Syria... Uncertainties and the ‘Graveyard of Expectations’

A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
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Syria... Uncertainties and the ‘Graveyard of Expectations’

A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)

Did Russia withdraw some of its forces from Syria after the Ukrainian war? What is the future of Arab normalization with Damascus? How serious is the recent presidential pardon decree in Syria? What is the fate of European sanctions? And how to deal with the economic crisis and the Russian ambiguity over the decision to extend the international mechanism for humanitarian aid across the border?

These were some of the “public questions” that European envoys to the Syrian file tried to answer in an unannounced meeting in Cyprus last week, with an understanding that Syria is the “graveyard of expectations” like other countries in the Middle East.

In Larnaca, on the shores of the Mediterranean, and tens of kilometers from the two Russian bases in western Syria, the envoys held their “secret” meeting to exchange information about the Syrian situation, the prospect of European policy, and the repercussions of the Ukrainian war.

Before the start of their closed meeting, the envoys had to visit Nicosia, and hear “the complaints of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry over Turkey sending Syrians to them by sea, or by air to Turkish Cyprus, to exert pressure on them and Europe in the immigration file.”

On the following day, European envoys and government representatives, including officials from Germany, France, Sweden and Ireland, held intensive discussions, featuring an intervention by UN Envoy Geir Pedersen. Here are the most important topics:

What about the presidential pardon?

The amnesty issued by President Bashar al-Assad for “terror crimes” - which stipulated the release of around 2,000 people and the cancellation of security and arrest warrants for about 200,000 people – was described by representatives of the Syrian government as an “unprecedented step.” Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad sent written letters to some Arab foreign ministers, including Jordanian Ayman Safadi, praising the “exceptional decree.”

The participants in the Larnaca meeting expressed two diverging stances:

The first group said that the decree that held the number 19 since 2011 was a “positive step”. They argued that it differed from the previous 18 decrees “because it deals with those accused of terrorism, that is, politicians.”

One of the participants quoted Miqdad as saying in an official meeting that there was a “decision to empty the prisons of detainees.”

Others spoke of the necessity of “not closing the door to the regime,” but “encouraging it to adopt more similar moves.” They noted that the amnesty decision was taken in response to Arab requests and internal needs.”

Miqdad was informed that maintaining this path would be considered “an essential step for building confidence.”

The second opinion cautioned against welcoming the decree hastily, stressing the need to ensure that it was not a mere “propaganda step.” Participants said that “pressure must be made to allow institutions such as the International Red Cross to visit prisons and verify the actual number” of people who have been released.

One of the attendees also spoke about the presence of more than 100,000 people detained or missing in Syrian prisons, saying: “Amnesty will not change the image of Syria.”

What about Arab normalization?

There was consensus that Arab normalization with Damascus was ongoing, and the question is “not whether it will happen, but when.” One of the participants said that if the European countries chose to wait for the implementation of Resolution 2254 before normalization, the lifting of sanctions and the contribution to the reconstruction, they might miss the train, because Arab countries continue the normalization process.

There were some expectations about “non-urgent” bilateral normalization steps with Damascus, pending the Arab summit in Algeria in November, when a collective Arab decision would be taken based on the prevailing political-regional atmosphere.

Representatives of major countries, such as Germany and France, emphasized the need to avoid making any step with Damascus until progress is achieved in the implementation of international resolution 2254. They highlighted the necessity to call for security and military reforms, within the visions of UN envoy Pedersen for a “step-by-step” approach.

No one talked about lifting European sanctions on Damascus, but voices mounted calling for Europe’s contribution to support “early recovery” projects in Syria in order to alleviate the burdens of the economic crisis, amid the political impasse, and for talks with Russia to extend the humanitarian aid mechanism across the border, before July 10.

What about Russia and Iran?

The Europeans exchanged information about the accuracy of Russia’s removal of some of its forces from Syria, amid assurances of actual military withdrawals of Russian pilots and forces, and estimates of the presence of about 4,000 Russian personnel in Syria.

One of the participants said: “There is information that Iran is filling the vacuum of Russian withdrawals, and that Turkey is seeking to change the equations in northern Syria.” Others spoke of the need to wait months or a year, before the effects of the Ukrainian war on Syria crystallize.

The general feeling expressed by more than one European envoy is “helplessness in the face of what is happening,” as if Syria will continue to face stagnation and suffering awaiting a breakthrough.

