Syria Constitutional Talks Conclude 8th Session, Position on Army ‘Thwarts’ Discussions in Geneva

The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Syria Constitutional Talks Conclude 8th Session, Position on Army ‘Thwarts’ Discussions in Geneva

The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)
The text of the opposition delegation’s proposal on the constitution and international agreements and the text of the government delegation’s proposal on state institutions (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Once again, the position regarding the Syrian state institutions, especially the army, thwarted the sessions of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva.

A dispute had erupted between the government delegation headed by Ahmed al-Kuzbari and the opposition negotiating body headed by Hadi al-Bahra over institutional reform.

In contrast to Damascus’ warnings about replicating Iraq’s disastrous attempt to restructure the army and voicing a total rejection of making the army neutral, the opposition delegation called for reform to avoid Syria becoming a failed state.

Moreover, the opposition called for an impartial role for the army during the power transfer.

Under UN sponsorship, the Constitutional Committee’s eighth session last week recorded a “tempo” improvement in addition to participants agreeing to some common points.

However, translating those common points into consensual texts that could serve as pillars of Syria’s constitution remains an obstacle. This, as promised in the closing session on Friday, requires UN envoy Geir Pedersen to take an additional shuttle tour between Syrian actors and external players before the Committee’s next session.

Under previous UN facilitative arrangements, the program of the eighth round included presenting a constitutional principle every day starting from Monday and leaving the last day for discussions and consensus.

The civil society delegation affiliated with Damascus presented a proposal for “unilateral coercive measures from a constitutional standpoint.”

For his part, Bahra presented a proposal for “the supremacy of the constitution and the hierarchy of international agreements,” while Kuzbari proposed the principle of “preserving and strengthening state institutions.”

The civil society delegation affiliated with the opposition discussed the issue of “transitional justice.”

A Western official summarized to Asharq Al-Awsat the discussions that took place during the five days of the Committee’s eighth round of talks:

Coercive Measures

Kuzbari received the proposal presented by the civil society delegation affiliated with Damascus. Their bid emphasized that “unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Syrian people constitute economic terrorism and infringes on the basic constitutional rights of the Syrian people.”

They also warned that unilateral coercive measures could limit “the security of its basic living requirements.”

It was suggested for the constitution to include “the state’s obligation to seek the lifting of unilateral coercive measures and to demand the countries that imposed sanctions to pay appropriate compensation.”

Additionally, the proposal called for opposing and rejecting sanctions as a national duty for every Syrian.

It emphasized that the right to development and the reconstruction of what was destroyed by terrorism and external aggression is a project for the Syrian people under the constitution.

The proposal added that refugees’ right to safe and voluntary return is humanitarian and may not be linked to any external political conditions.

When discussing the proposal, the government delegation focused on the incompatibility of coercive measures with international law and chose to link these measures to the “terrorist war on Syria.”

Meanwhile, the opposition delegation considered the proposal “unconstitutional” and stressed that reconstruction and development are economic rights and should not be restricted by unilateral coercive measures.”

Some of the attendees considered “everyone who encourages sanctions a traitor.”

A Warning against “Racialization”

The following day, Kuzbari presented a proposal on “state institutions” in a session chaired by Bahri.

His proposal ensured that “institutions are entitled to specific powers by the constitution and that undermining them or threatening them internally or externally is an act punishable by law.”

“The responsibility of the army is to protect the homeland against terrorism and occupation,” the proposal acknowledged, adding that “preserving and strengthening the army is a national duty.”

During discussions, the opposition members focused on “Syrian institutions needing a lot of reforms because they have lost their credibility due to human rights violations.”

Opposition attendees suggested that “reform should not affect the restructuring of the army and the institutions that committed direct violations, but rather radically improve the institutional system.”

They stressed the “necessity of political neutrality for institutions, especially the army so that they do not interfere in the processes of power transition.”

On the other hand, the government delegation focused on “the legitimacy of institutions and their steadfastness despite being targeted by terrorism and international interventions.”

“The restructuring of institutions in other countries such as Iraq has only led to disasters... and the recommendations of international organizations for reform have failed,” said a Damascus representative.

The opposition urged the necessity of embracing reform as a basic entitlement to restore institutions to their work in all Syrian lands. Otherwise, Syria would be a failed state.

According to the opposition delegation, reform may require restructuring institutions, accountability for officials, and removing impunity for abusers, especially from the security services and the army.

The government delegation defended its proposal.

“State institutions exist, and reform does not mean restructuring. It should not be an excuse to destroy institutions or allow external interference,” a government representative said.

They stressed that “the army cannot be impartial, as there is no neutral army in the matter of protecting the people.”

More so, they argued that corruption and institutional failure are individual cases that did not undermine Syrian institutions’ steadfastness and commitment to their duties.

“Reform is ongoing and continuous and cannot reach the point of building alternative institutions. The experience of alternative institutions in Syria and other countries has failed miserably,” noted a government representative.

The Constitution, International Agreements

The proposal presented by Bahra dealt with “the supremacy of the constitution and the hierarchy of international agreements.”

It considered “the constitution as the supreme law of the country.” However, it argued that international agreements must be set higher than national laws.

