عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Features

Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)
TT
TT

Drone Race in the Middle East

An Iranian drone (AFP)
An Iranian drone (AFP)

Over the past two decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been characterized by deep divisions, political turmoil, and inadequate governance.

Geopolitical competition and increased ambitions of some countries (Iran, Israel, Turkey) were reflected in bold and unilateral foreign policies that in many cases exceeded longtime restrictions imposed by partnerships with foreign powers and conflicted with regional agendas.

In the MENA region, drones have become an essential part of the political and security dynamics and one of the aspects of competition between the region’s countries.

Drones have reached unprecedented levels of sophistication, expanding their use from a specialized military tool available only to Israel and the US in 2001 to the relatively cheap, high-tech weapons in the arsenal of a growing number of countries.

The global drone market is expected to attract nearly $100 billion in investment over the current decade, with a 30% increase in spending on research, development, and procurement. This underlines the growing strategic importance of drones within the defense systems of many countries.

Drones, or Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), have captured the attention of many governments in the Middle East and made headlines due to their advancing role in the region’s conflicts, including Libya, Syria, and Iraq.

Currently, thirteen countries in the region operate combat drones or are in the process of acquiring them. Four of these countries are at the point of exporting their drones to regional or foreign countries.

Turkey

Turkey’s rapid and dynamic rise to the club of countries that owns armed drones was remarkable, not because of its leadership in using these drones in conventional combat operations, but rather for the major role that Ankara may play in the global market in the near future.

Among Turkey’s trading partners in the region are Qatar, Tunisia, and the Libyan Government of National Accord in Tripoli.

Doha recently received the first batch of six Bayraktar TB2 combat aircraft and three ground control stations, according to a deal signed in 2018.

Meanwhile, Tunisia signed in early March 2020 a contract worth $240 million with the Turkish Aerospace Industry to purchase six (Anka-S) combat drones with three control stations and training services.

Moreover, Azerbaijan signed a contract to purchase combat drones from Turkey.

Baku wants to deploy the acquired drones against Armenian forces in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. This was made possible after the Azerbaijani parliament recently approved bilateral military cooperation with Turkey.

Iran

Iran and Arab countries are racing to develop their drone capabilities. Chinese platforms, especially the Wing Loong series produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group since 2015, are popularly used by Iran.

The (Cai - Hong - CH 4B) produced by China’s State-owned Aerospace Science & Technology Corp is also being used.

These models have already been used in special operations. In parallel, some countries are boosting their local industries and have invested in local models.

Iran has made significant progress with its drone technology. A 2019 report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency describes drones as “Iran’s fastest-growing air capability.”

In Tehran’s military strategy, drones represented a cost-effective solution in terms of enhancing information-gathering, reconnaissance, attack capabilities and compensating for traditional structural deficiencies.

Israel

Israel has a leading position among the dominant countries in the field of drones, and it may come second only to the US.

Until 2014, Israel remained the world’s leading exporter of drones, accounting for 61% of global exports.

The most prominent Israeli drone (MALE), of the (Heron - TP) class, can perform strategic missions at an altitude of more than 13,000 meters and a flight time of more than 30 hours, thanks to a variety of sensors and munitions with a maximum payload of up to 2700 kg.

This aircraft can operate via satellite with an automatic take-off and landing system. It can also operate autonomously in harsh weather conditions and adapt to emergency missions.

It’s noteworthy that Israel does not sell its advanced aircraft to any of the countries in the MENA region due to constant concerns about the threat posed by its Arab neighbors.

In other words, Israel is absent from the regional market for drones, and its exports target European countries like Germany, Britain, and Latin American and Asian countries, where India tops the list in terms of spending.

Most Viewed

 
 
Features

Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
TT
TT

Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.