The only certainty put forward by one of the attendees is that the Middle East and Syria in particular, “are the graveyards of expectations.”



Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: At Saddam’s Request, I Tried to Prevent the American War on Iraq 

Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)
Gemayel maintained good relations with Saudi leaders from the era of King Faisal to that of King Salman. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Lebanese former President Amine Gemayel’s term (1982–1988) was difficult and turbulent. The Lebanese people were divided, and regional and international conflicts over Lebanon intensified. His presidency began amid the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Beirut and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel. The difficult developments followed swiftly.

In the year following the 1982 invasion, Moscow and Damascus supported Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, sparking the “Mountain War,” which deeply fractured the Druze–Maronite coexistence in the region. In 1984, Damascus backed Nabih Berri, head of the Amal Movement, leading to the “February 6 Intifada,” which shifted the sectarian power balance in Lebanon, which was in the throes of its 1975-1990 civil war.

Another significant event occurred in 1983 when suicide bombers attacked the barracks of the US Marines and French troops in the multinational peacekeeping force, killing hundreds and prompting Western withdrawal. Amid those explosions, Hezbollah was born—a force that would later become the most dominant player in Lebanon, particularly after inheriting Syria’s role there. During Gemayel’s term, Syria attempted to broker a “militia peace,” but the so-called “Tripartite Agreement” collapsed, paving the way for more wars and negotiation rounds.

Gemayel did not surrender to efforts aimed at controlling or isolating his presidency. He worked to maintain Lebanon’s relations with the West, strengthened ties with moderate Arab countries, and built relationships with leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi, as he recounts in the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amine Gemayel sits down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Close relationship with Saudi Arabia and its kings

Asked about his relationship with Saudi Arabia, beginning with his visit alongside his father, Pierre, to meet King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Gemayel said: “I’m proud of that relationship. I’m proud to have met all the kings—from King Faisal to King Salman. There isn’t one of them with whom I didn’t have a close personal relationship, and I take pride in that. Most of them had a special affection for me.”

He added: “At this time in Lebanon’s history, Saudi Arabia is the elder brother. Saudi Arabia never stabbed Lebanon in the back. It was always by Lebanon’s side through good times and bad, offering moral, social, and humanitarian support. You can’t deny that. You have to appreciate and respect those who stood by you in tough times.”

He also recounted a fond memory involving King Salman: “May God prolong his life. When he was governor of Riyadh, I used to visit him regularly. The Riyadh office knew me well. Every time I came to the Kingdom, it was expected that I’d visit the governorate.”

“Once, when I had an appointment with him, he took me to the desert to a camp of his—traditional tents, but inside one of them was a high-tech office with internet and modern communications. He told me he could contact anyone from there at any time. I asked if I could call home. He replied, ‘No.’ I was surprised. Then he said, ‘You can’t call home because your home is here.’ That’s how warm the atmosphere was. I truly appreciated his gesture.”

He continued: “In Lebanon’s difficult days, the Kingdom was always by our side. Even today—despite frustration with Lebanon’s ingratitude or Iranian influence—Saudi Arabia still has Lebanon in its heart. It waited for the first opportunity to return and help. Today’s hope in Lebanon is due to the Kingdom’s full weight and influence, working to restore Lebanon’s institutions and stability.”

Saddam’s armored car

Regarding his relationship with Saddam, Gemayel said: “It was a very warm relationship. I visited him several times in Baghdad. Once, during my presidency, there was an assassination attempt against me. He called and asked, ‘What are you doing about your security? They say you need better protection.’ I told him we were doing our best and relying on God. He said, ‘That’s not good enough—I’ll send you my car.’ The next day, his armored car arrived by plane—fully fortified inside and out.”

That relationship lasted until Saddam’s final days in power. Gemayel recalled: “On the eve of the (American) war, he sent word asking to meet. I went to Baghdad. He told me, ‘Things aren’t going well with the Americans. You have good relations with them—can you help us understand their intentions?’ I told him the issue was bigger than me. I had good contacts, but not at the presidential level anymore. He asked me to try anyway. So I went to the US, met with some people, but avoided senior officials to avoid media attention.”