Discussions took place on the proposal, with attendees asking technical questions.

One of the questions revolved around whether international agreements transcend national law directly at the time of their signing or after conforming to the national legal system and issuing appropriate legislation.

The opposition delegation proposed including human rights agreements in the constitution.

Meanwhile, the government delegation considered “international agreements in the human rights field as a door to infiltrating Syrian sovereignty.” It also refuted accusations of Damascus not being concerned with human rights.

The civil society delegation affiliated with Damascus supported the government delegation’s statements on the matter.

“This principle aims to put Syria under international trusteeship,” a civil society representative said.

Justice or Revenge

Civil society representatives affiliated with the opposition presented a proposal on “transitional justice.”

The proposal includes the state’s commitment to building societal peace by adopting a comprehensive approach to transitional justice.

It stressed the principle of non-impunity for human rights abusers.

War crimes, crimes against humanity and human rights violations do not fall with the passage of time or the issuance of a former amnesty with a series of measures, reforms, and accountability.

A heated discussion erupted as the Damascus delegation warned that the opposition’s proposal “opens the door to external interference and presents a back door to disrupting state institutions and social cohesion.”

The government delegation argued that the proposal accomplishes what the “international war on Syria couldn’t.”

Some suggested “justice in favor of compensating Syria for the war declared by foreign countries,” warning that the proposal’s text “incriminates the Syrian government in advance.”

However, this was denied by the opposition.

“The term is mentioned in many Arab and international constitutions, as transitional justice is a national process,” an opposition representative argued.

“It’s not a matter of revenge... there is a wide package of measures required to ensure sustainable peace,” they added.

“These measures include legal and illegal accountability measures that focus on reparations, memorialization and institutional reform programs.”

Papers, Amendments

On Friday, the participants gave written amendments to the proposals submitted successively in the previous four days.

Pedersen thanked Kuzbari and Bahra for their “good conduct of the discussion.”

Pedersen noted progress in the level and method of discussion, even “if there was no progress in the agreed content.”

The UN envoy expressed concern that “continuing discussion at this pace may require years before reaching final formulations.”

Accordingly, he vowed to consult with everyone to develop better mechanisms before the ninth round, which is slated for 25-29 July.

Pedersen said that he agreed with Kuzbari and Bahra on the importance of finding ways to speed up the pace of work and achieve results.



What’s Left of Hezbollah Two Years after the War?

A poster expresses gratitude to Iran for its support to Lebanon. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
A poster expresses gratitude to Iran for its support to Lebanon. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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What’s Left of Hezbollah Two Years after the War?

A poster expresses gratitude to Iran for its support to Lebanon. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
A poster expresses gratitude to Iran for its support to Lebanon. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The expanded war in Lebanon, which erupted with widespread Israeli bombardment on September 23, 2024, and led to intense clashes and battlefield shifts, has forced a new reality on Hezbollah.

The Iran-backed group's military capabilities, supply lines, and political influence have significantly declined following severe losses within its senior leadership ranks. Furthermore, Hezbollah's deployment on the ground and operations have fundamentally changed compared to its pre-war positioning.

Two years later, the group is navigating a far more complex military landscape. While the loss of a vast portion of its leadership, declining drone and missile capabilities, and shrinking supply lines through Syria have severely weakened its position, the party still retains enough military capacity to continue operating.

It is actively attempting to reorganize its ranks and adapt to an altered battlefield reality - one that stretches from north of the Litani River into broader territory across southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, security and defense expert Riad Kahwaji estimated that Hezbollah's capabilities have significantly declined between 2024 and today across its leadership, military structure, political influence, and supply lines, evaluating the scale of this drop to have "exceeded nearly half."

He explained that the group has lost the vast majority of its first- and second-tier leaders, while most of the leaders present today were classified within the third tier in 2024.

Hezbollah supporters carry posters of slain Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei during a rally coinciding with his funeral in Iran in Beirut's southern suburbs. (EPA file)

The nature of management within the group has also changed, as "management in 2024 was local under Iranian guidance, whereas today management and guidance have become directly Iranian," he added.

On the military level, Kahwaji said that "the party's forces have become stationed north of the Litani, after having previously been present directly on the border."

"Nabatieh has practically become the separation line of contact between the group's presence and the Israeli forces," he noted.

Regarding the military arsenal, he said that "missile and drone capabilities still exist, but they have become less than half of what they were before."

He added that Hezbollah's political influence within Lebanon has significantly weakened from its previous levels, noting that one of the most prominent shifts affecting the group is the severe disruption of its supply lines through Syria, which have now been largely cut off.

Since the November 2024 ceasefire up to the current stage, retired Brigadier General Dr. Khalil Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat that the party’s "capabilities have dropped compared to what they were before the war, but it has not lost its military capacity and still possesses capabilities that allow it to continue."

Its limited responses to Israel during the current stage may be a sign that it has entered a new "phase of reorganization and rebuilding of combat readiness," he added.

Helou explained that the period following the November 2024 ceasefire was marked by ongoing Israeli assassinations targeting Hezbollah operatives, while the group largely refrained from retaliating.

