عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Arab World

Washington Vows More Sanctions on Houthi Leaders

Houthi fighters ride on the back of a patrol truck as they secure the site of a pro-Houthi tribal gathering in a rural area near Sanaa, Yemen, on July 21, 2016. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
Houthi fighters ride on the back of a patrol truck as they secure the site of a pro-Houthi tribal gathering in a rural area near Sanaa, Yemen, on July 21, 2016. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
TT
TT

Washington Vows More Sanctions on Houthi Leaders

Houthi fighters ride on the back of a patrol truck as they secure the site of a pro-Houthi tribal gathering in a rural area near Sanaa, Yemen, on July 21, 2016. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
Houthi fighters ride on the back of a patrol truck as they secure the site of a pro-Houthi tribal gathering in a rural area near Sanaa, Yemen, on July 21, 2016. REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah

Washington has pledged to take the “necessary steps” and use all “appropriate tools” to hold Houthis responsible for the recent attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and their role in protracting the conflict in Yemen, described as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.

A sharp rhetoric is being resorted to in US statements as well as diplomatic moves made by US officials in the State Department and the White House. The US has also reiterated the importance of finding a solution for Yemen according to international references, especially UN Resolution 2216.

Regarding recent statements made by US President Joe Biden about redesignating Houthis as a terrorist organization, a US State Department official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the revision of such a decision is still ongoing against a backdrop of the deteriorating situation in Yemen and the failure to establish a ceasefire.

Although the official did not elaborate more on the review steps, he stressed that Washington “is committed to improving the humanitarian situation in Yemen.”

Speaking under the condition of anonymity, the official asserted that the US had not found a single positive role for Iran in Yemen.

If Iran wants to show that it can be a responsible actor, it must begin by ending its interference in the conflict in Yemen, “and from this standpoint, we have supported dialogue between it and the countries of the region in the interest of security and stability,” the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The US administration will continue to work with its partners in the region to stand against the “unfortunate Houthi attacks,” as well as continue to hold the Houthis responsible for their “heinous actions.”

As for diplomatic efforts, the official pointed to the efforts of US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking and said they help in building international consensus for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire and a political solution.

Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government had both announced their support for a ceasefire and the resumption of political talks.

Moreover, the official praised Oman in helping untangle the Yemeni crisis, describing it as a “decisive and proactive regional role.”

US State Department spokesman Ned Price said that the US administration is “taking a close look” at the appropriate response for the Houthi attacks.

“What we will continue to do, no question about it, is to stand with the UAE, stand with Saudi Arabia,” said Price.

Speaking at a press briefing, Price revealed that Washington will continue to work with its partners and allies to hold Houthis accountable.

“We will continue to hold the Houthis to account for these terrorist attacks. We will do that in different ways. We have used a number of tools already, and I suspect you will see us continue to do that in the days and weeks ahead,” he Price.

“We will not relent in designating Houthi leaders and entities involved in military offensives that are threatening civilians and regional stability, perpetuating the conflict, committing human rights abuses, or violating international humanitarian law, or exacerbating the very grave humanitarian crisis,” he added.

Commenting on the steps taken by the US administration, Norman Roule, a former official in the CIA and a current senior advisor to the “United Against Nuclear Iran” project, said that Washington had hoped to force the Houthis to return to negotiations for a peaceful solution in good faith.

However, the Houthi attacks and speeches indicate a “terrorist organization.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Roule pointed to Iran encouraging Houthis.

Because of this, the group has repeatedly refused diplomatic operations and attacked dozens of civilian targets in the hope of causing great human losses.

However, Roule believes that relisting Houthis as a terrorist group will not be easy.

According to the expert, there are people in the US administration who believe the redesignation will impede humanitarian operations and make a political settlement out of reach.

The Houthis have been more willing to consider a political settlement when they face military setbacks, and neither the Biden administration nor Europe is likely to support military action, “so I don’t think the administration will be able to do much in that regard,” said Roule.

He added that the US would continue to send Lenderking to find out whether political solutions are possible.

