One of the Daraa Children Who Sparked Syria Revolt Recounts to Asharq Al-Awsat His Journey of the Past 10 Years

Mouawiya Syasneh. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Mouawiya Syasneh. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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One of the Daraa Children Who Sparked Syria Revolt Recounts to Asharq Al-Awsat His Journey of the Past 10 Years

Mouawiya Syasneh. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Mouawiya Syasneh. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

“I have no regrets and I am ready to do it again,” declared Mouawiya Syasneh, one of the children whose anti-regime graffiti in Daraa ten years ago sparked popular protests against Damascus’ iron-fisted rule.

Daraa is now known as the cradle of the revolution that has evolved into a brutal conflict pitting the opposition against the regime.

“I would do it again twice and thrice if it means not living under a regime that has not spared a single means of killing and destruction against our people,” Mouawiya told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Mouawiya was forced to quit Daraa, but his departure paved the way for a new phase of struggle against the regime. He was among the second batch of people who were displaced from Daraa through a Russia-sponsored agreement on Daraa al-Balad. He has found a new home in Aleppo.

Beginnings
With the eruption of the so-called Arab Spring revolts across the Arab world a decade ago, people were pinned to the television screens to watch the rapid developments.

In early 2011, protests swept Daraa when regime forces arrested 20 children, who were no older than 15, for spray-painting anti-regime graffiti on a local school wall.

Mouawiya was among the detainees.

“We were just children back then. The most we dreamed of was playing and staying up late,” he recalled. “We avidly watched the developments in the Arab world. Our parents doubted whether such revolts could be taken up by the Syrians against a regime that controls the country through its security agencies and military.”

He recalled how he and several of his friends impulsively wrote the graffiti on the school wall at around 3:00 am in mid-February. “Your turn is up, doctor,” read one, in reference to president Bashar al-Assad. Another read “freedom” and “down with the regime”.

“We quickly fled the scene,” he added. “The next day people, including the school principal, were dumbstruck by what they saw. It was incredible.”

Soon after, security agency and police vehicles descended on the school to investigate. “Eventually, informants pointed the fingers at us and the security agencies soon raided our homes.” Mouawiya said six of his friends were detained, while he remained in hiding for three days.

Once he believed that the situation was calm, he ventured home at around 4 am to find political security agents waiting for him. He was beaten and verbally abused. He was taken to the police station where he was severely tortured and beaten.

Terror and torture
Mouawiya recalled the “hellish and terrorizing” conditions of his arrest and torture. “I was held by the political security agency for around a week in Daraa. I was tortured for four hours a day during which I was investigated through intimidation and threats.”

Their questions focused on the sides that had encouraged the children to write the graffiti. Soon after, Mouawiya was transferred to the political security branch in Sweida and then the Palestine branch in Damascus. There, he said he encountered several children from Daraa who were also accused of writing anti-regime graffiti on the walls of other school and government buildings.

More torture was in store. “After 20 days, we felt that we would die at the underground facility. Then, one day, the security forces eased their torture and changed the way they treated us,” said Mouawiya. The children were informed that Assad had issued an amnesty for them.

“This is a generous gesture from him and you must respect and appreciate it by cooperating with us later and inform the security agency of any person who tries to undermine the state security or encourage protests,” the children were informed by a senior official at the station.

“In other words, they wanted us to work as informants,” continued Mouawiya.

He and the other children were released after some 40 days in detention. Back in Daraa, they were forced to sign a pledge that they would no longer engage in anti-regime acts.

“We were back, but were surprised to witness the heavy military and security deployment at the entrances of the city,” he added. “We were also surprised to see our families gathered at the Omari square as they waited our arrival. It turned out that a major revolutionary movement was underway in the city and its countryside in wake of our arrest.”

Taking up arms
“I was a child at the time and was not aware of the rapid developments related to the revolt that were taking place in Daraa and the province as a whole,” remarked Mouawiya.

The regime soon started to bring in reinforcements and militias to contain the situation. It attempted to storm and strike Daraa al-Balad. It failed in controlling an inch of the city.

