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Washington's Priorities in Syria Don't Include Iran's Withdrawal

US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)
US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)
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Washington's Priorities in Syria Don't Include Iran's Withdrawal

US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)
US forces patrol Kurdish-controlled oil fields in northeast Syria, Oct. 28, 2019, (AP)

The administration of US President Joe Biden has set five priorities in Syria, none of which call for the withdrawal of Iran, in contrast to the previous administration of President Donald Trump.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, the priorities discussed by American officials behind closed doors are keeping troops deployed in northeastern Syria until the defeat of the ISIS group; providing cross-border aid; maintaining the ceasefire; supporting efforts to hold human rights violators to account and abandoning weapons of mass destruction; pushing forward a political settlement based on United Nations Security Council resolution 2254. Washington is also keen on supporting the stability of Syria's neighbors, including Jordan and Israel.

These priorities were outlined by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the sidelines of the conference for the international coalition to defeat ISIS in June. Biden's team is expected to reiterate them when the coalition holds a second meeting in Brussels next month.

Meanwhile, earlier this week Blinken declared during a press conference with his Qatari counterpart Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani in Washington that the US continues to oppose the normalization of ties with Damascus.

"I would simply urge all of our partners to remember the crimes that the [Bashar] Assad regime has committed and indeed continues to commit. We don’t support normalization, and again, we would emphasize to our friends and partners to consider the signals that they’re sending," he said.

Application of priorities
The priorities are the culmination of efforts by the Biden administration since he was sworn in as president some ten months.

US Central Command commander Kenneth McKenzie had paid a secret visit to northeastern Syria in wake of the chaotic American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to reassure Washington's Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that the US will continue to remain deployed in the region east of the Euphrates River.

The US has also exerted pressure on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against launching a new military operation along Turkey's border with Syria because it may distract from the fight against ISIS.

The overall impression is that American forces will remain in their positions until the end of Biden's term.

As for humanitarian files, Biden's Syria team has held dialogue with Russian President Vladimir's Putin's envoy to Syria to ensure that the relevant Security Council resolution on cross-border aid deliveries will be extended. Indeed, it was extended in July and US National Security Council’s coordinator for the Middle East, Brett McGurk, Russian deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin and the presidential envoy Alexander Lavrentiev met in Geneva this week to agree to extend it for another six months when it expires in early 2022.

On the diplomatic level, the Biden administration has continued to issue statements in support of a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria, the activation of the political process and carrying out constitutional reform in line with resolution 2254. Along with France and Britain, it has also encouraged the Syrian opposition to bring up rights violations committed by the regime.

In late July, the US Treasury issued a new list of sanctions against Syrian figures over human rights violations and ties to terrorism. Washington has also allowed exemptions from the Caesar Act that would allow the operation of the Arab Gas Pipeline from Egypt to Jordan to Syria and then to Lebanon. The exemption was granted on condition that Damascus would not benefit financially from the move or that the parties concerned would not deal with figures and entities that are on the sanctions list.

Iran... the elephant in the room
Apparently, the important elements in these priorities are issues that have not been mentioned, which are the goals that were set by the Trump administration.

Biden's team has yet to appoint an envoy to Syria like James Jeffrey and his predecessors. The file is still being mainly handled by McGurk, while the Defense and State Departments are no longer as involved in it as they were under Trump. It remains to be seen if this will still be the case when Barbara Leaf assumes her position in the State Department. Leaf is nominated as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs.

Moreover, the Biden team has not launched a diplomatic and political campaign with Arab countries to prevent them from normalizing ties with Damascus. American officials have so far informed Arab officials that the US does not encourage normalization and it will not take that step.

Furthermore, it believes that normalization should come at a price, significantly since the Caesar Act still stands.

"None of them have been told not to" speak with Assad by senior American officials, Jeffrey said this week. As a result, Arab leaders feel they have an implicit green light to strengthen ties with Assad’s regime.

This is not the only change. On the geopolitical level, there has been a significant shift in the declared stance on Iran's presence in Syria.

The Trump administration's Syria strategy was drafted by his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jeffrey and others. It prioritized the defeat of ISIS; support for the implementation of resolution 2254; Iran's withdrawal from Syria; prevent the regime from using weapons of mass destruction and ridding it of chemical arms; and providing the necessary humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of Syrians in Syria and abroad.

The former administration had also set conditions for normalizing ties with Assad: Ending support to terrorism; ending support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah; refraining from threatening neighboring countries; abandoning weapons of mass destruction; the voluntary return of refugees and the displaced; and holding war criminals to account.

The administration had resorted to isolating Damascus - in coordination with its Arab and European allies - to implement its priorities in Syria. It also kept American troops deployed east of the Euphrates and at the al-Tanf base. It prevented Damascus from benefiting from strategic resources and imposed economic sanctions and introduced the Caesar Act. It stood against Arab or European normalization with Assad and provided intelligence and logistic support to Israeli raids in Syria and to Turkey's deployment in northwestern regions.

McGurk's appears to have a different approach that the former administration. He believes that the American goals must be aligned with its tools and ability to use these tools, as well as how willing Moscow is to work with this pressure.

The Biden team has been keen on preventing the collapse of the Iran nuclear negotiations and has held back from taking escalatory steps against it in Syria.

In an article to Foreign Policy in 2019, McGurk said the Arab countries will resume cooperation with Damascus. Washington's opposition to such a move will force the Arabs to carry out diplomacy behind Washington's back, so the best approach is for the US to draft a realistic agenda with its Arab partners. This includes encouraging them to condition renewing relations with Assad in exchange for trust-building measures from the regime.

The Biden team is expected to present its goals in Syria to Washington's partners on the sidelines of next month's international anti-ISIS coalition conference.

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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.