Gemayel’s cousin, a top US lawyer with ties to James Baker, helped arrange a meeting: “We met Baker, who was almost retired but still influential. After a few days, he said he saw a glimmer of hope. He jokingly pulled out a stack of one-dollar bills and asked when I was born. I said December 1942. He found a bill with a serial number matching my birthdate, signed it, and gave it to me for luck. I still have it.”

Saddam Hussein welcomes Gemayel in Baghdad. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

“Sadly, it didn’t work. The Americans had made up their minds. Many tried—including the Vatican—but nothing succeeded. Still, it was an effort made at Saddam’s request.”

Gemayel added: “My ties with Saddam and his team, especially Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, remained very good. Saddam wanted to help Lebanon. But his relationship with (Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad was bad. They had mutual hatred. I still have the armored Mercedes he sent me—top-level protection, still in excellent condition.”

Asked about Saddam’s personal demeanor, Gemayel said: “Very approachable. One-on-one, there was no protocol. He was warm and engaging—you forget he’s this powerful figure. But reaching him was a maze—multiple layers of security and misdirection. You’d think you were meeting Saddam, only to find it was a lookalike. Eventually, you’d be taken to a modest house far from the airport, where the real Saddam would be waiting.”

On Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, he said: “Kuwait’s issue with Iraq is old, like Lebanon’s issue with Syria. But historical claims don’t justify violating sovereignty or erasing borders. Despite my personal ties with Saddam, we strongly opposed the invasion of Kuwait—a country with excellent relations with Lebanon. Just as we rejected Assad’s plans to annex Lebanon to Syria, we rejected Saddam’s attempt to annex Kuwait.”

Gemayel and Gaddafi: From estrangement to friendship

Gemayel’s relationship with Gaddafi began with tension but later transformed into friendship. He recalled: “When I became president, Libya, without coordination, sent military forces to Lebanon. That was illegal and against Arab League protocols. I sent Gaddafi a message demanding their withdrawal. He refused and took a hostile media stance. So I cut diplomatic ties with Libya early in my presidency.”

Later, Moroccan King Hassan II helped mediate: “I had a close relationship with King Hassan II. He invited me to a private dinner in Morocco. During the meal, he left twice—unusual for him. The second time, he returned smiling and said, ‘Gaddafi is on the phone—he wants to meet you.’ I was surprised and hesitant, especially with the issue of Imam Moussa al-Sadr still unresolved. But the king reassured me, saying Gaddafi had promised a new page. He offered his own plane and a senior minister to accompany me to guarantee safety.”

Amine Gemayel had a frosty relationship with Moammar al-Gaddafi that turned to friendship. (Courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

They traveled secretly, landed at a military airport in Libya, and met Gaddafi. Gemayel recounted: “He was extremely courteous and warm. We had a long conversation and agreed to reset relations. He asked how Libya could support Lebanon internationally. I thanked him, and flew back to Beirut.”

“But during our flight, Israeli radio reported that my plane had disappeared en route from Morocco. Panic erupted in Beirut—emergency meetings, calls to the US, plans to file complaints at the UN and Arab League. My wife was informed. She calmly said, ‘I’m not worried. Amine does these things—there must be good behind it.’ Eventually, the king reassured everyone I was fine.”

After that, Gemayel and Gaddafi maintained a cordial relationship: “He would often insist I visit. During the Arab Summit in Algiers, our seats were side by side. Gaddafi wanted a statement condemning the US raid on Tripoli that killed his adopted daughter. I proposed he draft a statement to be added to the final communiqué. I wrote it for him. He loved it.”

“There was also an issue with his tent. He refused to stay in a hotel and insisted on his tent. Algerian security and President Chadli Benjedid objected. Gaddafi threatened to leave. I mediated, and in the end, he sent the tent as a gift to my plane.”

Gaddafi never discussed the disappearance of al-Sadr with Gemayel. Gemayel said Syrian intelligence had reportedly played a role in the disappearance, as it controlled Libyan airports at the time. The mass popularity of al-Sadr was said to have disturbed the Syrian regime because his vision for Lebanon’s Shiites conflicted with Syria’s agenda.

Despite all the hardships of his presidency, Gemayel said he harbors no bitterness: “I have peace of mind knowing I stayed true to national principles and did my best.”

He expressed satisfaction with his son Sami Gemayel’s political path as a lawmaker and head of the Kataeb Party, and praised President Joseph Aoun’s guidance of the army and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s professional record—wishing success for the current leadership in Lebanon.