Why the EU May Find it Tough to Squeeze Out Russian Oil

A general view shows a local oil refinery during sunset in Omsk, Russia, on March 16, 2022. (Reuters)
A general view shows a local oil refinery during sunset in Omsk, Russia, on March 16, 2022. (Reuters)
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Why the EU May Find it Tough to Squeeze Out Russian Oil

A general view shows a local oil refinery during sunset in Omsk, Russia, on March 16, 2022. (Reuters)
A general view shows a local oil refinery during sunset in Omsk, Russia, on March 16, 2022. (Reuters)

The European Union has proposed a phased embargo of Russian oil but may find it tricky to implement, given Europe's complex distribution network and challenges in tracking crude once it is blended or refined.

The plan, if agreed by member states, would take effect in six months for crude, and in eight months for diesel and other oil products.

How watertight will any EU sanctions be?
Under the proposal, Hungary and Slovakia would be granted a longer period - until the end of 2023 - to adapt to the embargo. This means that countries in the EU would still be able to purchase Russian oil via Hungary and Slovakia, unless the plan is ratified to prevent both countries from buying more oil than they need.

Can Russian oil still end up in Europe after a ban?
European countries might still continue buying Russian cargoes from other third countries without being aware of its origin.

Oil can usually be traced to its origin based on its chemical make up, such as sulphur content and density. However, some buyers have been deceived in the past by forged documents, hiding the origin of cargoes from countries under sanctions, including Iran and Venezuela, according to industry sources.

That becomes more difficult if the crude is blended with other crudes for refiners, and almost impossible after it is processed into standard products, such as gasoline, diesel or jet fuel.

Who is seeking to phase out or halt Russian oil purchases?
At least 26 major European refiners and trading companies have suspended spot purchases or intend to phase out a combined 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) of Russian imports, according to JP Morgan.

European companies including Shell, TotalEnergies , Repsol and BP no longer buy any refined products with Russian content. And BP's contracts state any deal with a seller that violates its policy will be invalid, according to trade information detailed in the Platts trading window.

Several shipping firms are also asking for guarantees that cargoes have no Russian origin or interest, and have not been transferred from a ship with Russian ties, according to documents seen by Reuters.

Why is it so tough to trace cargoes of Russian oil?
Even with all those documents in place, there is no guarantee of eliminating any traces of Russian hydrocarbons once it enters the EU's main oil importing hub, the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) complex - made up of eight ports spread across two countries, 96 terminals, and 6,300 storage tanks owned by hundreds of international oil companies.

"Some products processed in European refineries will continue to contain Russian oil," Shell says. "At the same time, many products like diesel are typically blended - meaning a proportion of the liquids mixed into the pipes and tanks that feed the entire industry will have originated in Russia."

In ARA, the blended Russian oil may show up in customs data simply as fuel from the Netherlands, said Cuneyt Kazokoglu, head of oil demand analysis at FGE.

"I think a lot of European countries will quote imports from 'Netherlands' to hide the origin of Russian products," Kazokoglu said.

Where does the oil go from ARA?
Fuel can be loaded onto cargoes and re-exported to other regions and countries. It can go by barge to other terminals within the same port, or head down the Rhine river to Switzerland, France and Germany. This can hide the fuel’s origin, traders said.

From the ARA hub, oil products can be distributed through NATO’s Central European Pipeline System (CEPS), which links to six maritime ports and 11 refineries across the continent, three rail and 16 truck-loading stations, and six international airports.

"If it's not a Russian owner, then apart from the origin certificate - but even that can be changed - it's hard for the (storage) terminal to identify the origin of products," said Krien van Beek, a broker at ODIN-RVB Tank Storage Solutions in Rotterdam.

What are companies doing to deliver on their promises?
Buyers are increasingly requesting breakdowns on the origin of blended oil from storage sites, industry sources said, to make their own decision on whether they can accept it. But fully traceable origin documentation is not always readily available in a reasonable time frame before a deal takes place.

Some shipping charterers provide a certificate detailing where fuel was produced or processed. While a country's customs authority would have access to that data with imported cargoes, the documents are considered confidential.

Shell previously classified goods of Russian origin as those with 50% or more of their content from fuel produced in Russia. But the firm recently tightened its restrictions on buying Russian oil, saying it would no longer accept refined products with Russian content, including blended fuels, according to clauses in its trading contracts. The restriction, however, only applies to platforms where companies are allowed to insert their own clauses, and would exclude the gasoil contract on the major ICE exchange, one source familiar with the matter said.

Some other traders continue to evaluate whether a diesel blend, for example, containing up to 49% Russian diesel, would count as a non-Russian product, three trading sources told Reuters.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.