Has Iran Inherited Syria’s Role at the Shebaa Farms ‘Mailbox’?

Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)
Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)
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Has Iran Inherited Syria’s Role at the Shebaa Farms ‘Mailbox’?

Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)
Israeli forces fire artillery from their position on the border with Lebanon after a barrage of rockets were fired from Lebanon, Friday, Aug. 6, 2021. (AP)

In July 2001 Hezbollah struck the position of an Israeli radar. The move was an act of retaliation to Tel Aviv’s attack on a Syrian military radar in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley region. That attack was, in turn, a response to Hezbollah’s shelling of positions in the disputed Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms region.

Twenty years later, the Iran-backed party struck an open area in the Shebaa Farms and Israel retaliated with artillery fire. The attacks were a sign of their commitment to the “rules of engagement” in place since 2006 after testing how much they can be changed and after southern Lebanon has become tied to the “shadow war” playing out between Israel and Iran on land and at sea.

How has the “southern front” become more connected to Tehran than to Damascus? What do the Shebaa Farms have to do with the Golan Heights? Is there a connection between the escalation in Syria’s Daraa and the test in southern Lebanon?

After he became prime minister in 2001, Israel’s Arial Sharon attempted to change the “rules of the game” in Lebanon. He retaliated to Hezbollah attacks by ordering raids on Syrian forces in Lebanon – a first since 1982. Previously, such attacks were limited to Lebanese targets.

At the time, Damascus was in control and averted any direct confrontation with Israel. That role was relegated to Hezbollah. All sides, therefore, conveyed messages through the Shebaa Farms that acted as a form of “mailbox” after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. The new rules were: An Israeli radar in return for a Syrian one, with Hezbollah executing the order.

Several developments have since taken place in Lebanon, Syria and the region that have altered this equation:

One: After the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, Damascus declared that Shebaa was Lebanese territory occupied by Israel. The United Nations, however, says that it is in fact Syrian territory that has been occupied since 1967. Then Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa informed then UN chief Kofi Annan that Syria views the territory as Lebanese, granting Hezbollah free reign to “resist” Israeli occupation.

Two: The death of Syrian president Hafez Assad in June 2000 and his son Bashar’s assuming of power changed the equation between Damascus and Hezbollah. When paying his respects at Hafez’s grave in al-Qardaha in 2001, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah vowed to “liberate the Shebaa Farms.”

Three: The Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005. The assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005 prompted the withdrawal. Ahead of the pullout, Hezbollah staged a “loyalty to Syria” march. Soon after, the party would begin to hold greater sway in Lebanon, while Iran’s influence in the region would outmatch Syria’s and its traditional allies.

Four: Syria and Israel, through American mediation, were on the verge of signing of a peace deal in late February 2011, just days before the eruption of the Syrian protests. American mediator Frederic Hof had drafted the deal that would include Damascus severing “military ties” with Iran and Hezbollah and “neutralizing” any threat to Israel. In return, Syria would reclaim the Golan Heights according to the June 4, 1967 border.

At the time, Hof recalled that Bashar had informed him that the Shebaa Farms were Syrian territory, not Lebanese. Bashar falsely predicted that Lebanon would soon follow in striking peace with Israel should Syria make a similar deal. Such a move would have inevitably impacted Iran and Hezbollah’s influence.

Five: The eruption of anti-regime protests in Syria in March 2011 gave way to Hezbollah and Iran’s eventual intervention in the country to defend their ally in Damascus. They would later reinforce their military presence in various Syrian regions, especially the south. The Golan Heights would become “tied” to other Iranian “fronts” in the Middle East.

Six: Russia intervened militarily in Syrian in September 2015 to support the regime and help it reclaim territory after it was on the brink of collapse. Syria was therefore, turned into a Russian base and starting point for its expansion in the Middle East. Moscow would sponsor various deals and settlements, including one in mid-2018 that called for Iran and its allies to pull out from the South and the area bordering the Golan.

Seven: Israel would soon begin carrying out raids against Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria in an attempt to impose “red lines” that include preventing Iran from establishing military bases, preventing the delivery of precision missiles to Hezbollah and preventing Tehran and the party’s military entrenchment in the Golan. The United States in turn entrenched itself in the al-Tanf base on the border between Syria, Jordan and Iraq in an attempt to block the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut route. In 2020, Israel announced that it had carried out over 50 air strikes against Syrian targets and fired over 500 projectiles and rockets.

Eight: Syria transformed into a “mailbox” between Iran and Israel after the assassination of Jihad Mughnieh, the son of prominent Hezbollah operative Imad. Jihad was killed by an Israeli strike on the Golan Heights in early 2015. The ensuing escalation was “limited and agreed” to be restricted to the Shebaa Farms in line with the “rules of the game” that had been in place after the July 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

In February 2018, Syrian air defenses shot down an Israeli F-16 jet in retaliation to Israeli strikes that were prompted by an Iranian drone’s breach of Israeli airspace. Tel Aviv responded by carrying raids against Syrian and Iranian positions. That was the first time that Israel and Iran directly confronted each other since the 1979 Iranian revolution. It also marked the widest Israeli attack against Syrian forces since Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Golan had by now become one of the arenas where retaliations can play out. At the time, an Iranian Mahan Air jet flew over the al-Tanf base to test the American response. An American F-15 flew very close to the Iranian aircraft and shots were fired from Syria Quneitra towards the Golan, prompting Israeli helicopter fire.

Nine: For the first time, Russia began to detail Israeli strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria. At the same time, reports said Damascus had received a new anti-aircraft defense system that would protect Syria against Israeli strikes. Simultaneously, Russia was exerting efforts to meet its commitments in the deal on southern Syria, specifically in Daraa, amid complaints from Jordan, Israel and the US over Iranian attempts to advance in the area.

