What’s the Fallout from Ukraine’s Pipe Shutdown?

An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)
An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)
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What’s the Fallout from Ukraine’s Pipe Shutdown?

An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)
An employee walks at Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom's Sudzha pumping station, January 13, 2009. (Reuters)

The shutdown of a gas pipeline in eastern Ukraine has sent a fresh wave of energy jitters through Europe.

The price of gas jumped - then fell. The cutoff is in sharp focus because it's the first time that the war has disrupted the Russian natural gas that flows through Ukraine to get to Europe, where it powers factories and generates electricity.

Here are key things to know:

What happened in Ukraine?
The operator of the gas pipeline system, Gas TSO of Ukraine, said it could no longer transport gas through a compressor station in the Luhansk region in eastern Ukraine, near the border with Russia. It said it had no operational control over the station in Russian-held territory, with occupying forces interfering in the station's operation and diverting gas in a way that endangered the stability of the pipeline system.

The company said it repeatedly told Russian state-owned gas exporter Gazprom about threats to flows from such interference but that its appeals were ignored.

The pipeline handles around a third of Russian gas heading to Europe. The Ukrainian operator said the gas flows could be made up through another pipeline that crosses from Russia into Ukraine near the town of Sudzha.

Gazprom said that was not possible, but gas flows at Sudzha rose overnight, by about 8 million cubic meters per day.

Why is this getting attention?
While Russia has halted natural gas to Poland and Bulgaria over a dispute about payments in rubles, Wednesday's cutoff is the first disruption in gas supplies flowing through Ukraine due to the war.

Any suggestion that energy supplies are vulnerable sends prices higher. Spot gas prices rose 4% at the open of trading Wednesday, to 103 euros per megawatt. They later eased, to around 95 euros per megawatt hour, below where they were Tuesday.

European governments aren't happy about sending hundreds of millions of dollars a day to Russia for energy but haven't been able to agree on a natural gas boycott because of heavy dependence of major economies like Germany and Italy. The European Union’s executive commission has proposed a phaseout of Russian oil but has run up against resistance from reliant countries like Hungary.

Economists estimate that a total cutoff of both oil and natural gas would throw Europe into a recession. A loss of gas alone would hit industries such as metals, fertilizer, glass and ceramics that have already throttled back production in some cases due to high gas prices. And consumers would face even higher electric and heating bills than they already do.

To avoid those outcomes, the EU has proposed cutting Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of the year through additional supplies of pipeline gas from Norway and Azerbaijan, more purchases of liquefied gas that comes by ship, faster rollout of wind and solar, and conservation. Whether that can be achieved remains to be seen.

What is going on with gas flows?
Tom Marzec-Manser, head of gas analytics at the ICIS market intelligence firm, said the Ukraine move "is not a huge cutoff to gas supplies." He described it as a loss of a few percent in overall European gas supply, when considering imports and domestic production.

"Nevertheless, it is worrying to the market that a development like this has happened," he said, noting concerns about possible energy sanctions that could interrupt deliveries and the gas cutoff to Bulgaria and Poland. "But it is not fundamentally altering the supply and demand balance in the European gas market."

Before the war, the share of Russian gas that flowed to Europe through Ukraine had fallen to around 18%. Of that, about a third goes through this particular part of the pipeline system that was shut down. That can be up to 32.6 million cubic meters a day; in recent days, it has been around 23 million cubic meters a day.

Much but not all of that gas could be rerouted through the pipeline entering Ukraine near Sudzha, said Zongqiang Luo, a gas analyst at Rystad Energy.

Even with added capacity through that town, some 10 million cubic meters per day of gas would still be in search of a pipeline route to get to Europe, and "where exactly is not clear as capacity in seemingly full," Luo said.

Over the course of a year, that daily flow would amount to around 3.6 billion cubic meters of gas, out of the roughly 150 billion cubic meters that Europe imports from Russia. It isn't a huge amount by comparison, but gas supplies are scarce, prices are high and gas importers and governments are scrambling to find all the non-Russian gas supplies they can.

What’s the impact on energy users in Europe?
Thanks to mild weather, Europe is in better shape on gas after scraping through the winter with barely adequate reserves. Reserves are filling faster than they did last year, but that needs to continue to cover demand this coming winter.

The interruption would make it harder for European countries to meet their goals for storage levels next winter and would "hasten Europe’s plans to move away from imports of Russian gas," Luo said.

"As the European gas grid is well integrated, no one country is likely to suffer any immediate impact, but this will put further strain on the system and place a floor on downside price movement,” Luo added.

Germany is receiving a quarter less gas through Ukraine, the Energy Ministry said Wednesday. Increased supplies from Norway and the Netherlands are partly compensating for the shortfall, said Annika Einhorn, a ministry spokeswoman.

She noted that the majority of Russian gas reaches Germany through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline under the Baltic Sea rather than via Ukraine.

What are possible motivations for the move?
Both Gas TSO of Ukraine and Gazprom have sought to underline their reliability as gas suppliers despite the enmity fueled by the war so analysts are still trying to figure out what the game is. Barbara Lambrecht at Commerzbank said, "It remains to be seen whether the disruption to supply turns out to be anything more than just a flexing of muscles."

Tim Ash, senior emerging markets sovereign strategist at BlueBay Asset Management, said it could be about forcing Europe's hand.

"I think frustrations are building in Ukraine that Europe is proving too slow in rolling out an energy embargo on Russia," he said. "If Europe is not prepared to shut off the energy money printing machine for Moscow, why would Ukraine not take matters into their own hands?"



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.