Taher Al-Masry’s Memoirs: Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement Angered Hafez al-Assad

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from the memoirs of former Jordanian Prime Minister Taher Al-Masry, for which he chose the title, “Al-Haqiqa Baydaa (The Truth is White), reveals information and events in Jordan’s political history since 1973 and his clash with those in power.

Taher Al-Masry, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, was known for his adherence to a comprehensive national identity, and formed a bridge in the relationship between the two countries.

He was appointed minister in 1973, then an ambassador to major capitals, and he later assumed the position of minister of foreign affairs in the 1980s. He was elected deputy in parliament in 1989. Al-Masry was appointed prime minister in 1991 and parliament speaker in 1993. He assumed the presidency of the Senate in 2009.

Asharq Al-Awsat chose excerpts from his book, which presented a detailed account of the opportunity to rebuild the relationship between late King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yasser Arafat in 1984.

He touched on the efforts to formulate a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, with Arab support, that would pave the way for an international peace conference.

During that period, in which he was minister of foreign affairs, Al-Masry explains the historical framework of the agreement, and its failure for reasons related to differences within the organization. He talks about the Jordanian decision to dismantle the legal and administrative link with the West Bank after the Algiers summit in 1988, a move that Al-Masry opposed, warning against harming the unity between the two brotherly peoples.

Al-Masry recounts: “When Ahmed Obeidat was assigned to form the cabinet in January 1984, to succeed Mudar Badran’s government, King Hussein’s politically flexible and far-reaching vision was looking for opportunities to improve the country’s situation and prepare for the challenges posed by regional circumstances. […] I would like to point out here that the King’s vision is based on the fact that Jordan and Palestine are the countries that are more concerned with solving the Palestinian issue, and if harmony, coordination or agreement is achieved between them, it will facilitate the unification of an Arab position towards the negotiations.”

“At that time, the convening of the 17th Palestinian National Council conference in Amman was a first and preliminary step for what would happen next, and I think that Ahmed Obeidat did not value the importance of that picture. The exit of the PLO from Beirut in 1982 was of paramount importance to Jordan, especially with the ‘displacement’ of PLO leader Yasser Arafat among the Arab capitals. His instability generated bitterness for the Palestinian leadership, and affected the morale of the Palestinians. King Hussein saw the opportunity to save Yasser Arafat, who was in dire need of convening the Palestinian National Council in order to organize the affairs of the organization, and confirm its legitimacy and presence on the Palestinian political and national scene.”

Al-Masry said Arafat agreed without hesitation, which angered Syria. Hafez al-Assad tried to prevent the convening of the council by making threats and offering incentives.

Nonetheless, the conference was held in Amman from Nov. 22-29, 1984, in the presence of the Jordanian monarch at the opening session.

In parallel, Syria was rallying its ground forces on the northern Jordanian border, threatening military action against the country.

According to Al-Masry’s memoirs, King Hussein began to take new steps towards a Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, which he was convinced was the cornerstone for reaching the international conference. He relied on King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s project calling for the settlement of the Palestinian issue, which was announced during the second Fez Summit.

“King Hussein was keen on informing Saudi Arabia of his first steps regarding the agreement. Marwan al-Qasim was in charge of communicating with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal. […] King Hussein’s goal behind obtaining Saudi Arabia’s clear and public support for this agreement was to strengthen the Jordanian and Palestinian positions, and for King Fahd to persuade the administration of President Ronald Reagan of the new Jordanian strategy.

“After the convening of the Palestinian National Council and King Hussein’s success in this important step, the features of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement began to crystallize, but involved several disagreements before reaching its final form. Arafat put his initials on it on Feb. 11, 1985, claiming that he wanted to seek the opinion of the Palestinian leadership. He left for Kuwait and did not return to Amman.”

According to Al-Masry, the text of the agreement, before its amendment, included five clauses:

1- Land for peace, as stated in United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions;

2- The right of self-determination for the Palestinian people;

3- Solving the Palestinian refugee problem according to United Nations resolutions;

4- Solving the Palestinian issue in all its aspects;

5- On this basis, peace negotiations take place in the light of an international conference, attended by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint (Jordanian-Palestinian) delegation.

“An agreement was reached on that day (Feb. 11, 1985) on the text and content, and Prince Saud Al-Faisal was contacted and informed of its details. […] News circulated about differences within the Palestinian leadership over some of the wording in the text. Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) supported the agreement, while Farouk Qaddoumi was against it. A few weeks after the signing ceremony, influential Palestinian leaders announced their rejection of the agreement.”

Consequently, Al-Masry said Arafat dispatched three people from the leadership: Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Mahmoud Abbas, and Abdul Razzaq Al-Yahya, to discuss the agreement with the Jordanias. As a result, two clauses were amended.

Al-Masry recalled how Syria strongly opposed and denounced the agreement. Damascus believed that it transferred the Palestinian “card” from Syria’s hands to Jordan’s, and that Amman wanted to “kidnap” the PLO to become supportive of its policies, to thus seek negotiations with the United States and Israel to permanently distance itself from Damascus, which could weaken Syria’s negotiating position.

On the international level, the Soviet Union was also opposed to this agreement. According to Al-Masry, Moscow believed that Jordan was exploiting the difficult Palestinian circumstances that followed the organization’s exit from Beirut in 1982 and its repercussions, “to encourage Yasser Arafat to transfer the rifle from the shoulder of the Soviet Union and the socialist system to the shoulder of the United States.”

