UN Security Council Extends Travel Exemption to Gaddafi’s Widow

Slain Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s widow, Safia Farkash.
Slain Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s widow, Safia Farkash.
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UN Security Council Extends Travel Exemption to Gaddafi’s Widow

Slain Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s widow, Safia Farkash.
Slain Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s widow, Safia Farkash.

The United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya decided to extend a travel exemption to slain Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s widow, Safia Farkash, for “humanitarian purposes.”

The decision, effective from December 1, 2021 through May 31, 2022, also includes Aisha Muammar Gaddafi and Mohammed Muammar Gaddafi.

Dr. Mustafa al-Fituri, who had attended the trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi at the International Criminal Court as an independent observer, said the Council’s decision to extend the period rather than lifting the restrictions permanently "has to do with the internal political situation.”

“Perhaps members of the UN Security Council believe that setting Gaddafi’s family members free may allow them to be involved politically,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He also assumed Farkash did not assign an advocate who communicates with the UN sanctions committee and insists on lifting these travel restrictions.

The Council issued a resolution on February 27, 2011, under which travel bans and asset freezing decisions were issued against Gaddafi, his family members and some of his aides.

However, it began to gradually lift restrictions on Gaddafi’s widow, and two of his sons, Aisha and Mohammed, for a period of six months, the last of which was from June to November 2021.

Farkash fled Libya after the outbreak of the revolution and sought refuge in Algeria, Oman and Cairo with her daughter, Aisha. Mohammed, Gaddafi’s son from his first wife Fathia, followed them, while his other son Hannibal is still held in Lebanon.

Under the humanitarian travel exemption granted, travel information shall be provided by the aforementioned individuals for information purposes of the Committee prior to and within one month after travel, as per the Provisional Guidelines of the Committee and the Committee’s Implementation Assistance Notice.

The Committee could consider extending or renewing the exemption, should circumstances warrant, and any future decision would take into account the level of information provided.

Many Libyan academics, journalists and jurists have previously called for launching an initiative of solidarity with Gaddafi’s widow.



Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
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Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)

As war rages between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran may soon need to call upon its network of regional allies - groups it has armed and funded for years. But now, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” looks strained, fragmented, and far from ready.

On June 19, 2025, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard urged Iran’s regional allies to take action to relieve mounting pressure on Tehran. At that point, Iran was entering its second week of heavy Israeli bombardment. Strategically, an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital once seemed unthinkable, but the regional terrain has since shifted. Iran’s supply routes are now disrupted, and its key proxy groups have either been neutralized or weakened.

According to The Times of Israel, Israel launched this war after nearly two years of systematically targeting Iran’s allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel had triggered a chain of retaliation that left many of Iran’s partners damaged or demoralized. With the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon, and Hamas reduced to guerrilla tactics in Gaza, few proxies appear ready for a new confrontation.

In Gaza, Hamas has been forced into small ambushes and urban warfare, its rocket arsenal depleted and many senior leaders killed. Iranian communication channels with the group have also eroded. Israel’s targeted assassination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander linked to Palestinian factions, further strained coordination. For now, Hamas can offer little more than rhetorical support.

In Iraq, US forces have fortified their embassy in Baghdad, while withdrawing from bases such as Ain al-Asad. Iraqi factions loyal to Iran are posturing, threatening US interests should America enter the war. But most Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to drag the country into open conflict, knowing the consequences could be disastrous. Iran, too, is cautious about sacrificing Iraq’s political and economic value.

Hezbollah, reeling from the death of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2024 Israeli strike, is in disarray. Its military capacity and leadership have been significantly degraded. Though the party retains some strategic capabilities, domestic and regional pressures have so far restrained it from opening a major front.

In Yemen, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s last viable card. They now play a key role in smuggling weapons and expanding Iranian influence into Africa. Should the US directly join Israel’s war, Tehran may finally authorize the Houthis to use their stockpile of ballistic missiles, signaling a decisive and potentially catastrophic new phase of the conflict.