Divided, Besieged Syria Presents ‘Conditions’ for Normalization

Soldiers near the Syrian and Russian flags in Daraa, Syria (Reuters)
Soldiers near the Syrian and Russian flags in Daraa, Syria (Reuters)
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Divided, Besieged Syria Presents ‘Conditions’ for Normalization

Soldiers near the Syrian and Russian flags in Daraa, Syria (Reuters)
Soldiers near the Syrian and Russian flags in Daraa, Syria (Reuters)

Damascus wants to and is trying to impose its conditions.

Despite Syria being divided into three main spheres of influence with five different armies operating, Damascus believes it can submit normalization requests. This feeling ran even higher after the “Afghan slap.”

Problems and crises have not changed and may have even increased, exacerbated, and deepened. But Damascus believes that it is in a “stronger negotiating position,” and that time is in its favor so long that Washington has abandoned its principles of “nation-building” and “regime change.”

For Damascus, Moscow’s support makes it believe it is capable of objecting. Whenever the Syrian capital is in doubt, Russia lends a helping hand.

Examples corroborating that analogy are ample, especially when reviewing the course of developments over the last few days. Damascus had hesitated in receiving UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen ever since the start of 2021. But what started with strong rejection was mellowed out by a Russian intervention that got Damascus to say yes to Pedersen’s visit.

Pedersen is scheduled to meet with Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad on Saturday.

This visit, for Damascus, comes post regime forces entering the governorate of Daraa. Ten years ago, the southwestern governorate and its capital of the same name were the cradle for Syria’s uprising.

Keen to return to the area through peace or war, Damascus claims that “the conspiracy started in Daraa and that it is where it should be buried.” Syrian rebels, however, believe that their revolution had sprung out of Daraa and that it will not be quelled to the regime’s content.

Moscow doesn’t mind pacing its work according to Damascus’ timing and wishes. It even sent the deputy Russian defense minister to confirm that the regime and its allies would enter Daraa either under truce or by force.

Nevertheless, Damascus is oblivious to the enigmas behind why Russia is in a rush to enter Daraa. For Moscow, how fast it closes in on capturing Daraa is tied to three key dates.

The first date is marked by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Yair Lapid, to prepare for Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s visit to Moscow in October.

In a foreign ministry statement that preceded Lapid’s arrival, Moscow openly expressed its desire to prevent Syria from becoming a theater for military confrontation between other states, stressing that such wars threaten to spill over across the whole region.

In other words, Moscow does not want Israeli airstrikes in Syria to evolve to a full-fledged military battle between Damascus and Tel Aviv or between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

The second date involves a meeting of the Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Lebanese oil ministers in Amman to discuss the transfer of Egyptian gas to Lebanon via Syria.

Washington had agreed to this and that the Biden administration even approved a Jordanian request to waive any penalties pertaining to the Caesar Act.

Regarding this process, Damascus put in place several conditions.

The first of these conditions was resuming political visits to Syria, and this is what happened with the arrival of a Lebanese ministerial delegation for the first time since 2011. The second was holding an Arab ministerial meeting with the participation of Syria in Amman.

The third and final condition was an implicit acknowledgment of accepting the regime’s official return to Daraa’s provincial capital, where tens of kilometers of gas pipelines need repairing and security is required to control Jordan’s borders.

As for the third key date, it anticipates the Syrian-US dialogue. It has already been agreed that the White House National Security Council's Middle East policy coordinator, Brett McGurk, will meet with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin and the Kremlin’s special envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev in Geneva on September 14 and 15.

So far, the Russia-West dispute in Syria remains on the premise of “whoever blinks first loses.”
A few days ago, in a closed session, Lavrov told European officials that they needed to help rebuild Syria and talk to President Bashar al-Assad there. Still, they insisted that the regime needs to change its behavior first.

The reality of the situation is that while the Syrians are waiting on the embers of ruin for foreign players to make their move, Russia continues to advance its own conditions and undermine Western references and policies.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
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What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.