Who Attacked Al-Tanf In Syria, Why?

Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)
Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)
TT
20

Who Attacked Al-Tanf In Syria, Why?

Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)
Syrian opposition fighters train with Americans at Al-Tanf base (Maghawir Al-Thawra Brigade)

In mid-2017, US forces launched raids on armed factions close to the Al-Tanf garrison in the Syrian desert. The attacks drew a red line and defined the rules of engagement between Washington and its allies on the one hand and Moscow and its partners on the other.

The question today is “what has changed?” to lead up to US forces and ally Syrian opposition factions getting attacked by drones on Wednesday evening.

Four years ago, US and Russian contacts agreed on a memorandum of understanding that prevented the two countries’ armies from colliding in Syria. According to the agreement, the Euphrates River would serve as a divider separating Russian and US forces.

East of the Euphrates, Manbij and its neighboring Aleppo countryside, and Al-Tanf would be marked as Washington’s territory, while west of the Euphrates and two security blocs in al-Hasakah and Qamishli would be left for Moscow and its allies.

The deal stood the test of time, especially as the US-led Coalition staged attacks against ISIS and Russia targeted opposition factions.

By the end of 2019, some field changes east of the Euphrates had resulted in then US President Donald Trump pulling US forces away from Syria’s borders with Turkey, leaving room for Ankara to wiggle its way into Tal al-Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.

This gave rise to new agreements between Washington and Ankara and between Russia and Ankara. These agreements aimed to coordinate complex military deployments at hand and prevent patrols and air forces from clashing under the new status quo.

With the start of 2020 and the US taking out Iran’s Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, Syrian-Iraqi borders transformed into an arena for US-Iranian clashes and message exchange.

More so, Israel continued to pound Iranian sites near the borders to cut off the Tehran- Al Bukamal- Damascus – Beirut route conjured up by Iranian forces as an alternative for the Tehran- Baghdad – al-Tanf – Damascus-Beirut route blocked by US forces at Al-Tanf.

Iranians had been operating a military base at the border city of Al Bukamal.

What’s New Today?

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the agreement to roll back US combat forces deployed in Iraq, pressure has been building up against US presence in Syria.

Factions aligned with Tehran, have more than once, hit US bases in the war-torn country. Turkish drones targeted Kurdish leaders in the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). At the same time, each of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria stepped up political campaigns against the “illegitimate” presence of US forces in Syria.

In contrast, Washington sought, through secret contacts and visits, to reassure Kurds and allies in Syria.

Nevertheless, it became widely believed that US presence in Syria is not open-ended.

Despite the many and immense disputes between Moscow, Damascus, and Tehran on the one side and Ankara on the other, the four players come together over the need to pressure the US and Kurds east of the Euphrates.

Another factor in the equation is played by developments in the Israeli-Russian relationship. Since the first day of Naftali Bennett becoming Israel’s prime minister, Russian President Vladimir Putin raised the stakes involved in any airstrike against Syria.

The Russian-operated Khmeimim airbase has been openly publishing the details of how Syrian air defenses have been using Russian missiles to confront attacks. This has reduced Israel’s attack margins in Syria.

Bennett tried to inherit Netanyahu’s leverages with Putin. He wanted the same “free pass” Netanyahu had for bombing sites in Syria if they did not involve Syrians or Russians.
The new Israeli prime minister dispatched Foreign Minister Yair Lapid to restore the “military coordination mechanism” between Moscow and Tel Aviv.

Before every Syria summit with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Putin used to step up raids near Turkish-held positions in the Levantine country. Similarly, the recent escalation against the US’ Al-Tanf base came just before Bennett’s arrival to the resort city of Sochi to meet with Putin and discuss Syria and Iran’s presence there.

Prior to Bennett’s visit, Russia had prepared “rhetorical ammunition” to put pressure on Israel.

Khmeimim airbase published details of the latest Israeli bombing on the 14th of October with a focus on Al-Tanf.

According to the Russian airbase in Syria, an “Iranian base” at the T-4 airbase in Homs was attacked by “Israeli F-16 tactical fighters that entered Syria’s airspace through the US-controlled Al-Tanf area.”

It is widely believed that Al-Tanf provides logistical support for Israeli raids.

Therefore, Moscow has sought several times to dismantle the US-operated base.

Former US officials had tabled the possibility of dismantling Al-Tanf in negotiations with Russia, but they quickly took back this option in response to Israel’s demands. Even when Trump talked about withdrawing from Syria, it was clear that this would not include Al-Tanf.

With all that being said, it still doesn’t mean that Al-Tanf’s bombing was staged by Russia.