Answering a question about the link between nuclear talks in Vienna with Iran and Houthis, Roule explained that the Iranians have always separated nuclear talks from regional and missile issues.

“Perhaps Tehran’s attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not related to the talks. However, the size of the attack and the complex nature of weapons used by the Houthis likely require some degree of Iranian support, perhaps even being directly involved in the attacks,” said Roule.

He stressed that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are still very safe despite the recent attacks. This safety is due to the skill of the air defense units and security services, but the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks pose a threat to millions of expatriates living in these countries.

“This makes the Houthi attacks an attack on the international community no less than (Al-Qaeda’s) attacks in New York,” concluded Roule.

Most Viewed

 
 
Arab World

Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
TT
TT

Move to Repeal Syria’s Anti-Brotherhood Law Raises Questions over Group’s Political Return

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and several ministers attend a military parade in Damascus. (Syrian Defense Ministry)

Syrian lawmakers are gathering signatures to propose repealing a law that makes membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death, as the group signals it wants to return to politics after decades of prohibition.

The parallel moves have raised questions about whether Syria’s transitional authorities will allow the Brotherhood back into political life, and how much room they will give political parties.

Abdel Nasser Houshan, chairman of the People’s Assembly’s Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the proposal to repeal Law No. 49 of 1980 was still at the signature-gathering stage and had not been submitted to the assembly.

Under the assembly’s rules, 17 members must first approve the proposal before a bill can be drafted and submitted for referral to the relevant committee, he said.

The legacy of Law 49

Media leaks had suggested lawmakers could discuss the proposal at their next session, expected in the middle of this month. Houshan’s comments indicate that the steps needed to bring it before the assembly remain incomplete.

Enacted in July 1980 under former President Hafez al-Assad, Law 49 classified every member of the Muslim Brotherhood as a criminal punishable by death. It became a key weapon in the former government’s confrontation with the group, whose members and supporters faced decades of arrests and persecution.

Hussam Jazmati, a researcher on Islamist organizations and groups, expects “broad support inside and outside the assembly” for repealing the law, given the abuses associated with it under the former government.

Repealing the “strange” law matters regardless of whom it targeted, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He called it “one of the instruments of state terror under the Assad regime,” saying security agencies used it to pursue people merely suspected of belonging to the Brotherhood.

The law left a deep legacy of intimidation in Syrian society, particularly in conservative and religious communities, he said.

“Sympathy for its victims could provide a basis for supporting its repeal, even among groups that do not support the Brotherhood politically.”

Yet the law’s legal status is itself unclear.

The declaration issued at the “Victory Conference” on Jan. 29, 2025, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, suspended all exceptional laws. It remains unclear whether that covered Law 49 — or whether the law still requires a legislative repeal.

The declaration also dissolved the Baath Party, the parties of the National Progressive Front and their affiliated organizations, and banned their reconstitution.

It dissolved military factions and revolutionary political and civilian bodies, requiring their integration into state institutions.

But it did not dissolve all political parties without exception, leaving unresolved the legal basis for party activity during the transition.

A test of political will

For Abdel Rahman al-Haj, a researcher specializing in Islamist movements, bringing the repeal before the People’s Assembly would be “a test of the transitional government’s political will.”

An indefinite delay could signal that the authorities do not want to ease the Brotherhood’s return to politics or allow it an active role in the next phase, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Leaving the law in place without invalidating it in the constitutional declaration, and leaving it to the People’s Assembly, will be understood as additional pressure on the group,” he said.

The Brotherhood had already faced various forms of pressure to dissolve itself, he added.

The Syrian Brotherhood’s Shura Council held its fifth regular session on Sept. 27, 2026, issuing a 16-point statement on political, security and economic developments, as well as regional and international issues.

The statement affirmed the group’s desire to participate in political life and called for pluralism and rules governing party activity. Observers read it as preparation for a return to politics inside Syria.

Al-Haj said its second and sixth points showed that “the group wants to engage in party competition and is preparing for the return of political life as set out in the constitutional declaration.”

