Washington Won’t Normalize Ties with Damascus, Won’t Prevent Others from Doing So

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, speaks at a joint news conference at the State Department in Washington, US, October 13, 2021. (Reuters)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, speaks at a joint news conference at the State Department in Washington, US, October 13, 2021. (Reuters)
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Washington Won’t Normalize Ties with Damascus, Won’t Prevent Others from Doing So

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, speaks at a joint news conference at the State Department in Washington, US, October 13, 2021. (Reuters)
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accompanied by UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, speaks at a joint news conference at the State Department in Washington, US, October 13, 2021. (Reuters)

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent remarks on Syria have been the clearest American position on the war-torn country. They were clear for what they openly declared and did not, which is probably the most important.

At a press briefing alongside his counterparts from the United Arab Emirates and Israel in Washington, Blinken said on Wednesday that the American priority in Syria lies in “expanding humanitarian access for people who desperately need that assistance, and we had some success, as you know, with renewing the critical corridor in northwestern Syria to do that.”

The other priority lies in “sustaining the campaign that we have with the coalition against ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria,” he said.

The third is “making clear our commitment, our ongoing commitment to demand accountability from the [Bashar] Assad regime and the preservation of basic international norms like promoting human rights and nonproliferation through the imposition of targeted sanctions; and sustaining local ceasefires, which are in place in different parts of the country,” stated Blinken.

“As we’re moving forward, in the time ahead, keeping violence down; increasing humanitarian assistance and focusing our military efforts on any terrorist groups that pose a threat to us or to our partners, with the intent and capacity to do that. These are going to be the critical areas of focus for us, and they’re also, I think, important to advancing a broader political settlement to the Syrian conflict consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254,” he added.

In reality, however, the gap between these statements and the developments on the ground is vast. True, the resolution to extend cross border aid was passed in July, but a meeting between American and Russian officials in Geneva revealed that Moscow was still committed to its stance. Russia has said that extending the resolution next year hinges on a report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Moscow’s satisfaction with the progress in providing assistance for the “early recovery” in Syria related to reconstruction and the delivery of aid across zones of influence.

Moreover, the gap between statements and the situation on the ground also apply to maintaining the ceasefire. True, the ceasefire has held along the frontlines for 18 months, but air strikes, clashes and provocations are ongoing, whether by Russia in northern Syria or Israel throughout the country.

Notably, Blinken made his statements weeks after Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Moscow and ahead of Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s visit to the Russian capital next week. The PM is expected to receive reassurances from Russian President Vladimir Putin that Israel has “free reign” to crack down on Iran and Syria without harming the Russian army.

Blinken made his remarks of a “ceasefire” amid ongoing raids, clashes and drone strikes on northeastern Syria. The US continues to threaten to impose sanctions on Turkey and the Biden administration extended the national emergency executive order in Syria that was first issued in 2019 in wake of Ankara’s incursion against Kurdish forces. The administration has also assured its Kurdish alliances in Syria that US forces will remain deployed in regions east of the Euphrates in wake of the chaotic American withdrawal from Afghanistan. The situation in Kurdish regions and near the border has so far, held, but Turkey has in recent days signaled it was ready for a military escalation to put an end to perceived threats from Syria.

More doubts have been cast over America’s statements and its actions. While Blinken spoke about pushing for a “broader political settlement”, the official has yet since his appointment to meet with UN special envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen even though he has had opportunities to do so in Rome, New York and Washington. It is as if he were saying that the Syrian file is not important. So, it came as no surprise that Blinken failed to mention in his remarks on Wednesday the meeting of the Syrian Constitutional Committee in Geneva on Monday.

Blinken was also expected to declare Washington’s stance from Arab attempts to normalize ties with Damascus. He said: “What we have not done and what we do not intend to do is to express any support for efforts to normalize relations or rehabilitate Mr. Assad, or lifted a single sanction on Syria or changed our position to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible progress toward a political solution, which we believe is necessary and vital.”

Significantly, Blinken made his statements after meeting with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and months after Jordan’s King Abdullah II had visited the US. No doubt, Amman and Abu Dhabi are very eager for rapprochement with Damascus. So, it was notable that Blinken said the US does not intend to express support for efforts to normalize ties with the regime. This stands in contrast to the former Trump administration, whereby the Biden administration will declare its position and principles, but it won’t wage a diplomatic and political campaign to discourage its allies or sanction those who veer off its stances.

This hands-off approach could be blamed on several factors, one of which is Washington’s exhaustion from the Middle East in general, and the significant resistance the Biden policy over Syria is witnessing in American institutions.

This was demonstrated when two members of Congress’ Foreign Relations Committee openly opposed Arab normalization with Damascus and demanded that Washington prevent it. Two prominent members of the committee also contacted Arab countries to warn them against rushing to normalize relations as the US heads towards midterm elections in which the Republics are tipped to make gains.



ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.