Major Russia-led changes have been happening in southern Syria. These changes included settlements that extended from west to north of the Daraa governorate. These agreements have rolled their way east, near Al-Tanf’s land borders, that has come to be known as the “55 km area.”

These “Russian settlements” are achieved through a public understanding with Jordan and a hidden one with Israel in the hope of reducing Iranian influence in the south.
It was remarkable that hours after targeting Al-Tanf, the Jordanian army announced the downing of a drone used in an attempt to smuggle drugs from Syria.

Although Putin and Bennet will be discussing what happened at Al-Tanf, two key players remain absent from the summit: Iran and the US.

Therefore, once again, Putin finds himself involved in searching for a recipe that balances antagonistic parties and competing interests.



US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
TT
20

US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)

Syrians have lived under the shadow of US sanctions for 46 years, spanning generations who know no other reality. These sanctions have become woven into every aspect of daily life, from banking and international aviation to construction and food supplies. Their burden has fallen hardest on ordinary people, rather than on the symbols of the ousted Assad regime.

While lifting sanctions now would undoubtedly unlock planning and reconstruction efforts, political and security concerns persist, and Syria’s dilapidated infrastructure may impede private-sector investment.

Most importantly, we must ask whether US President Donald Trump’s move to begin lifting sanctions was as improvised as his 2018 announcement to withdraw militarily from Syria, or whether it marks a pivotal shift in US foreign policy toward Syria.

On May 13, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This triggered a period of confusion and internal reviews before his administration outlined an initial mechanism that balanced implementing his announcement with addressing his advisors’ worries over unfettered engagement with the new Syrian leadership.

Before assessing this current phase of easing sanctions, we need a historical overview of them, their context, underlying rationale, implementation methods, and what their potential impact might be for Syria and its people. Sanctions on Syria can be divided into three eras: under Hafez al-Assad, under his son Bashar, and now under interim President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Shift toward Iran (1979–2000)

US sanctions on Syria began in 1979, following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the rise of Iran’s revolution. With the end of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Damascus, Hafez al-Assad viewed Iran’s emerging regime as a counterweight to Iraq and Israel.

Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 due to its role in Lebanon and its support for fighters opposed to Israel. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on foreign aid, defense exports, and the transfer of dual‑use goods. In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan barred Syrian planes from landing in the US.

The Iraq War (2001–2010)

Sanctions entered a new phase as US policy shifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coinciding with Bashar al‑Assad’s arrival to power in July 2000. In his 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and North Korea the “Axis of Evil”, prompting Iran to form a “Resistance Axis” that included Syria and Hezbollah.

With these strains came stricter measures: the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act of 2003, enforced by OFAC at the US Treasury in 2004 under Executive Order 13338, targeted Syria’s role in Lebanon and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its opposition to the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On May 7, 2025, the Trump administration signed a notice extending the national emergency concerning Syria until May 7, 2026, encompassing executive orders from 2003 to 2012.

The Syrian uprising and Caesar Act

Following Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the US imposed a wave of sanctions targeting violence and human rights abuses. President Barack Obama’s April 29, 2011 executive order froze Assad regime assets, followed by an August 2011 ban on oil, asset freezes, and broad trade prohibitions, excluding food and medicine.

However, the defining moment came with the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, signed by Trump in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020. Targeting infrastructure, military maintenance, energy, and those funding the Assad regime, it also banned foreign investment in Syria’s reconstruction. This legislation aimed to check both Russian and Iranian influence and serve as leverage for negotiations with Moscow, permitting temporary waivers if productive talks occurred.

Though enacted long after the internal conflict began, the Act functioned less as a response to internal dynamics and more as an economic restraint on reconstruction efforts.

Al‑Sharaa after Assad

By late 2024, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen and Trump back in power, Syria had not been a US priority, with internal debate over how to engage the new al‑Sharaa administration. That shifted after Trump spoke with Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16, signaling alignment with Turkish‑Saudi policy against the hardline Israeli stance.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump began rolling back sanctions on Syria, but the fate of the Caesar Act remains uncertain, currently suspended in 180‑day increments, extendable. Although it was briefly lifted for humanitarian relief during the Feb 2023 Türkiye-Syria earthquakes and in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its full repeal remains on hold.

Mechanisms and challenges

Trump’s administration has implemented three key executive measures: Treasury’s “GL‑25” on May 23, enabling sweeping economic coverage; a 180‑day suspension of Caesar sanctions; and a specific waiver for the Commercial Bank of Syria via the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, allowing re‑establishment of correspondent banking relationships.