The Brotherhood appears to feel it faces “systematic exclusion and marginalization,” he said. At this stage of the transition, he added, it needs to test how serious the government is about establishing a legal framework for political activity ahead of an agreed political transition.

Jazmati sees a more immediate obstacle.

“The return of political life depends on the authorities’ will,” he said, adding that they do not appear to want organized parties, at least during the transition.

Still, he believes the Brotherhood could return to political activity “in one way or another.” Syria has a broad religious current that could find expression in several political parties and organizations, whether or not a new political parties law is enacted.

Sympathy for victims, doubts about the group

Jazmati draws a distinction between sympathy for the Brotherhood’s treatment under Assad and support for the organization today.

“There is widespread sympathy for the victims of arrests, persecution and abuses committed by the former regime, and support for addressing the injustices and providing redress for the harm they suffered,” he said.

That sympathy, however, “does not necessarily mean support for the group’s return in its current organizational form.”

The Brotherhood’s record during the Syrian revolution draws a less favorable assessment, he said, citing accusations that it tried to dominate opposition institutions and bore some responsibility for their failures, along with criticism of its management of political and relief work.

He described that negative view as resting on “a set of facts as well as a set of exaggerations,” stressing the need to distinguish between former detainees and victims of the government and the political organization that exists today.

Early in the revolution, sections of the Brotherhood’s support base welcomed its participation in preparatory conferences to establish the opposition Syrian National Council. Criticism of its performance within opposition institutions later intensified.

“The group’s popularity declined during those years, while other Islamist currents rose, particularly the current from which the leaders of Syria’s present authorities emerged,” Jazmati said.

Could a return spur other groups?

The Brotherhood’s signals have also raised questions about what its return could mean for Islamist organizations and other political forces waiting for rules governing party activity.

Al-Haj sees the prospect of its return encouraging other Islamist organizations as “possible, but unlikely.”

The Brotherhood’s presence rests on “its organizational and political history, rather than solely on its Islamist ideology,” he said. Other currents compete to represent that ideology, including the one from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emerged.

He expects the group to attract some Syrians who share its ideological outlook and are dissatisfied with the course of the transition.

Its return could do more to encourage non-Islamist organizations than Islamist ones to prepare for political participation, he said. But the transition’s uncertain contours make the consequences difficult to predict.

With the repeal proposal still at an early stage and the rules for party activity unresolved, the Brotherhood’s return to politics would test more than its own future.

It would also test the limits of pluralism Syria’s transitional authorities are prepared to allow.

Arab World

Asharq Al-Awsat Reveals How Hamas Leader in Gaza Survived Israeli Assassination Attempt

Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)
Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)
TT
TT

Asharq Al-Awsat Reveals How Hamas Leader in Gaza Survived Israeli Assassination Attempt

Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)
Hamas official Ali al-Amoudi (Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Information Center)

Hamas sources have disclosed how an urgent intelligence warning helped Ali al-Amoudi, who oversees the movement’s political bureau in Gaza, escape an Israeli assassination attempt on Oct. 3.

Amoudi survived a strike on a residential building hit by several missiles and suicide drones. Five Palestinians were killed.

An urgent warning

Three sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that an urgent intelligence report reached Amoudi about three hours before the attack, prompting him to leave. It did not, however, confirm that he was the intended target.

In separate, matching accounts, the sources said Amoudi was in the apartment later struck. He took the warning seriously and moved to a safe location.

The warning followed hours of drone surveillance. During daylight on Oct. 2, two members of the air unit of the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing, spotted two Israeli reconnaissance drones repeatedly circling the building and the port area west of Gaza City.

The drones were of a type Palestinian security personnel knew for its dangerous capabilities, the sources said. They use artificial intelligence and other technologies to pinpoint targets.

After tracking the drones for hours, the two members suspected preparations for an assassination attempt against a senior figure in the area. They alerted higher-level security officials. Their urgent report reached those responsible for protecting senior Hamas figures, including Amoudi.

