Syria Constitutional Talks Conclude 8th Session, Position on Army ‘Thwarts’ Discussions in Geneva

The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Syria Constitutional Talks Conclude 8th Session, Position on Army ‘Thwarts’ Discussions in Geneva

The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Once again, the position regarding the Syrian state institutions, especially the army, thwarted the sessions of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva.

A dispute had erupted between the government delegation headed by Ahmed al-Kuzbari and the opposition negotiating body headed by Hadi al-Bahra over institutional reform.

In contrast to Damascus’ warnings about replicating Iraq’s disastrous attempt to restructure the army and voicing a total rejection of making the army neutral, the opposition delegation called for reform to avoid Syria becoming a failed state.

Moreover, the opposition called for an impartial role for the army during the power transfer.

Under UN sponsorship, the Constitutional Committee’s eighth session last week recorded a “tempo” improvement in addition to participants agreeing to some common points.

However, translating those common points into consensual texts that could serve as pillars of Syria’s constitution remains an obstacle. This, as promised in the closing session on Friday, requires UN envoy Geir Pedersen to take an additional shuttle tour between Syrian actors and external players before the Committee’s next session.

Under previous UN facilitative arrangements, the program of the eighth round included presenting a constitutional principle every day starting from Monday and leaving the last day for discussions and consensus.

The civil society delegation affiliated with Damascus presented a proposal for “unilateral coercive measures from a constitutional standpoint.”

For his part, Bahra presented a proposal for “the supremacy of the constitution and the hierarchy of international agreements,” while Kuzbari proposed the principle of “preserving and strengthening state institutions.”

The civil society delegation affiliated with the opposition discussed the issue of “transitional justice.”

A Western official summarized to Asharq Al-Awsat the discussions that took place during the five days of the Committee’s eighth round of talks:

Coercive Measures

Kuzbari received the proposal presented by the civil society delegation affiliated with Damascus. Their bid emphasized that “unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Syrian people constitute economic terrorism and infringes on the basic constitutional rights of the Syrian people.”

They also warned that unilateral coercive measures could limit “the security of its basic living requirements.”

It was suggested for the constitution to include “the state’s obligation to seek the lifting of unilateral coercive measures and to demand the countries that imposed sanctions to pay appropriate compensation.”

Additionally, the proposal called for opposing and rejecting sanctions as a national duty for every Syrian.

It emphasized that the right to development and the reconstruction of what was destroyed by terrorism and external aggression is a project for the Syrian people under the constitution.

The proposal added that refugees’ right to safe and voluntary return is humanitarian and may not be linked to any external political conditions.

When discussing the proposal, the government delegation focused on the incompatibility of coercive measures with international law and chose to link these measures to the “terrorist war on Syria.”

Meanwhile, the opposition delegation considered the proposal “unconstitutional” and stressed that reconstruction and development are economic rights and should not be restricted by unilateral coercive measures.”

Some of the attendees considered “everyone who encourages sanctions a traitor.”

A Warning against “Racialization”

The following day, Kuzbari presented a proposal on “state institutions” in a session chaired by Bahri.

His proposal ensured that “institutions are entitled to specific powers by the constitution and that undermining them or threatening them internally or externally is an act punishable by law.”

“The responsibility of the army is to protect the homeland against terrorism and occupation,” the proposal acknowledged, adding that “preserving and strengthening the army is a national duty.”

During discussions, the opposition members focused on “Syrian institutions needing a lot of reforms because they have lost their credibility due to human rights violations.”

Opposition attendees suggested that “reform should not affect the restructuring of the army and the institutions that committed direct violations, but rather radically improve the institutional system.”

They stressed the “necessity of political neutrality for institutions, especially the army so that they do not interfere in the processes of power transition.”

On the other hand, the government delegation focused on “the legitimacy of institutions and their steadfastness despite being targeted by terrorism and international interventions.”

“The restructuring of institutions in other countries such as Iraq has only led to disasters... and the recommendations of international organizations for reform have failed,” said a Damascus representative.

The opposition urged the necessity of embracing reform as a basic entitlement to restore institutions to their work in all Syrian lands. Otherwise, Syria would be a failed state.