GL‑25 has no set expiry and can be revoked anytime, while Caesar waivers renew every six months. An earlier GL‑24 waiver, issued in January, allowed limited official and energy sector transactions and personal transfers, but US banks have remained cautious.

The permit covers four sectors: finance, oil‑gas, maritime shipping, and aviation. US persons remain barred from transactions that may benefit Russia, Iran, or North Korea, meaning rigorous due diligence is necessary. The original executive orders remain in force, although press reports suggest possible cancellations.

Procedurally, Syria remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as removal would require Congress to be notified by the US State Department. The Department of Commerce and State’s defense trade regulators have yet to remove export controls, which means that Syria still falls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations, necessitating export licenses for most goods, excluding basic food and medicine.

Furthermore, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham is still designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Even after al‑Sharaa met Trump, the Treasury’s waiver excludes HTS leader Abu Mohammed al‑Golani, al-Sharaa's former nom de guerre, who remains sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, supported by a likely Russian veto of any attempt to remove HTS from global blacklists. Arms embargoes and surveillance‑tech restrictions will also persist.

The Caesar Act itself was renewed by Congress in January 2025 for five years, lasting until January 2030 unless overturned legislatively and its suspension may be extended in November 2025. But these continue as temporary waivers, not full repeals.

US politics and Congressional dynamics

Legislative repeal would require Act passage in Congress. Ironically, Trump’s allies in this are Democrats, as many Republicans, especially senators, remain wary.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch remarked that Trump lifted sanctions a bit more than what was expected, but cautioned that the sanctions could come back. US energy firms, together with Syrian‑American groups, have lobbied Trump to ease sanctions, while pro‑Israel lobby AIPAC insists any relief must hinge on demonstrable positive behavior from the new Syrian government.

Impact on economy and society

In 2018, the UN estimated at least $250 billion would be required to rebuild Syria fully, far beyond what domestic resources can furnish.

Serious barriers remain: destroyed roads, hospitals, and power networks hinder basic services. Reviving industry needs massive investment; millions displaced internally or abroad need rehousing; food, fuel, medical gear, and decent jobs are in short supply.

Even a partial lifting marks a seismic shift: essential imports like food, medicine, and technology could flow more freely; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and roads becomes feasible; frozen international assets might be unfrozen, inviting foreign companies back to construction, energy, and trade.

The most immediate relief will come from reconnecting Syrian banks to global payment systems, especially SWIFT, dismantling the economic collapse born of widespread distrust. Yet Syria remains on the FATF grey list, deterring banks and obstructing liquidity, so regulatory frameworks must be built.

Future prospects

Ambitious domestic and regional projects have surfaced under al‑Sharaa, with some contracts bypassing competitive bids. The UAE has been granted an $800 million concession at the Port of Tartus, via a Dubai Ports World MoU, to develop multi-purpose terminals, industrial zones, dry ports, and logistics hubs.

Meanwhile, a 30‑year deal with French CMA CGM was signed to develop Latakia Port. China’s VDL company secured rights to 300,000 m² in the Adra Free Zone outside Damascus for 20 years to build industrial and commercial facilities with tax breaks, labor flexibility, and repatriable profits.

A Qatari-US-Turkish energy consortium plans a $7 billion, 5,000 MW power project.

All are seen as steps to lure foreign capital and reshape Syria’s foreign policy by leveraging international corporate interests.

Uncertain transition

The sanctions regime hinges on three pillars: Syria’s State Sponsor designation (since 1979), the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and the Caesar Act (2019). Only the first may soon shift, pending a State Department and Congressional review; the others remain entrenched.

While Syria will not likely see a flood of US investment tomorrow, the first visible presence would probably involve Turkish and Gulf investors, as the US must first verify the stability and reliability of the new Syrian leadership before enabling wider investors to return.

Damascus does not fully control its territory or armed factions, and fresh sanctions may target entities linked to coastal violence in recent months.

Thus, Caesar’s intent has transitioned from coercing the Assad regime to ensuring al‑Sharaa’s good behavior. But its six‑month renewals offer limited investor certainty, making regional neighbors the marginal beneficiaries.

Al‑Sharaa’s teams may aim to woo Trump with bold reconstruction plans akin to a Marshall Plan. But Trump isn’t easily swayed. He has yet to appoint an ambassador to Damascus; instead, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack was named envoy to Syria, indicating Syria remains an extension of Turkish policy.

Trump is unpredictable and could reverse course swiftly, but current signs still point to provisional waivers rather than a full repeal of sanctions.