The sole person responsible for Amoudi’s security, who knew his location, went to him immediately after receiving the report and briefed him.

Amoudi suspected he was the target and decided to leave without delay. About an hour or more later, powerful guided missiles and one or two suicide drones struck the apartment, confirming his suspicions, the sources said.

A central figure

Amoudi was very close to former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, both inside and outside Israeli prisons. They were imprisoned together before their release. Amoudi was freed in the prisoner exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, which Hamas called “Loyalty to the Free.”

In the days and weeks before the assassination attempt, Amoudi contested an internal election to lead Hamas in Gaza against Nizar Awadallah. Neither secured a decisive result. A runoff was halted after it was challenged.

Amoudi is a central figure in Hamas, both in Gaza and beyond.

Reading the drones

Operatives on the ground are becoming more adept at identifying the drones that constantly fly over Gaza and assessing their danger, the sources said. Some conduct reconnaissance; others are suicide drones. Their capabilities vary by model.

Israel deploys several types, some with known military names and others whose names remain unknown, the sources said. Palestinian factions and others in Gaza give some drones their own names, drawing on information about their models and capabilities from websites covering Israeli military affairs.

With drones constantly overhead, the factions’ armed wings monitor the skies to try to avert attacks on potential targets or limit their impact.

Gaza residents call drones of all types “zannana,” or “buzzers.” Many know little about their actual names or differing missions, while Palestinian factions are building their capacity to observe them and learn more.

Similar warnings

Senior Hamas security official Moein al-Arabid received a warning about similar drones before his abduction on Sept. 2, one source said. Other security officials received the warning too, but it was ignored.

No one expected a ground operation to abduct Arabid or anyone else. They anticipated an aerial assassination attempt instead, and some officials took precautions to conceal themselves.

The sources said drones are constantly monitored across Gaza to assess whether Israel is preparing to target a senior figure.

Izz al-Din al-Bayk, commander of the al-Qassam Brigades’ Northern Brigade, received a similar report days before his assassination, one source said. He left one location for another but was killed there, in a residential building in the al-Nasr neighborhood of northwestern Gaza City.

The source suggested that certain technologies had pinpointed Bayk’s new location, citing Israel’s heavy reliance on artificial intelligence and other technologies, alongside collaborators working with its domestic security agency, Shin Bet.

The source said the agency exploited collaborators’ economic circumstances and personal and social vulnerabilities to recruit them.

Arab World

US Assurances Against Expansion of War on Lebanon, Provided Netanyahu Is Given No Pretext

A man rides his motorcycle next to damaged buildings in West Zawtar, southern Lebanon, October 1, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man rides his motorcycle next to damaged buildings in West Zawtar, southern Lebanon, October 1, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
TT
TT

US Assurances Against Expansion of War on Lebanon, Provided Netanyahu Is Given No Pretext

A man rides his motorcycle next to damaged buildings in West Zawtar, southern Lebanon, October 1, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man rides his motorcycle next to damaged buildings in West Zawtar, southern Lebanon, October 1, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

A state of uncertainty hangs over the political and security situation in southern Lebanon following the postponement of a US-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli military meeting until after Israel's Knesset elections and the US midterm elections. The delay has prompted the development of a preemptive plan to address the possibility that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may seek to expand the security zone by targeting the highlands and hills stretching between Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jabal al-Rihan.

Bridging the period until the Israeli elections on October 27 remains a central concern for Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, who is seeking to contain the repercussions should Netanyahu insist on expanding the security zone.

Asharq Al-Awsat has learned from a political source directly involved in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations that Aoun is in contact with senior US administration officials, urging them to pressure Netanyahu and prevent him from expanding the security zone if he concludes that such a move is necessary to boost his political standing and secure his return as prime minister.

US Assurances Against Escalation

The political source confirmed that Aoun had received US assurances that Washington would not give Netanyahu the green light to expand the security zone, provided he is given no pretext to justify targeting the highlands between Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jabal al-Rihan.