According to the opposition delegation, reform may require restructuring institutions, accountability for officials, and removing impunity for abusers, especially from the security services and the army.

The government delegation defended its proposal.

“State institutions exist, and reform does not mean restructuring. It should not be an excuse to destroy institutions or allow external interference,” a government representative said.

They stressed that “the army cannot be impartial, as there is no neutral army in the matter of protecting the people.”

More so, they argued that corruption and institutional failure are individual cases that did not undermine Syrian institutions’ steadfastness and commitment to their duties.

“Reform is ongoing and continuous and cannot reach the point of building alternative institutions. The experience of alternative institutions in Syria and other countries has failed miserably,” noted a government representative.

The Constitution, International Agreements

The proposal presented by Bahra dealt with “the supremacy of the constitution and the hierarchy of international agreements.”

It considered “the constitution as the supreme law of the country.” However, it argued that international agreements must be set higher than national laws.

Discussions took place on the proposal, with attendees asking technical questions.

One of the questions revolved around whether international agreements transcend national law directly at the time of their signing or after conforming to the national legal system and issuing appropriate legislation.

The opposition delegation proposed including human rights agreements in the constitution.

Meanwhile, the government delegation considered “international agreements in the human rights field as a door to infiltrating Syrian sovereignty.” It also refuted accusations of Damascus not being concerned with human rights.

The civil society delegation affiliated with Damascus supported the government delegation’s statements on the matter.

“This principle aims to put Syria under international trusteeship,” a civil society representative said.

Justice or Revenge

Civil society representatives affiliated with the opposition presented a proposal on “transitional justice.”

The proposal includes the state’s commitment to building societal peace by adopting a comprehensive approach to transitional justice.

It stressed the principle of non-impunity for human rights abusers.

War crimes, crimes against humanity and human rights violations do not fall with the passage of time or the issuance of a former amnesty with a series of measures, reforms, and accountability.

A heated discussion erupted as the Damascus delegation warned that the opposition’s proposal “opens the door to external interference and presents a back door to disrupting state institutions and social cohesion.”

The government delegation argued that the proposal accomplishes what the “international war on Syria couldn’t.”

Some suggested “justice in favor of compensating Syria for the war declared by foreign countries,” warning that the proposal’s text “incriminates the Syrian government in advance.”

However, this was denied by the opposition.

“The term is mentioned in many Arab and international constitutions, as transitional justice is a national process,” an opposition representative argued.

“It’s not a matter of revenge... there is a wide package of measures required to ensure sustainable peace,” they added.

“These measures include legal and illegal accountability measures that focus on reparations, memorialization and institutional reform programs.”

Papers, Amendments

On Friday, the participants gave written amendments to the proposals submitted successively in the previous four days.

Pedersen thanked Kuzbari and Bahra for their “good conduct of the discussion.”

Pedersen noted progress in the level and method of discussion, even “if there was no progress in the agreed content.”

The UN envoy expressed concern that “continuing discussion at this pace may require years before reaching final formulations.”

Accordingly, he vowed to consult with everyone to develop better mechanisms before the ninth round, which is slated for 25-29 July.

Pedersen said that he agreed with Kuzbari and Bahra on the importance of finding ways to speed up the pace of work and achieve results.



Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
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Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)

Syrian authorities on Sunday announced the destruction of large quantities of narcotics, including 400 million captagon pills seized by security forces in multiple operations.

"Large quantities of narcotic and psychotropic substances seized during various security operations were destroyed in batches," the drug enforcement department announced in a statement carried by state news agency SANA.

It added that the quantities destroyed included "400 million captagon pills, 12.2 tons of hashish, in addition to 2.3 tons of cannabis plants, six kilograms of heroin, as well as 5.4 million narcotic pills".

"Tools and equipment used in smuggling, concealment, transport, and manufacture, including chemical substances," were also destroyed.

Synthetic stimulant captagon became Syria's largest export after the civil war began in 2011, flooding the region and becoming a key source of illicit funding for now ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Syria's new authorities who took power in December 2024 have been working to combat the captagon trade.