Ten: Iranian sources confirmed the July 29 drone attack on an Israeli tanker in the Gulf of Oman that left a Briton and Romanian dead. This marked the first escalation of its kind between Israel and Iran. The drone attack was retaliation to Israeli raids in June on central Syria that killed senior members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hezbollah.

Those attacks were followed up last week with rocket fire from southern Lebanon on northern Israel, not the Shebaa Farms nor the Golan. Israel consequently fired back with air strikes, not artillery fire, on Lebanon – the first such attacks since 2006.

The two sides would soon, however, return to limiting their retaliatory attacks to Shebaa – the old mailbox. This time around, the messages were being exchanged between Tel Aviv and Tehran that are waging both a “shadow” and direct war. As it stands, new Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett is unhappy with the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear deal, while Iran’s new President Ebrahim Raisi is keen on burnishing his credentials on the Arab “fronts”.



The Border Zone with Lebanon: A Refuge for Syrians Fearing ‘Change’

The Jdeidet Yabous Syrian border crossing, where images of Assad and his father appear to have been defaced (Asharq Al-Awsat).
The Jdeidet Yabous Syrian border crossing, where images of Assad and his father appear to have been defaced (Asharq Al-Awsat).
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The Border Zone with Lebanon: A Refuge for Syrians Fearing ‘Change’

The Jdeidet Yabous Syrian border crossing, where images of Assad and his father appear to have been defaced (Asharq Al-Awsat).
The Jdeidet Yabous Syrian border crossing, where images of Assad and his father appear to have been defaced (Asharq Al-Awsat).

The road from Beirut to Damascus is now lined with unfamiliar scenes. In just a few days, everything has changed for those traveling to the Syrian capital by land from Lebanon. Once an economic lifeline for Damascus, the route bustled with visitors—Syrians and Lebanese alike—and large trucks carried goods from Beirut’s port to Syria, a necessity brought on by international sanctions that have forced the country to rely on this corridor.

The journey to Damascus via Lebanon begins at the Masnaa border crossing, which, during the early days of Syria’s upheaval, saw unprecedented traffic heading into Syria. While outbound traffic has returned to normal—or even declined—inbound activity has surged again. Hundreds of Syrian families line up at the border, hoping for “humanitarian exceptions” to enter Lebanon. However, the influx has clogged the route for everyone, even those eligible for entry. For days, the road was virtually impassable until Lebanese authorities intervened to reopen it. Still, complaints from Syrians about alleged abuses at the border prompted General Security chief Major General Elias al-Baysari to launch an investigation into these violations, followed by measures to reduce the number of entries to just a few hundred.

Some Syrians leave after being denied entry, only for others to arrive, clinging to the hope that Lebanon might eventually open its doors. Entry is now restricted to those with valid residency, travelers transiting through Beirut’s airport, or individuals with official documentation.

Families wait in cars, with children and women inside while men gather around fires outside. Ayman, a man in his fifties from rural Damascus, anxiously waits for permission to cross after being denied entry by the checkpoint. He mentions receiving a promise that his case will be reviewed. “We are in danger. I won’t take my children back to die,” he says, refusing to elaborate on the exact threat. Determined, he vows to remain in the deserted zone indefinitely if necessary.

Despite no reports of targeted violence against former regime supporters or religious minorities—especially Shiites—fear remains pervasive. Bilal, a Syrian from the predominantly Shiite town of Zahraa near Aleppo, recounts how a relative was killed and claims that his name is on a wanted list. “I’ll never go back,” he says firmly.

The scene repeats itself just past the first opposition-held checkpoint, opposite the abandoned Syrian passport office. Crossing is straightforward and no longer requires ID for Lebanese citizens, unlike in the past. A friendly greeting and a wave from the armed guards suffice, often accompanied by a smile and “Welcome!” This is a stark contrast to the past, when multiple military checkpoints, infamous for soliciting bribes in the form of bread, cigarettes, or cash, made travel cumbersome.

Now, entering and exiting Syria via land is remarkably easy—no paperwork, no questions, and no inspections.

Near a victory arch along the road, adorned with images of deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his late father Hafez, stands a young man. His old car is parked nearby, with his wife and three children—all under ten years old—waiting inside. Hesitantly, he approaches a Lebanese traveler, asking whether he can enter Lebanon without the “yellow card” once issued by Syrian authorities for outgoing vehicles. Syrian border guards had turned him away, warning that Lebanese authorities might confiscate his car.

The man, from the Shiite-majority village of Foua near Idlib, is determined to reach Lebanon. “I’ve arranged for work with someone there, and I need to leave as soon as possible,” he explains nervously. Though he insists no one has harmed him, his unease is evident as he prepares to leave.

The Assads’ towering portraits remain intact, likely due to their height, while those at ground level have been torn down or trampled. Military checkpoints have been vandalized or destroyed.

Abandoned vehicles litter the roadside, some still smoldering, while others have been stripped of all valuables—tires, parts, and accessories. Military vehicles, tanks, and armored carriers, some still loaded with ammunition, lie deserted along the route from the border to Damascus. These remnants tell the story of a collapsed regime and an uncertain future.

Scattered among the wreckage are vehicles destroyed by Israeli missile strikes targeting Syrian air defense systems, including anti-aircraft launchers mounted on military trucks.

The stretch of abandoned military hardware extends from the Syrian border to the outskirts of Damascus. These vehicles were once meant to defend the capital but now lie powerless, deserted by soldiers who left their uniforms discarded along the roadside as they fled. The old Syrian flag lies tattered and forgotten in multiple locations, untouched—neither reclaimed nor mourned.