The source said Hezbollah was the party concerned. With dialogue between Aoun and the group suspended, the president has instead been consulting Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to convey a message to his ally, Hezbollah, which has continued to observe the ceasefire and has not responded to Israeli attacks and violations.

The source revealed that the decision to convey the message to Hezbollah was prompted by information obtained by security and military officials indicating that the group had taken a series of precautionary measures to prepare for the possibility of Netanyahu expanding the security zone by targeting the highlands between Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jabal al-Rihan.

The source ruled out Hezbollah initiating a ceasefire violation, saying the group would have no choice but to defend itself if its positions came under attack. Residents of the area, however, are concerned that the confrontation could spread from north of the Litani River to their communities, particularly after Hezbollah built fortifications near residential areas.

The source argued that Hezbollah would be forced into an existential battle if it came under attack, considering the area its first, and possibly last, line of defense in the south after Israel established control through firepower over towns near Beaufort Castle, north of the Litani River, which overlooks the area to its south.

The source added that the Internal Security Forces' seizure of a shipment of explosives in Dahr al-Baidar, while it was being transported to Beirut's southern suburbs, had unsettled Hezbollah. The group was consequently compelled to launch media campaigns against President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to justify why the truck was being sent to it.

Hezbollah Fails to Recover Explosives Shipment

Meanwhile, a parliamentary source close to the Shiite duo said Hezbollah had attempted to recover the truck without having its cargo of explosives confiscated.

The source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hussein Abdullah, head of Hezbollah's Liaison and Coordination Unit, who succeeded Wafiq Safa, promptly contacted security and military officials in an effort to secure the truck's release, but was unsuccessful.

The source noted that Hezbollah had not expected its request to be rejected. The group argued that the explosives were intended to be transported south for use in confronting the Israeli military should it decide to expand the security zone.

According to the source, Hezbollah's intervention was itself an acknowledgment that the cargo belonged to the group. However, its efforts were met with refusal, along with a firm stance from Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, who called for an expanded investigation.

Salam's position supported a request by Government Commissioner to the Military Court Judge Claude Ghanem to involve the Internal Security Forces' Information Branch in the investigation.

A New Political Phase

The parliamentary source said the refusal to comply with Hezbollah's request sends a message domestically and internationally that Lebanon has entered a new political phase, distinct from the period preceding Aoun's election as president and the formation of Salam's government.

The government has adopted decisions aimed at establishing the state's exclusive control over weapons, beginning south of the Litani River, with the process subsequently extending north of the river to the Lebanese-Syrian border.

The source said these decisions were behind the seizure of the explosives shipment, alongside the government's commitment to enforcing Cabinet decisions prohibiting the carrying, transportation and use of weapons.

Asked about the implications, the source explained that allowing Hezbollah to recover the explosives would, in the eyes of domestic and international observers, effectively signal the collapse of the project to strengthen state authority.

It would also risk prompting the international community to abandon its commitments to helping Lebanon recover, which are conditional on the state exercising exclusive control over weapons. Lebanon would consequently risk falling off the international community's list of priorities if the explosives were returned to Hezbollah.

The source stressed that the seizure of the explosives would increase international attention to Lebanon and strengthen its negotiating position, particularly in light of admissions by the truck driver and his companion that the cargo was to be delivered to an individual in Beirut's southern suburbs known as Zulfiqar.

The source also addressed the campaign launched by Hezbollah's official television outlet, Al-Manar, against Salam over his position on the seizure of the shipment and his insistence on establishing responsibility and revealing Zulfiqar's real identity.

The campaign also targeted Aoun following the European Union member states' approval of a military mission to Lebanon to support and train the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces, helping them extend state authority across the country's entire territory.

According to the source, the campaign against Aoun primarily stems from Hezbollah's belief that the European mission's mandate to support Lebanon's security and military institutions would contribute to placing all weapons under state control.

The mission is not intended to replace the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Rather, its activities would extend across Lebanese territory.

The source said this prospect is a source of concern for Hezbollah, particularly if it becomes clear that bringing the group's weapons under exclusive state control is part of the European mission's program to help Lebanon extend its authority throughout the country.