Khaled Eid, the head of the drug enforcement department, announced in June that authorities "carried out 1,550 operations to seize and foil" drug smuggling attempts since Assad's fall, according to SANA.

He said authorities dismantled 90 international smuggling networks, shut down 17 captagon manufacturing plants, and seized 697 million captagon pills and 15 tons of hashish during those operations.


Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
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Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan downplayed advances by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in the Blue Nile region, urging residents not to fear an attack on the regional capital and vowing to fight until what he called the rebellion is defeated.

His remarks came hours after the RSF-aligned Tasis alliance claimed control of five areas in Geissan, a day after announcing the capture of the Bau locality headquarters.

Speaking in Khartoum on Friday evening while offering condolences over the death of Khatmiyya Sufi leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, Burhan sought to reassure residents of Ad-Damazin, the Blue Nile capital.

“Don’t be afraid,” he said, citing the army’s expulsion of RSF fighters from Khartoum as evidence of its ability to prevail.

“They were sitting in the very house where I am speaking,” he added. “Wherever they enter, they will find themselves in a tunnel, in a trap they cannot escape.”

Burhan said that the war remained a priority, acknowledging that much of the state’s resources were being directed toward military operations.

“The army is defending Sudan, its citizens and their right to exist. We will fight until we win, and we will win,” he declared.

The Tasis alliance, comprising the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, announced on Friday that its forces had captured several towns in Geissan, nearly 40 kilometers southeast of Ad-Damazin.

The alliance had claimed control of the Bau locality headquarters the previous day, while conflicting accounts emerged from the warring sides over other towns.

Blue Nile’s regional government stressed that the army still held the initiative and was working to restore security in the southern part of the region.

Burhan also praised the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Mirghani, for supporting the army throughout the war through its members and political positions, describing it as a partner alongside other parties and organizations backing the military and Sudanese people.

While acknowledging what he described as hardships in daily living conditions, he attributed much of the economic pressure to an “economic war” waged by countries he accused of instigating the conflict on April 15, 2023.

He also criticized reports about famine and fuel shortages, describing them as attempts to discourage Sudanese citizens and undermine morale.

Famine warnings

Despite Burhan’s dismissal of the reports, international humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned of worsening food insecurity in parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) identified famine conditions in El Fasher and Kadugli and warned of further deterioration driven by fighting, displacement, drought and insufficient humanitarian funding.

According to a World Health Organization alert issued on October 12, IPC analysis covering February through May 2026 found that around 19.5 million people in Sudan faced acute food insecurity at crisis level or worse, including around 135,000 in the catastrophic category.

The World Food Program (WFP) has documented restrictions on the movement of goods, particularly in areas affected by fighting and displacement.

It attributed rising food prices to disrupted supplies and the depreciation of the Sudanese pound.


Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
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Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 

Years of a devastating war have failed to dismantle Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Gaza, with Israel continuing to uncover underground passages even in areas under its military control.

Recent Israeli announcements have detailed new discoveries on both sides of the Yellow Line, established under the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement. The boundary initially left Israel controlling about 50% of Gaza, a share that has since expanded to more than 65%.

The latest operation, described as the first of its kind since the ceasefire, targeted a Hamas tunnel west of the Yellow Line and Salah al-Din Road, near the southern side of the Netzarim Corridor toward central Gaza.

Israeli forces have also reported destroying several tunnels within areas they control, underscoring the complexity of an underground network that has proved more extensive and resilient than anticipated.

Origins of the Tunnel Network

Hamas first used a tunnel in a military operation on September 26, 2001, a year after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

The group detonated explosives inside a tunnel approximately 150 meters long beneath a military tower at the Termit outpost in Rafah, southern Gaza, killing and wounding several Israeli soldiers.

Israel initially paid limited attention to the tactic, quickly sealing and destroying the tunnel using rudimentary methods rather than the advanced technology employed today.

Hamas subsequently repeated the approach in other operations, including one in 2006 in which Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured.

After taking control of Gaza, Hamas devoted considerable resources to developing tunnels for defensive and offensive operations, as well as smuggling weapons and military equipment.

Commercial tunnels also proliferated along the Rafah border after Israel imposed a sweeping blockade on the territory.

