Syria’s Idlib Poses New Test to Putin, Erdogan

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during their meeting in Ankara, Turkey September 16, 2019. (Reuters)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during their meeting in Ankara, Turkey September 16, 2019. (Reuters)
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Syria’s Idlib Poses New Test to Putin, Erdogan

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during their meeting in Ankara, Turkey September 16, 2019. (Reuters)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands during their meeting in Ankara, Turkey September 16, 2019. (Reuters)

The fate of Syria’s Idlib, or at least part of it, hinges on the summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi on September 29. The summit is taking place shortly after a summit between Putin and Syrian President Bashar Assad in Moscow and talks between Russian and American envoys last week.

Idlib is caught between contradictory demands and delicate balances of power.

Assad had initially succumbed to the Kremlin’s demand to maintain the current borders of zones of influence in Idlib, in place after a summit between Putin and Erdogan in March. He has now changed his tune, and is again pushing for the regime’s return to the northwestern province, which is the last opposition-held pocket in the country.

Damascus believes the time is right to capture the province, given its geopolitical reading of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fact that Syria and the Middle East are not high on Joe Biden’s list of priorities. This has allowed greater room for regional initiatives. Damascus is also seeking to exploit Turkey’s current position that it perceives as being under pressure.

The Damascus regime has already exploited the abovementioned conditions by returning to the southern Daraa province, the “cradle of the revolution”. The regime has also received a boost from Jordan, whose monarch King Abdullah II has received backing for his proposals on restoring stability in southern Syria through combating terrorism and drugs smuggling. Amman was also party to the agreement on extending gas pipelines from Egypt to Lebanon that cross through Jordan and Syria.

Moreover, the recent dialogue in Geneva between the Russian and American envoys has revealed how low Syria has dropped on Washington’s list of priorities. Biden’s Syria team is solely concerned with offering humanitarian aid, preserving stability, securing a ceasefire and preventing the resurgence of ISIS.

In contrast, the former American administration believed that Idlib - even though it is held by the extremist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group - was a card that could be used to pressure Damascus and Moscow. Biden’s team sees little difference between the HTS and other extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. It believes that fighting these groups should be a priority after the Afghanistan pullout and has shifted its focus on fighting terror in Syria and Iraq. The latest American strike on the Idlib countryside and the assassination of a leading al-Qaeda member, who was unnamed, could be seen as a sign of this new shift in priorities.

Putin and Damascus see eye-to-eye over several issues in Syria. He believes that the deployment of foreign forces is a “main obstacle” in restoring the country’s sovereignty and kicking off reconstruction. He too has warned of “pockets of terrorism”. Putin has tested Russia’s influence by extending its control in the South and now, he is trying to test whether he can extend it to the North in Idlib, which explains why Moscow has intensified its air strikes there.

It has so far targeted a faction that is allied to Ankara, as well as cities and regions that it had never struck before. Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently said that Turkey has not met it commitments in Idlib in line with an agreement reached last year.

Putin is therefore keen on using the Idlib and Europe-bound migrant cards to pressure Erdogan ahead of their meeting on Wednesday. Damascus, meanwhile, wants to implement the same deal it recently struck in Daraa in the North.

The agreement, reached between regional forces at the expense of Syrian parties, allowed Russia to reap greater influence in the country, while the US took a step back. It also adopted a somewhat lenient approach towards the opposition and, in a way, added to the 2018 deal that was already in place in the South.

However, there’s a major difference between the South and North: Turkey.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar responded to Lavrov’s statements by claiming that Moscow was the one that had reneged on its commitments in Idlib. In contrast to Amman’s welcoming of “the Syrian government and Syrian Arab Army” to Daraa and reception of Syrian ministers, Ankara wants Moscow to prevent the return of the “regime and its militias” to Idlib.

Russia believes that Turkey has not met its pledges in northwestern Syria: it has not reopened the Aleppo-Latakia highway, set up safe zones on either side of it and deployed joint patrols there; and it has not fought terrorist groups and differentiated between them and the moderate ones.

On the other end, Ankara believes that Moscow has not met its commitments in two areas: it has not stopped its air strikes and shelling on Idlib and prevented a new wave of refugees from the area that is home to 4 million people; and it has not evacuated regime forces from points that were agreed upon.

Relations between Turkey and Russia go far beyond Idlib. Cooperation between them is ongoing east of the Euphrates River in spite of the rising tensions over Idlib.

Given the above complexities, officials have dug up an old proposal over Idlib that includes “exchanging” the area south of the Aleppo-Latakia highway with the Tall Rifaat area in the Aleppo countryside. In other words, paving the way for the return of government forces to the area south of the international highway in Idlib.

Opening the highway would in turn pave the way for reconstructions in the area. Moscow would meanwhile, give Ankara the green light to advance its allied factions to weaken the US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Aleppo.

Another factor in the equation is Iraq’s attempts to arrange a meeting between Turkish intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, and Syrian national security chief Ali Mamlouk. Hakan wants to “fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its affiliates” east of the Euphrates, while Mamlouk wants to achieve a “breakthrough” in regards to the Turkish “occupation” in Idlib.

The second old proposal dug up by officials and placed on the Putin-Erdogan summit table is related to the Constitutional Committee. Russia and Turkey believe it to be the most important “achievement” of the Astana process they are party to with Iran. Putin and Erdogan may have their differences over Idlib, but they are in agreement over the breakthrough by United Nations envoy Geir Pedersen.

