Syria…Small Details of Big Disappointments

 Vehicles queue for petrol at a gas station in Damascus, Syria, February 19, 2017. Picture taken February 19, 2017. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki
Vehicles queue for petrol at a gas station in Damascus, Syria, February 19, 2017. Picture taken February 19, 2017. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki
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Syria…Small Details of Big Disappointments

 Vehicles queue for petrol at a gas station in Damascus, Syria, February 19, 2017. Picture taken February 19, 2017. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki
Vehicles queue for petrol at a gas station in Damascus, Syria, February 19, 2017. Picture taken February 19, 2017. REUTERS/Omar Sanadiki

Three small Syrian details, in Damascus, Daraa, and As-Suwayda, are linked by a thread that leads to major conclusions. With the beginning of the second decade of the Syrian tragedy, the local “players” started to adapt to live under collapses and ruptures, for many years, backed by the external “stakeholders”, who are competing to shape the new Syrian fabric.

The details of Damascus are the darkness, the “ice queues” and the talk of migration. For the first time in a hundred years, the Syrian capital sleeps in complete darkness. Electricity is available for two out of 24 hours, in the richest Damascene neighborhoods, which are inhabited by the traditional high officials and the war’s “nouveaux riches”.

If the rise in food prices, the lack of fuel, and the queues for bread and gasoline are not something new, Damascus streets are seeing people waiting in long lines for cold cubes that protect against heat and preserve food.

The bet was on a radical government change that puts at the top of its priorities addressing daily problems and offering solutions or attempts to solve issues related to corruption and administrative stagnation. However, the government lineup disappointed the audience and fell short of touching daily concerns.

There are no immediate breakthroughs in the daily search of gas cylinders and bread, nor solutions to the energy crisis and the exchange rate of the lira, nor political progress in the country, which is torn by three or four spheres of influence.

What is also new in Damascus is the open talk about migration. Before, people used to speak quietly about it, while now they loudly declare their wish in the streets, and in front of guests. It is not surprising that a Syrian human rights organization announced that the people residing in the country advised Syrians abroad not to return.

However, the people of Daraa al-Balad were surprised by a desire from Damascus for a military return to its neighborhoods, which opponents considered the “cradle of the revolution” a decade ago.

Behind this desire lies a thread that extends beyond Daraa and its neighborhoods. Damascus, backed by Tehran, wants to return to the borders of Jordan and the line of disengagement in the occupied Golan, as part of Iranian efforts to establish “strategic fronts” in southern Syria, southern Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza... and others.

Moscow, for its part, has other calculations. It is still looking for local arrangements in agreement with its ally in Daraa, Ahmed Al-Awda. Those arrangements may be sufficient for the return of “state control” and the preservation of the Russian-American-Jordanian agreement concluded in the south in 2018, and which guarantees the elimination of terrorism and the exit of Iran’s factions, in exchange for the return of the government and the presence of a local authority.

Moscow is betting that such arrangements would give appetite for Arab countries for “normalization” and support the Russian model in Syria and reconstruction plans.

Russia succeeded in postponing a military resolution in southwestern Syria, but it was not able to abolish it, as happened in its northwest with its understanding with Ankara, and in its northeast through its agreement with Washington.

The Daraa diaries are marked with clashes, assassinations, sieges, negotiations, and the swaying between a new settlement and another incursion. Amid this situation, a political party suddenly emerged in Jabal Al-Arab in As-Suwayda, supported by an armed faction, whose members are Druze, in uniform, and well-trained.

This political party is the Syrian Brigade Party, and its armed wing is the Anti-Terrorism Force, which includes about 2,500 fighters, with attractive salaries for each element and leader.

The two organizations, which were formed over the last month, share unified rhetoric.

The first is “an independent military force with its leadership, and its affiliates, all of whom are from As-Suwayda Governorate, aiming to fill the security vacuum in the area.”

The second is a political party that was established “in cooperation with international and regional sides, to realize a dream – that is the revival of As-Suwayda’s historical political role after “the collapse of state institutions and the inability to secure bread, medicine, electricity and water and all the necessities of life, in light of an irremediable corrupt system.”

As-Suwayda’s diaries are about kidnappings, control centers and youth recruitment, and the struggle over drug and hashish smuggling lines to neighboring countries. It is a struggle related to building spheres of influence, but also pertains to the seizure of financial resources and the competition between the war “nouveaux-riches.”

Other details contribute to the interpretation of these diaries, such as the agreement of Turkish and Russian soldiers to exchange water for electricity in the east of the Euphrates, and the two parties’ understanding to allow a Turkish company to provide electricity in Idlib.

Are the four threads of Syria still intertwine in its capital, Damascus? A question with an answer that will disappoint and shock many Syrians at home and abroad.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.