Moscow’s analysis prompted it to declare war on the agreement. The battle erupted inside the PLO Executive Committee, which witnessed stormy quarrels between supporters and opponents. Fahd al-Qawasmi paid his life for that.

“King Hussein and the palace officials dealt with the PLO to reach the Jordanian-Palestinian arrangement, and at that time I was more involved in this file than Ahmed Obeidat, but I kept him informed of the developments, as I was the only participant from the Council of Ministers in the relevant discussions,” said Al-Masry.

“After the resignation of the Obeidat government, we completed our duty with the government of Zaid Al-Rifai in promoting the Jordanian-Palestinian understanding. We went with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to Algeria, then Rome, Paris and London.”

The Jordanian diplomat continued: “I carried royal messages about the goals of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement to the Arab Gulf states, and asked them to support it and understand its reasons, so I went to Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, southern and northern Yemen, and the UAE.”

Negotiations between Iran and the United States over Tehran's rapidly advancing nuclear program will move Wednesday to what's known as the “expert level” — a sign analysts say shows that the talks are moving forward rapidly.

However, experts not involved in the talks who spoke with The Associated Press warn that this doesn't necessarily signal a deal is imminent. Instead, it means that the talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff haven't broken down at what likely is the top-level trade — Tehran limiting its atomic program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.

“Agreeing to technical talks suggests both sides are expressing pragmatic, realistic objectives for the negotiations and want to explore the details,” said Kelsey Davenport, the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association who long has studied Iran's nuclear program.

“If Witkoff was making maximalist demands during his talks with Araghchi, such as dismantlement of the enrichment program, Iran would have no incentive to meet at the technical level.”

That technical level, however, remains filled with possible landmines. Just how much enrichment by Iran would be comfortable for the United States? What about Tehran's ballistic missile program, which US President Donald Trump first cited in pulling America unilaterally out of the accord in 2018? Which sanctions could be lifted and which would be remain in place on Tehran?

“The most important determinant of expert talks’ value lies in whether there is a political commitment to do something and experts just need to figure out what,” said Richard Nephew, an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who worked on Iran sanctions while at the US State Department during negotiations over what became the 2015 nuclear deal.

“If the experts also have to discuss big concepts, without political agreement, it can just result in spun wheels.”

Experts and the 2015 nuclear deal

The 2015 nuclear deal saw senior experts involved in both sides of the deal. For the US under President Barack Obama, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz reached an understanding working with Ali Akbar Salehi, then the leader of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Both men's technical background proved key to nailing down the specifics of the deal.

Under the 2015 agreement, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only to 3.67% purity and keep a stockpile of only 300 kilograms (661 pounds). Today, Iran enriches some uranium up to 60% purity — a short, technical step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%. The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency put Iran's overall uranium stockpile in February at 8,294.4 kilograms (18,286 pounds).

The deal also limited the types of centrifuges Iran could spin, further slowing Tehran's ability to rush for a bomb, if it chose to do so. It also set out the provisions of how and when sanctions would be lifted, as well as time limits for the accord itself.

Reaching limits, relief and timelines require the knowledge of experts, analysts say.

“A nonproliferation agreement is meaningless if it cannot be effectively implemented and verified,” Davenport said. “The United States needs a strong technical team to negotiate the detailed restrictions and intrusive monitoring that will be necessary to ensure any move by Iran toward nuclear weapons is quickly detected and there is sufficient time to respond.”

It remains unclear who the two sides will be sending for those negotiations.

Hiccups already heard in these negotiations

Both the Americans and the Iranians have been tightlipped over exactly what's been discussed so far, though both sides have expressed optimism about the pace. However, there has been one noticeable dispute stemming from comments Witkoff made in a television interview, suggesting Tehran could be able to enrich up to 3.67% purity. However, analysts noted that was the level set by the 2015 deal under Obama.

Witkoff hours later issued a statement suggesting that comparison struck a nerve: “A deal with Iran will only be completed if it is a Trump deal.”

“Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment and weaponization program,” Witkoff added.

Araghchi responded by warning that Iran must be able to enrich.

"The core issue of enrichment itself is not negotiable,” he said.

Despite that, experts who spoke to the AP said they remained positive about the talks' trajectory so far.

“Although still early stages, I’m encouraged so far,” said Alan Eyre, a former US diplomat once involved in past nuclear negotiations with Tehran. “The pace of negotiations — to include starting expert level meetings this Wednesday — is good.”

He added that so far, there didn't appear to be any “mutually exclusive red lines” for the talks as well — signaling there likely wasn't immediately any roadblocks to reaching a deal.

Nephew similarly described reaching the expert level as a “positive sign.” However, he cautioned that the hard work potentially was just beginning for the negotiations.

“They imply the need to get into real details, to discuss concepts that senior (officials) might not understand and to answer questions. I also think too much can be read into them starting,” Nephew said. “Expert talks can sometimes be a fudge for seniors to avoid working on tough issues — ‘let’s have experts discuss it while we move on to other things’ — or to sidestep big political decisions."

Corey Hinderstein, the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former US government nuclear expert, described herself as feeling “cautious optimism” over the expert talks beginning.

“Heads of delegation are responsible for setting strategic goals and defining success,” she said. “But if there is a deal to be made, the technical experts are the ones who will get it done.”

Taher Al-Masry’s Memoirs: Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement Angered Hafez al-Assad