Washington's Priorities in Syria Don't Include Iran's Withdrawal

US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)
US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)
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Washington's Priorities in Syria Don't Include Iran's Withdrawal

US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)
US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)

The administration of US President Joe Biden has set five priorities in Syria, none of which call for the withdrawal of Iran, in contrast to the previous administration of President Donald Trump.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, the priorities discussed by American officials behind closed doors are keeping troops deployed in northeastern Syria until the defeat of the ISIS group; providing cross-border aid; maintaining the ceasefire; supporting efforts to hold human rights violators to account and abandoning weapons of mass destruction; pushing forward a political settlement based on United Nations Security Council resolution 2254. Washington is also keen on supporting the stability of Syria's neighbors, including Jordan and Israel.

These priorities were outlined by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the sidelines of the conference for the international coalition to defeat ISIS in June. Biden's team is expected to reiterate them when the coalition holds a second meeting in Brussels next month.

Meanwhile, earlier this week Blinken declared during a press conference with his Qatari counterpart Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani in Washington that the US continues to oppose the normalization of ties with Damascus.

"I would simply urge all of our partners to remember the crimes that the [Bashar] Assad regime has committed and indeed continues to commit. We don’t support normalization, and again, we would emphasize to our friends and partners to consider the signals that they’re sending," he said.

Application of priorities
The priorities are the culmination of efforts by the Biden administration since he was sworn in as president some ten months.

US Central Command commander Kenneth McKenzie had paid a secret visit to northeastern Syria in wake of the chaotic American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to reassure Washington's Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that the US will continue to remain deployed in the region east of the Euphrates River.

The US has also exerted pressure on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against launching a new military operation along Turkey's border with Syria because it may distract from the fight against ISIS.

The overall impression is that American forces will remain in their positions until the end of Biden's term.

As for humanitarian files, Biden's Syria team has held dialogue with Russian President Vladimir's Putin's envoy to Syria to ensure that the relevant Security Council resolution on cross-border aid deliveries will be extended. Indeed, it was extended in July and US National Security Council’s coordinator for the Middle East, Brett McGurk, Russian deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin and the presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev met in Geneva this week to agree to extend it for another six months when it expires in early 2022.

On the diplomatic level, the Biden administration has continued to issue statements in support of a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria, the activation of the political process and carrying out constitutional reform in line with resolution 2254. Along with France and Britain, it has also encouraged the Syrian opposition to bring up rights violations committed by the regime.

In late July, the US Treasury issued a new list of sanctions against Syrian figures over human rights violations and ties to terrorism. Washington has also allowed exemptions from the Caesar Act that would allow the operation of the Arab Gas Pipeline from Egypt to Jordan to Syria and then to Lebanon. The exemption was granted on condition that Damascus would not benefit financially from the move or that the parties concerned would not deal with figures and entities that are on the sanctions list.

Iran... the elephant in the room
Apparently, the important elements in these priorities are issues that have not been mentioned, which are the goals that were set by the Trump administration.

Biden's team has yet to appoint an envoy to Syria like James Jeffrey and his predecessors. The file is still being mainly handled by McGurk, while the Defense and State Departments are no longer as involved in it as they were under Trump. It remains to be seen if this will still be the case when Barbara Leaf assumes her position in the State Department. Leaf is nominated as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

Moreover, the Biden team has not launched a diplomatic and political campaign with Arab countries to prevent them from normalizing ties with Damascus. American officials have so far informed Arab officials that the US does not encourage normalization and it will not take that step.

Furthermore, it believes that normalization should come at a price, significantly since the Caesar Act still stands.

"None of them have been told not to" speak with Assad by senior American officials, Jeffrey said this week. As a result, Arab leaders feel they have an implicit green light to strengthen ties with Assad’s regime.

This is not the only change. On the geopolitical level, there has been a significant shift in the declared stance on Iran's presence in Syria.

The Trump administration's Syria strategy was drafted by his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jeffrey and others. It prioritized the defeat of ISIS; support for the implementation of resolution 2254; Iran's withdrawal from Syria; prevent the regime from using weapons of mass destruction and ridding it of chemical arms; and providing the necessary humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of Syrians in Syria and abroad.

The former administration had also set conditions for normalizing ties with Assad: Ending support to terrorism; ending support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah; refraining from threatening neighboring countries; abandoning weapons of mass destruction; the voluntary return of refugees and the displaced; and holding war criminals to account.

The administration had resorted to isolating Damascus - in coordination with its Arab and European allies - to implement its priorities in Syria. It also kept American troops deployed east of the Euphrates and at the al-Tanf base. It prevented Damascus from benefiting from strategic resources and imposed economic sanctions and introduced the Caesar Act. It stood against Arab or European normalization with Assad and provided intelligence and logistic support to Israeli raids in Syria and to Turkey's deployment in northwestern regions.

McGurk's appears to have a different approach that the former administration. He believes that the American goals must be aligned with its tools and ability to use these tools, as well as how willing Moscow is to work with this pressure.

The Biden team has been keen on preventing the collapse of the Iran nuclear negotiations and has held back from taking escalatory steps against it in Syria.

In an article to Foreign Policy in 2019, McGurk said the Arab countries will resume cooperation with Damascus. Washington's opposition to such a move will force the Arabs to carry out diplomacy behind Washington's back, so the best approach is for the US to draft a realistic agenda with its Arab partners. This includes encouraging them to condition renewing relations with Assad in exchange for trust-building measures from the regime.

The Biden team is expected to present its goals in Syria to Washington's partners on the sidelines of next month's international anti-ISIS coalition conference.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.