The Consequences of ‘Normalization’ with Damascus

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)
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The Consequences of ‘Normalization’ with Damascus

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad receives the UAE Foreign Minister (SANA)

Key Arab countries are expected to take more steps towards the normalization of ties with Syria before re-admitting Damascus into the Arab League by a more significant political initiative next spring when the regional organization holds its scheduled summit in Algeria.

Attention is now directed towards the parties conducting the next steps in normalizing ties with Damascus.

This comes after the visit of UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed to Damascus and his meeting with President Bashar al-Assad last week, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad meeting with a number of his counterparts in New York two months ago, and the head of Syria’s main spy agency, the General Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Hossam Louka, participating at an intelligence forum in Cairo a few days ago.

In the past few days, a series of public and non-public meetings were held between Arab and foreign officials to discuss the Syrian crisis and to coordinate between the involved parties “so that normalization would not come for free.”

Several ideas were put on the table of main Arab countries.

As for these states, they have taken the “first step” with Damascus, and therefore are waiting for “reciprocal steps” on Syria’s part before the normalization train goes to its next stations.

Individual or collective Arab expectations relate to three levels:

The first level pertains to Syrian files, such as Damascus positively handling the political process and the meetings of the Constitutional Committee.

The seventh round of Committee meetings led by Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen is currently under consideration by the UN to be held on December 13. Talks will tackle the return of refugees, detainees, and displaced persons, and finally the implementation of Resolution 2254.

The second level revolves around geopolitical expectations regarding the Iranian presence in Syria, the Turkish incursion into its north, and the possibilities of opening channels between Tel Aviv and Damascus.

Demands are no longer focused on removing Iran completely from Syria.

Rather, expectations revolve around mitigating, redefining, or dissolving the Iranian role, in addition to lowering Syria’s provision of logistical-military-training support to Iran in other files related to Arab countries.

As for the third level, it concerns Damascus’ cooperation in the areas of combating terrorism and crime, controlling the borders with Jordan, and stopping drug smuggling to Arab countries, whether from Jordan’s borders or from Syrian and Lebanese ports.

It also concerns not having more refugees pouring into neighboring countries.

Washington has not prevented Arab countries from normalizing ties with Damascus. Instead, the US is asking these countries to obtain internal or geopolitical “Syrian concessions” while reminding them of sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

Washington, at the same time, informed European countries of the need to maintain the “three no’s”: No to financing the reconstruction of Syria, no to breaking isolation, and no to lifting sanctions before achieving progress in the political process according to UNSC resolution 2254.

Indeed, countries are still committed to their positions and have sanctioned new Syrian ministers.

However, a number of European countries began to ask questions about the future of European policies towards Syria, which are confused between three directions: the urgency of Arab countries to normalize ties with Damascus, and the great doubts, especially from France and Germany, about the feasibility of engaging with Russia, which increases pressure on Europe with the “weapon of refugees” in Belarus, and American advice about the need to commit to traditional policy with Syria.

Doses of Arab normalization renewed the call for the need of reaching an international-Arab formula for a “step-for-step” approach that defines what is required of Damascus and the incentives offered to it, but a collective understanding on this has not yet emerged.



Iran Opts for Dialogue with Europe ahead of Trump's Return to Office

President Donald Trump shows a signed Presidential Memorandum after delivering a statement on the Iran nuclear deal from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House, Tuesday, May 8, 2018, in Washington. (AP)
President Donald Trump shows a signed Presidential Memorandum after delivering a statement on the Iran nuclear deal from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House, Tuesday, May 8, 2018, in Washington. (AP)
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Iran Opts for Dialogue with Europe ahead of Trump's Return to Office

President Donald Trump shows a signed Presidential Memorandum after delivering a statement on the Iran nuclear deal from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House, Tuesday, May 8, 2018, in Washington. (AP)
President Donald Trump shows a signed Presidential Memorandum after delivering a statement on the Iran nuclear deal from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House, Tuesday, May 8, 2018, in Washington. (AP)

It is difficult to predict what the outcomes will be of the discussions between Iran, France, Britain and Germany about Tehran’s nuclear program in Geneva on Friday.

Last week, the UN atomic watchdog's 35-nation Board of Governors passed a resolution again ordering Iran to urgently improve cooperation with the agency and requesting a "comprehensive" report aimed at pressuring Iran into fresh nuclear talks.

Britain, France, Germany and the United States, which proposed the resolution, dismissed as insufficient and insincere a last-minute Iranian move to cap its stock of uranium that is close to weapons-grade. Diplomats said Iran's move was conditional on scrapping the resolution.

Iran has been weighing its response to the censure, debating whether to increase uranium enrichment or by being open to the proposals expected at the Geneva talks.

The discussions may seek a new nuclear deal instead of the 2015 one with Tehran that is in tatters.

As it stands, Iran is likely to opt for negotiations instead of escalation due to a number of internal, regional and international reasons.

Diplomatic sources in Paris noted US President-elect Donald Trump’s appointments of officials handling Middle East affairs, underscoring their unreserved support to Israel and clear hostility to Iran.

These appointments may lead Iran to think twice before resorting to any escalation.

Even before Trump has taken office, his circles have said that the new president will take “several executive decisions related to Iran and that will be declared on his first day in office.” The decisions will be binding and do not need Congress’ approval.

However, Trump is unpredictable and the sources did not rule out the surprise possibility of him striking a deal with Iran related to its nuclear program and behavior in the Middle East. This means that Tehran will have to make major concessions, including abandoning its policy of “exporting the revolution”.

This remains a far-fatched possibility, however. In all likelihood, Washington under Trump will return to his “maximum pressure” policy against Iran on political, diplomatic and economic levels to make it return to the negotiations table and agree on a deal that completely ends its nuclear ambitions.

So, at the Geneva meeting on Friday, Tehran will seek to achieve two main goals: a nuclear breakthrough during what remains of US President Joe Biden’s time in office, and attempt to lure the European powers away from Trump.

The truth is that Tehran is wading in the unknown. One only has to go back to Trump’s past statements about how Israel should have struck Iran’s nuclear facilities during its October 26 attack on the country.

Trump has already shown Iran his hardline stance when he ordered the assassination of Quds Forces leader Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Based on this, Tehran is scrambling to avert a joint American-Israeli strike that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been dreaming of.

Iran is vulnerable now due to two main reasons: the Israeli strike in October weakened Iran’s air defenses and Netanyahu has said that Israeli jets can now run rampant over Iran without any worries.

And Tehran can no longer rely on its allied militias to threaten Israel with all-out war. Hamas in Gaza is no longer in a position to threaten Israel and neither is Hezbollah in Lebanon.

So, Iran now finds itself exposed and would rather turn to negotiations with Europe than risk escalation that would cost it dearly with Israel now that it can no longer rely on Hamas and Hezbollah.