, he managed to forge relations with various warring parties. The Russian and Syrian air forces may have used their air power to impose settlements in various parts of Syria, but Zorin also presented a “humanitarian” façade, taking part in funerals and offering assistance and reconciliation.

When dealing with the opposition, he often adopts their rhetoric, surprising politicians and civil society figures. This approach even led him to approve the suggestions over the formation of a joint council between the Syrian army, factions, Kurds and defectors. Politically, he was among the “architects” of the national dialogue conference in 2018 and arranged the travel of opposition figures onboard a military jet from Geneva to Sochi.

Behind closed doors, Zorin often complains of the regime’s stances and stubbornness. Openly, he animatedly explains the Russian position, while also presenting a more congenial image of Moscow. In 2016, he famously offered journalists in Geneva pizza as they awaited the announcement of a ceasefire agreement.

Years ago, Damascus informed Moscow that it was no longer capable of “protecting” Zorin as he moves about in Syria, warning that his “life was in danger” from terrorists and gunmen. The Russian Defense Ministry consequently returned Zorin back to the command center in Moscow where he was promoted to oversee the Syrian file on behalf of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu.

Just days ago, Zorin landed in Damascus with a new mission. He arranged a brief visit to the headquarters of the Eighth Brigade of the Fifth Corps, commanded by Ahmed al-Audeh, in Busra al-Sham in the Daraa countryside. Audeh is credited with facilitating the implementation of the 2018 agreement on southern Syria. The agreement, between the United States, Russia, Jordan and Israel, called for the return of government forces to the South, deployment of Russian patrols and Washington’s abandoning of factions that were demanded to lay down their heavy weapons. In return, Iranian militias would be withdrawn from the border with Jordan and the Golan Heights.

Audeh had dispatched a military convoy to Damascus to transport his “friend” to Busra al-Sham. Zorin informed his host that Damascus was not listening to Russia’s advice over the need to reach a settlement and abandon the military solution in order to enter Daraa al-Balad, the main opposition stronghold in the city. He informed Audeh that Russia will not dispatch its jets to support any army operation in the area that also includes 50,000 civilians.

Zorin’s position is in line with his superior, Shoigu, who believes that the solution to the conflict in Syria lies in consolidating the zones of influence with military arrangements. This view is in contrast to that of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who still believes in the possibility that the country can be united through the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254, according to Russia’s interpretation.

The Russian military view currently believes that Syrian forces are unable to control all parts of the country, citing a lack of human resources, the economic crises and intervention of foreign armies. Therefore, the “temporary solution” lies in the zones of influence: Reaching an agreement with Turkey over the northwest, an agreement with the US over the northeast, one with former fighters in the Free Syrian Army over the southwest and one with the government forces, Russia and Iran over the central-western regions.

The talk here is over four zones of influence, not three as had been the case. Damascus, however, has different calculations. The Syrian leadership is content with the turnout in the recent presidential elections that were held in regions it controls. It has taken in the statements of Jordanian officials and their decision to open the border with Syria soon after the return of King Abdullah II from a visit to Washington. It has also perceived signs of Arab openness to normalize relations with Damascus. The leadership is now, therefore, seeking victory after the elections. This is unlikely to happen as the situation in the northwest remains thorny due to the understanding between Ankara and Moscow.

So, the leadership set its sights on the “cradle of the revolution” – Daraa. It is seeking to persuade Moscow to support its position. Indeed, on Thursday the Fourth Division, headed by Maher Assad, President Bashar Assad’s brother, began striking Daraa al-Balad ahead of storming it.

Iran, which has been accused of recruiting local fighters to compensate for its withdrawal in 2018 and of flying drones over neighboring Jordan, was not openly fighting in the attack. It is believed, however, that it is present on the ground given the lack of Russian air cover.

The surprise came from the residents of Daraa and its factions. The Fifth Corps expanded its deployment in the eastern Daraa countryside after Zorin’s visit. In the western countryside, opposition fighters captured regime security checkpoints and detained some 500 Damascus loyalists. “New defections” were reported among individuals who had joined the army and security forces in wake of the 2018 agreement.

After a bloody day, the Russians intervened and arranged meetings between Daraa representatives and the army in search of a new settlement. The new agreement would call for keeping some fighters away from the area, resolving the issue of light weapons, setting up checkpoints and opening the Amman-Damascus highway. The Fifth Corps would play a role in the agreement as all sides await a new round of fighting between opposition factions that want to preserve Daraa’s liberties and the regime that wants military victory.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.