During the 51-day Gaza war in 2014, Hamas surprised Israeli forces with a series of cross-border tunnel operations, allowing its fighters to attack Israeli troops at close range.

The attacks heightened fears among residents of Israeli communities surrounding Gaza and prompted demands for stronger defenses against underground infiltration.

Israel subsequently built a technologically advanced border barrier equipped with aboveground and underground detection and protection systems.

However, during the October 7, 2023, attack, Hamas breached the new barrier using explosives designed to destroy sections of it and aerial means, including paragliders.

Tunnels, meanwhile, remained primarily defensive structures and facilities for command and control, although Hamas field commanders were later forced to abandon some of them after they came under attack.

Israeli Assessments

Israeli Southern Command officers have recently acknowledged that Hamas’ military arsenal, particularly its tunnel network, has not been completely eliminated.

They have also indicated that further measures are needed to address the future of the group’s weapons.

Amichai Mitelman, of the civil engineering department at Ariel University, estimated in a report published recently by Israel’s Maariv newspaper that a substantial portion of Hamas’ tunnels remains intact. He cautioned that no single method could destroy the entire network.

According to Mitelman, estimates of the total length of Gaza’s tunnels before the October 7 attack ranged from 500 to 1,000 kilometers.

Some tunnels were between 30 and 40 meters deep, with branching passages of varying widths, he explained.

Efforts to destroy the network by flooding tunnels with seawater or detonating large quantities of explosives have failed to eliminate it completely.

Filling tunnels with concrete has recently proved more effective, he said, although the method is costly and labor-intensive.

The Qassam Engineers

The underground network has remained a major challenge for Israel throughout the war, which has continued at a limited level despite the ceasefire.

Israel has demanded the complete destruction of Hamas’ tunnels under the ceasefire agreement, subject to monitoring by Israel, the United States and mediating countries.

The fate of Hamas’ other weapons, including rockets, has also become a central issue.

During operations to recover Israeli hostages, particularly the remains of those killed, it emerged that some had been buried in small tunnels and branches that Israeli forces had failed to detect.

Some of these passages remained intact within tunnel systems the military had believed it had destroyed.

Videos released by Hamas’ armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, featuring commanders and fighters killed during the war, have also shed light on the construction of the tunnels and the development of the group’s rocket arsenal.

The footage suggests that much of the work relied on local expertise and manual labor rather than exclusively on weapons smuggled from Iran or elsewhere, as is often assumed.

This has also prompted Israeli demands to dismantle Hamas’ weapons-manufacturing workshops.

The videos indicate that many of those responsible for tunnel construction and rocket development, known within the group as the “Qassam engineers,” did not hold formal engineering qualifications.

While a small number had engineering degrees, most had studied other subjects, and some had no academic qualifications.

Many were construction workers or technicians whose practical skills enabled them to oversee the development of the underground network over many years. They supervised excavation teams largely composed of younger Qassam recruits.

The so-called engineers assessed soil conditions, identified areas of structural strength and weakness, and determined tunnel routes before excavation began.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that tunnel construction and preparation followed what they described as professional engineering practices, using various types of equipment operated by skilled technicians.

The sources credited these workers with playing a central role in developing what Hamas considers a strategic military asset.

They acknowledged that construction had faced serious difficulties over the years, with numerous workers killed during excavation and others suffering paralysis or other injuries following soil collapses and unexpected incidents.

Security challenges also complicated the work, including alleged Israeli attempts to recruit informants from among faction members, tunnel workers and others to identify underground locations.

Other Hamas sources said the group’s rocket industry similarly relied on domestic development. According to these accounts, engineers from Gaza received training and studied relevant subjects at universities and other institutions before returning to train additional personnel, expanding the number of people capable of manufacturing and developing weapons.

The sources maintained that explosives were also manufactured and adapted locally to meet operational requirements, including those used to destroy sections of Israel’s border barrier during the October 7 attack.

They credited the engineers with adapting weapons to changing battlefield conditions.

The same approach, they added, extended to other locally developed weapons, including the Yassin 105 anti-armor projectile, which Hamas used extensively against Israeli forces during the war.