In September 2013, military developments were rapidly taking place and the revolutionaries were liberating several military positions from the regime. They managed to liberate areas close to Jordan and the regime started to retaliate with heavy shelling and rocket fire.

“My father was killed in such an attack as he was heading out for dawn prayers,” recalled Mouawiya. “I was 18 at the time and decided to take up arms and join the Free Syrian Army.” He would consequently take part in several battles against the regime and its militias.

In 2018, Daraa came under a total siege by the regime and Russian forces and Iranian militias in an attempt to recapture the city and neighboring villages. Negotiations between local committees and the warring parties led to a ceasefire and an agreement that Daraa city would not be stormed.

The situation would hold until July of this year when the regime again attempted to capture Daraa. Negotiations have again started between the concerned parties, with Russia acting as mediator. The regime is insisting that the remaining revolutionaries quit the regime.

“I opted for the difficult choice of displacement to opposition areas in the north to avert violence against my loved ones,” Mouawiya said.

“I will continue my revolutionary journey here in the north in the hopes of one day going home that we were forced to quit victoriously,” he added. “I am proud to be one of the youths who were a main spark of the Syrian revolt against the regime that has not spared any method to kill our loved ones.”

“A decade later, I am now 26 years old. I will teach my children how to resist the regime until it collapses and until freedom and dignity prevail.”



Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
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Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)

Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, arrived in Baghdad last Tuesday aboard a private jet. He was greeted by a security detail typically assigned by the government to former heads of state, a scene that would have been unimaginable for an Iraqi politician who faced widespread persecution for two years.

A political faction had wanted al-Kadhimi to leave Baghdad after a drone strike targeted his home in November 2021. He formally left the capital in late 2022 after a broad alliance, including political parties, judicial and governmental institutions, and activists, united to force him out of the public arena and effectively push him into exile.

The first image of al-Kadhimi, shaking hands with a security officer near his home in the Green Zone, offers a powerful snapshot of the changes unfolding in Iraq today. It also hints at the future of the country amidst a Middle East in the midst of unprecedented turmoil.

There are growing speculations surrounding the circumstances of al-Kadhimi’s return, with close associates suggesting it followed a “special invitation” to assist the Coordination Framework alliance in tackling an emerging crisis ahead of a potential second term for Donald Trump.

Critics of both the Framework and al-Kadhimi view this as further evidence of his knack for “saving the deep state.”

Did al-Kadhimi return to aid those who stripped him of the opportunity to remain secure in the public sphere, or is he seeking to help himself and his political agenda at a “golden moment”?

A newly appointed advisor to al-Kadhimi said: “The region is undergoing dangerous transformations that will affect Iraq, and all politicians must contribute to mitigating these risks.”

Meanwhile, politicians within the Coordination Framework commented: “Something will happen within the next two months... something for which the current Framework structure has no antidote.”

This answer offers little clarity about what transpired since the fall of 2022 and how the Coordination Framework and its media apparatus relentlessly targeted al-Kadhimi’s government. Now, he returns, with the political system pinning its hopes on him at a critical juncture.

“Recharging Phones”

Before al-Kadhimi’s return, signs emerged suggesting Baghdad had lost its ability to connect with key US decision-making circles, and to some extent, with its immediate regional surroundings.

Since the Democrats left their posts at the US State Department, the government of Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani has struggled to find a single Republican willing to answer the phone.

Reports indicate that a team assigned to revive communications with the Trump administration failed to establish a reliable channel, aside from ceremonial meetings with individuals uninterested in Iraq’s concerns.

The “loss of connection,” a term used by three senior figures in the government and one of the ruling parties, was underscored on November 13, when Sudani attended the Munich Security Conference without securing any meeting with an American official present at the event.

This communication breakdown coincided with a series of “unfriendly” US messages, frequently relayed by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson and US Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Adam Boehler.

Iraqi politicians suggest that the “deep state” sees al-Kadhimi as “the man capable of recharging the dead phones,” and potentially rescuing both al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework.

“No one knows if he’s willing to provide this service for free, or if he’ll offer it at any cost,” said a politician who opposed al-Kadhimi during his tenure as prime minister.

