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Sadr, Rival Ideologues Tussle for Power in Iraq

Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr delivers a statement in support of early elections outside of his home in Najaf city, on February 10, 2021. (AFP)
Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr delivers a statement in support of early elections outside of his home in Najaf city, on February 10, 2021. (AFP)
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Sadr, Rival Ideologues Tussle for Power in Iraq

Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr delivers a statement in support of early elections outside of his home in Najaf city, on February 10, 2021. (AFP)
Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr delivers a statement in support of early elections outside of his home in Najaf city, on February 10, 2021. (AFP)

Head of the State of Law coalition, former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been pressing for holding the parliamentary elections on time in October.

He has made a series of tweets to press his demand, even though he will not personally run in the polls, but his coalition will.

Maliki is not the only Shiite figure hoping the elections will be held as scheduled. Head of the al-Fatah coalition, Hadi al-Ameri has also been making the same demand.

Shiite forces are eager for the elections to be held on time, viewing them as an opportunity to make political gains after prominent cleric Moqtada al-Sadr announced his withdrawal from the race.

Sadr has notably only withdrawn from the elections, not announced a boycott. Moreover, he has not officially approached authorities to pull out from the polls, meaning the mercurial cleric could always still opt to participate.

Before he potentially makes such a move, Shiite powers are sending out the message that they are ready to step in and are capable of filling the void left behind the cleric. Ameri in particular has kicked off his electoral campaign, eyeing a sweep of parliament and the ultimate goal of naming a prime minister, who in Iraq must be a Sunni figure.

Ameri’s electoral agenda offers nothing new to the Iraqis, prompting criticism even from his own supporters. He made the same promises he and others had made in previous elections, none of which have been fulfilled.

Ameri prioritized the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, supporting armed formations and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), tackling unemployment and providing job opportunities, addressing water problems with neighboring countries, and others.

Meanwhile, efforts are underway to persuade Sadr to reverse his withdrawal decision. As it stands, he is waging a silent battle with his rival ideologues, who are hoping to win over the majority of his popular base during the elections.

The cleric and his rivals follow the same principles and ideological teachings of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed by the former regime in 1980, and Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father who was assassinated in 1999.

An Iraqi politician, who is close to both sides, told Asharq Al-Awsat that various blocs and leaderships are attempting to persuade Sadr to go back on his withdrawal.

Others, who are seen as Sadr’s rival ideologues, are promoting the idea that they would win enough seats in parliament to allow them to name a new prime minister. Among these figures is Maliki. They believe that the opportunity is available for them to isolate Sadr.

The politician added, however, that Sadr views himself as the sole heir of the Sadr ideological legacy, meaning whoever veers away from his movement will no longer represent the Sadrists and their views.

This rivalry goes beyond elections. Differences exist over the US troop deployment.

Sadr had declared his support to the agreement reached last month between Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Washington over their pullout, while the armed factions expressed their opposition to it.

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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.