Lebanese Vow 'Revenge' against Ruling Elite at the Ballot Boxes

Lebanese expats queue to cast their votes for the May 15 legislative election at Lebanon's Consulate in the Gulf emirate of Dubai on May 8, 2022. (AFP)
Lebanese expats queue to cast their votes for the May 15 legislative election at Lebanon's Consulate in the Gulf emirate of Dubai on May 8, 2022. (AFP)
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Lebanese Vow 'Revenge' against Ruling Elite at the Ballot Boxes

Lebanese expats queue to cast their votes for the May 15 legislative election at Lebanon's Consulate in the Gulf emirate of Dubai on May 8, 2022. (AFP)
Lebanese expats queue to cast their votes for the May 15 legislative election at Lebanon's Consulate in the Gulf emirate of Dubai on May 8, 2022. (AFP)

Joe, a Lebanese man in his 30s, is determined to "seek revenge" against his country's ruling elite by voting for forces of change and the opposition in Sunday's parliamentary elections.

Joe, who hails from the region of Jezzine, east of the southern city of Sidon, told Asharq Al-Awsat: "I want revenge against the ruling class that has led Lebanon to complete collapse and looted the funds of depositors and their life's savings."

He admitted that he had voted for the Free Patriotic Movement, founded by President Michel Aoun and now headed by his son-in-law and MP Gebran Bassil, during the 2018 elections.

His position has since changed after the FPM, which holds the presidency and the parliamentary majority, "had stood idly by as the people lost their life's savings."

"This presidency led us to the bottom of the abyss and so punishment is inevitable," he stressed.

This view is shared by several Lebanese who are seeking collective punishment of the ruling elite. They will vote along the slogan of the 2019 popular uprising of "Everyone means everyone."

Others have singled out Aoun and Bassil and their ally Hezbollah, blaming them for the current state of affairs in Lebanon, saying they will "reap what they sow" at the ballot boxes.

Lebanese seeking the "revenge vote" have expressed their complete rejection of the current political class, blaming it for the loss of their life's savings at banks, endless power cuts, the rise in the prices of medicine, fuel and food, the collapse of the local currency and several other numerous crises.

Moreover, many of these voters believe that the elections will be a prime opportunity to curb Hezbollah's influence that has "isolated Lebanon from its Arab environment."

On the other hand, many Lebanese have expressed their disappointment and frustration with the opposition and forces of change that failed in uniting their ranks and producing unified lists for the elections.

Dina, who votes in Beirut's second electoral district, said she was torn between voting for the forces of change or submitting a blank vote.

Dina, who is in her 40s, had taken part in the 2019 protests against the ruling elite and dropped her support for political parties. She told Asharq Al-Awsat that she is disappointed that the revolution has since 2019 become "scattered" with its members failing to field a united list against the ruling elite.

In the northern city of Tripoli, one resident said he will vote for the forces of change even though he was not impressed with their candidates.

The man, unemployed and in his 20s, told Asharq Al-Awsat that his family is divided between those who want to vote for the ruling elite and his siblings and cousins, who will vote for the forces of change.

"I am aware that voting for the forces of change will not take us from the abyss to the top in the blink of an eye, but it will at least drive a nail in the coffin of the ruling system," he remarked.

"We know the result of a vote for the ruling elite. We have endured it for the past 20 years."

"A boycott of the elections is an implicit acceptance of the current rulers, while a vote for the forces of change offers a glimmer of hope for us and punishes the ruling system," he stressed.

Elections expert Abbas Bou Zeid told Asharq Al-Awsat that votes for the opposition are an act of revenge against the ruling class.

He acknowledged that several people have been disappointed with the opposition for failing to field a unified list. The opposition groups have shown a lack of cohesion, which may prompt people to boycott the elections or vote blank.

"The opposition forces are still in the nascent phase," he remarked, citing the numerous opposition lists that have been fielded.

He noted that it remains to be seen whether the Aounists and Shiite duo of Hezbollah and the Amal movement will be punished in the elections. "We will find out when the results are announced on May 16."

Another elections expert, Kamal Feghali said several people will be seeking revenge against the ruling elite in the elections.

He cited studies he had carried out that show that the FPM will lose at least 7 points in its popularity in the elections. The FPM, which had won 26 percent of seats at parliament, is set to reap less than 20 percent this year.

As for Hezbollah, he noted that anger is brimming among its Shiite support base, with 35 percent of them now opposed to the party.

This rejection could have been reflected better had the forces of the revolution produced a unified opposition list, he lamented.

He revealed that 37 percent of people have expressed their determination to vote for the forces of change to punish the ruling elite. The number of those angry with the ruling class is much higher than this and will be revealed by the results of the vote.

He said the opposition's failure to unify its ranks will cost it in the elections. Prior to the announcement of their electoral lists, the opposition had enjoyed 45 percent support among the people. That number dropped to 20 percent after they failed to unite, with their lists falling below the voters' expectations.

"Unfortunately, the forces of change have appeared scattered and they have not proven their seriousness, which has disappointed the voters," said Feghali.

This disappointment may be reflected in a boycott or blank votes, or even votes for members of the ruling class beyond the FPM and Hezbollah.



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.