The Nightmare of Sanctions

The prospect of a second term for Trump brings a team that holds little affection for leaders in the Coordination Framework, ministers in the government, and officials in the judiciary.

Among them is the new National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, who has consistently seized opportunities to attack Baghdad, accusing it of “surrendering itself to Tehran.”

In Baghdad, there is a strong belief that the Republican team will not hesitate to act on Iraq once it finishes with Gaza and the war in Ukraine. The least that comes to the minds of Iraqi politicians, many of whom are disliked by Waltz, is that they will one day find their names on a sanctions list.

“Why not try al-Kadhimi’s formula, which gave Washington the confidence of a balance between it and the Iranians?” say many in Shiite parties, anxious about what lies ahead. Their list of speculations starts with sanctions on influential Shiites and ends with the potential for Trump to block the dollar.

Does al-Kadhimi possess these exceptional abilities that would make him a "steel dome," as some politicians in Baghdad envision him, now dreaming of discovering a way to protect them from a possible American storm?

“A Known Figure”

How did the Iraqi government end up in a political deadlock? Prominent politicians in the Coordination Framework offer explanations, often converging on the Syrian file. Iraq struggled to understand the new regional political philosophy and faced difficulties in shifting away from the rules of “Al-Aqsa Flood” to the post-Assad era.

“Since Trump doesn't think much about Iraq,” says David Schenker, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Washington will not engage in healthy relations with Iraq unless it aligns sufficiently with the changes in its surrounding environment.

Even among circles close to the religious establishment in Najaf, views are emerging that reflect an understanding of Iraq’s lost political position—one that sees the regime as a vital part of the Arab movement on regional issues.

Interestingly, this is all happening without any response from Tehran.

“Not because it has abandoned the Iraqi file, or is unable to influence it,” says a source familiar with the discussions surrounding al-Kadhimi’s return.

The source adds that “Tehran needs to revive Baghdad, which is reaching a dead end in foreign policy and losing vitality in its dealings with the region and the West,” though it remains unclear whether al-Kadhimi’s return is linked to this climate.

Despite a generally positive view of al-Kadhimi's tenure, many criticize al-Sudani for his delayed efforts to adapt to the region’s tumultuous changes. It was difficult to remain in the same place while a seismic shift occurred in Syria and a storm raged in Lebanon.

What role does al-Kadhimi play? Most likely, he seized the “golden opportunity.”

He sees himself as the person capable of quickly adapting to a changing Middle East, with a solid communication channel to the Arab world and experience in balancing regional dynamics.

Iraqi politicians argue that Trump’s era and the new Middle East will impose a new political equation in Baghdad, one that demands a person who can be a “reliable partner” in Arab decision-making circles to be recognized by the Americans.

For this reason, al-Kadhimi has secured his return ticket to the competitive arena—this time, not with slogans of “resistance,” but with a focus on integration into the new order.

Liberal Shiites

Al-Kadhimi’s return was preceded by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s announcement of a new alliance, and by the activities of Adnan al-Zurfi, a former candidate for the premiership whose nomination was opposed by armed factions.

Together, these elements form a growing context for the search for liberal Shiites offering a fresh alternative.

Those who favor this scenario and promote it as “the only solution” argue that Syria, under Ahmed al-Sharaa, Lebanon under Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, are missing Iraq—a country led by liberal Shiites who know how to balance relations between Washington and Tehran without tipping the scale.

Al-Kadhimi found his way back to Baghdad after the alliance that had relentlessly targeted him crumbled.

The Coordination Framework is no longer the same as it was in 2022. Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law coalition, is searching for ways to rein in al-Sudani, while the armed factions are working hard to carve out new positions that free them from the burden of “uniting the arenas.”

Meanwhile, Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, is experimenting with silence—a stance he typically avoids, especially in an election year.

Al-Kadhimi senses that all of these figures now welcome his presence in Baghdad.

They seek from him a “good reputation” for Iraq—one that does not require drastic changes to align with the new dynamics in Syria and Lebanon. The question remains: will he offer this service for free?