This pattern underscores a significant drop in Hezbollah's capabilities compared to its pre-2024 strength, while simultaneously indicating that the group has been undergoing a phase of reorganization, rearmament, and rebuilding of its combat readiness, he noted.

Helou stressed that the strategic landscape shifted following the outbreak of the US war on Iran at the end of February, which Hezbollah joined in early March.

"From that point until the second ceasefire on June 17, the party engaged in the fighting, launching effective retaliatory operations in certain areas and firing missiles into both the Israeli interior and Israeli-occupied territories," Helou said.

He remarked that during that phase, Israel "advanced, made incursions, and established its presence on the ground," while Hezbollah continued to carry out military responses, though the situation following the latest ceasefire has returned to a pattern similar to the period that followed November 2024.

"Today, we have virtually returned to the previous phase, as Hezbollah's responses to Israeli attacks have become almost nonexistent," he stated. "If we review operations over the past two and a half months since the ceasefire, the military operations carried out by the group against Israel are highly limited and can be counted on two hands. This stands in sharp contrast to dozens of daily Israeli operations, including airstrikes, shelling, and assassinations."


Trump, Yemen’s Alimi Discuss Bab al-Mandeb Developments

A Yemeni government soldier during the battles against the Houthis. (Military media)
A Yemeni government soldier during the battles against the Houthis. (Military media)
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Trump, Yemen’s Alimi Discuss Bab al-Mandeb Developments

A Yemeni government soldier during the battles against the Houthis. (Military media)
A Yemeni government soldier during the battles against the Houthis. (Military media)

US President Donald Trump discussed the accelerating military developments in Yemen during a telephone call on Sunday with the Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council Dr. Rashad al-Alimi.

The talks focused on the advance of Iran-backed Houthis near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, according to news agencies citing identical sources.

On the ground, battles are escalating in the highlands between western Taiz and northern Lahj.

Government and southern forces thwarted a Houthi advance towards al-Shamayatayn. They said they repelled repeated attacks, recaptured mountainous positions, and inflicted casualties among the Houthis.

Dozens of Houthis were killed in the past 24 hours, said field sources.

The government's Giants Brigades announced the destruction of five Houthi vehicles in the Kahbub mountains near Bab al-Mandeb, including a vehicle carrying a militant commander and another carrying an anti-aircraft weapon. All others on board were killed.

The government's National Shield Forces also announced the downing of two drones during the fighting.

In western Taiz, the fighting centered around Sharira, Mount Al-Mirzam, and Jardad, with Houthi infiltration attempts and attacks being thwarted.

In Marib, clashes and artillery shelling continue in Harib, Malaa, and Umm Reesh, with no change in the lines of control.

Government forces announced strikes on Houthi gatherings, fortifications, and artillery positions, as well as airstrikes and drone attacks in Marib and Al-Bayda.


Gaza Health Officials Say Israeli Fire Kills Three, Including Child

 Displaced Palestinians walk through a tent camp inside a school-turned-shelter in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, September 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Displaced Palestinians walk through a tent camp inside a school-turned-shelter in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, September 10, 2026. (Reuters)
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Gaza Health Officials Say Israeli Fire Kills Three, Including Child

 Displaced Palestinians walk through a tent camp inside a school-turned-shelter in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, September 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Displaced Palestinians walk through a tent camp inside a school-turned-shelter in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, September 10, 2026. (Reuters)

Gaza health officials said Israeli fire killed three people, including a woman and a child, and injured several others across the Palestinian territory on Monday.

Officials at Nasser hospital in the southern city of Khan Younis said the body of a child, Ismail Al-Bardawil, was brought to the medical facility after Israeli tanks opened fire on tents for displaced people in the Al-Mawasi area.

Mahmoud Bassal, the spokesman for Gaza's civil defense agency, which operates as a rescue force under Hamas authority, said the child was 11 years old.

In the central Gaza Strip, Al-Awda hospital officials said 31-year-old Fidaa Toutah died from her wounds after being shot by Israeli forces on Salah al-Din street east of Nuseirat refugee camp.

Officials at Al-Shifa hospital in Gaza City said a man, Mohsen Ahmed Bahjat, died after being shot in the head by a drone in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.

Gaza's civil defense agency confirmed the identities of the dead to AFP.

It said its teams had transported nine wounded people to hospitals following Israeli fire in Khan Younis in the south and Bureij refugee camp in the center of the territory.

When contacted by AFP, the Israeli military said it was checking the reports.

Israel in October last year agreed to a ceasefire brokered by the United States but since then has advanced further into Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed no let-up in strikes targeting Hamas, which led the unprecedented October 7, 2023 attack against Israel.

The 2023 attack killed 1,221 people, according to an AFP tally based on official Israeli figures.

The massive Israeli offensive in response has left most of Gaza in ruins and killed more than 73,900 people, according to Gaza's health ministry, which is under Hamas authority and whose figures are considered reliable by the United Nations.

Israeli strikes have killed more than 1,300 people since the ceasefire was announced last year, according to the Gaza health ministry.

The Israeli army has identified five deaths in its ranks over the same period, as well as the death of one civilian contractor.