The breakthrough saw the government and opposition agree to a UN mechanism to kick off daily meetings between the heads of the government and opposition delegations to the committee when they meet in Geneva next month. They would work on drafting the principles of the constitution during the sixth round of committee talks.



As It Attacks Iran's Nuclear Program, Israel Maintains Ambiguity about Its Own

FILE - This file image made from a video aired Friday, Jan. 7, 2005, by Israeli television station Channel 10, shows what the television station claims is Israel's nuclear facility in the southern Israeli town of Dimona, the first detailed video of the site ever shown to the public. (Channel 10 via AP, File)
FILE - This file image made from a video aired Friday, Jan. 7, 2005, by Israeli television station Channel 10, shows what the television station claims is Israel's nuclear facility in the southern Israeli town of Dimona, the first detailed video of the site ever shown to the public. (Channel 10 via AP, File)
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As It Attacks Iran's Nuclear Program, Israel Maintains Ambiguity about Its Own

FILE - This file image made from a video aired Friday, Jan. 7, 2005, by Israeli television station Channel 10, shows what the television station claims is Israel's nuclear facility in the southern Israeli town of Dimona, the first detailed video of the site ever shown to the public. (Channel 10 via AP, File)
FILE - This file image made from a video aired Friday, Jan. 7, 2005, by Israeli television station Channel 10, shows what the television station claims is Israel's nuclear facility in the southern Israeli town of Dimona, the first detailed video of the site ever shown to the public. (Channel 10 via AP, File)

Israel says it is determined to destroy Iran’s nuclear program because its archenemy's furtive efforts to build an atomic weapon are a threat to its existence.

What’s not-so-secret is that for decades Israel has been believed to be the Middle East’s only nation with nuclear weapons, even though its leaders have refused to confirm or deny their existence, The Associated Press said.

Israel's ambiguity has enabled it to bolster its deterrence against Iran and other enemies, experts say, without triggering a regional nuclear arms race or inviting preemptive attacks.

Israel is one of just five countries that aren’t party to a global nuclear nonproliferation treaty. That relieves it of international pressure to disarm, or even to allow inspectors to scrutinize its facilities.

Critics in Iran and elsewhere have accused Western countries of hypocrisy for keeping strict tabs on Iran's nuclear program — which its leaders insist is only for peaceful purposes — while effectively giving Israel's suspected arsenal a free pass.

On Sunday, the US military struck three nuclear sites in Iran, inserting itself into Israel’s effort to destroy Iran’s program.

Here's a closer look at Israel's nuclear program:

A history of nuclear ambiguity Israel opened its Negev Nuclear Research Center in the remote desert city of Dimona in 1958, under the country's first leader, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. He believed the tiny fledgling country surrounded by hostile neighbors needed nuclear deterrence as an extra measure of security. Some historians say they were meant to be used only in case of emergency, as a last resort.

After it opened, Israel kept the work at Dimona hidden for a decade, telling United States’ officials it was a textile factory, according to a 2022 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, an academic journal.

Relying on plutonium produced at Dimona, Israel has had the ability to fire nuclear warheads since the early 1970s, according to that article, co-authored by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a researcher at the same organization.

Israel's policy of ambiguity suffered a major setback in 1986, when Dimona’s activities were exposed by a former technician at the site, Mordechai Vanunu. He provided photographs and descriptions of the reactor to The Sunday Times of London.

Vanunu served 18 years in prison for treason, and is not allowed to meet with foreigners or leave the country.

ISRAEL POSSESSES DOZENS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, EXPERTS SAY

Experts estimate Israel has between 80 and 200 nuclear warheads, although they say the lower end of that range is more likely.

Israel also has stockpiled as much as 1,110 kilograms (2,425 pounds) of plutonium, potentially enough to make 277 nuclear weapons, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a global security organization. It has six submarines believed to be capable of launching nuclear cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles believed to be capable of launching a nuclear warhead up to 6,500 kilometers (4,000 miles), the organization says.

Germany has supplied all of the submarines to Israel, which are docked in the northern city of Haifa, according to the article by Kristensen and Korda.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST POSE RISKS

In the Middle East, where conflicts abound, governments are often unstable, and regional alliances are often shifting, nuclear proliferation is particularly dangerous, said Or Rabinowitz, a scholar at Jerusalem's Hebrew University and a visiting associate professor at Stanford University.

“When nuclear armed states are at war, the world always takes notice because we don’t like it when nuclear arsenals ... are available for decision makers,” she said.

Rabinowitz says Israel's military leaders could consider deploying a nuclear weapon if they found themselves facing an extreme threat, such as a weapon of mass destruction being used against them.

Three countries other than Israel have refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan and South Sudan. North Korea has withdrawn. Iran has signed the treaty, but it was censured last week, shortly before Israel launched its operation, by the UN's nuclear watchdog — a day before Israel attacked — for violating its obligations.

Israel's policy of ambiguity has helped it evade greater scrutiny, said Susie Snyder at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, a group that works to promote adherence to the UN treaty.

Its policy has also shined a light on the failure of Western countries to rein in nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, she said.

They “prefer not to be reminded of their own complicity,” she said.