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Syria... Uncertainties and the ‘Graveyard of Expectations’

A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
    London -Ibrahim Hamidi
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Syria... Uncertainties and the ‘Graveyard of Expectations’

A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)

Did Russia withdraw some of its forces from Syria after the Ukrainian war? What is the future of Arab normalization with Damascus? How serious is the recent presidential pardon decree in Syria? What is the fate of European sanctions? And how to deal with the economic crisis and the Russian ambiguity over the decision to extend the international mechanism for humanitarian aid across the border?

These were some of the “public questions” that European envoys to the Syrian file tried to answer in an unannounced meeting in Cyprus last week, with an understanding that Syria is the “graveyard of expectations” like other countries in the Middle East.

In Larnaca, on the shores of the Mediterranean, and tens of kilometers from the two Russian bases in western Syria, the envoys held their “secret” meeting to exchange information about the Syrian situation, the prospect of European policy, and the repercussions of the Ukrainian war.

Before the start of their closed meeting, the envoys had to visit Nicosia, and hear “the complaints of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry over Turkey sending Syrians to them by sea, or by air to Turkish Cyprus, to exert pressure on them and Europe in the immigration file.”

On the following day, European envoys and government representatives, including officials from Germany, France, Sweden and Ireland, held intensive discussions, featuring an intervention by UN Envoy Geir Pedersen. Here are the most important topics:

What about the presidential pardon?

The amnesty issued by President Bashar al-Assad for “terror crimes” - which stipulated the release of around 2,000 people and the cancellation of security and arrest warrants for about 200,000 people – was described by representatives of the Syrian government as an “unprecedented step.” Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad sent written letters to some Arab foreign ministers, including Jordanian Ayman Safadi, praising the “exceptional decree.”

The participants in the Larnaca meeting expressed two diverging stances:

The first group said that the decree that held the number 19 since 2011 was a “positive step”. They argued that it differed from the previous 18 decrees “because it deals with those accused of terrorism, that is, politicians.”

One of the participants quoted Miqdad as saying in an official meeting that there was a “decision to empty the prisons of detainees.”

Others spoke of the necessity of “not closing the door to the regime,” but “encouraging it to adopt more similar moves.” They noted that the amnesty decision was taken in response to Arab requests and internal needs.”

Miqdad was informed that maintaining this path would be considered “an essential step for building confidence.”

The second opinion cautioned against welcoming the decree hastily, stressing the need to ensure that it was not a mere “propaganda step.” Participants said that “pressure must be made to allow institutions such as the International Red Cross to visit prisons and verify the actual number” of people who have been released.

One of the attendees also spoke about the presence of more than 100,000 people detained or missing in Syrian prisons, saying: “Amnesty will not change the image of Syria.”

What about Arab normalization?

There was consensus that Arab normalization with Damascus was ongoing, and the question is “not whether it will happen, but when.” One of the participants said that if the European countries chose to wait for the implementation of Resolution 2254 before normalization, the lifting of sanctions and the contribution to the reconstruction, they might miss the train, because Arab countries continue the normalization process.

There were some expectations about “non-urgent” bilateral normalization steps with Damascus, pending the Arab summit in Algeria in November, when a collective Arab decision would be taken based on the prevailing political-regional atmosphere.

Representatives of major countries, such as Germany and France, emphasized the need to avoid making any step with Damascus until progress is achieved in the implementation of international resolution 2254. They highlighted the necessity to call for security and military reforms, within the visions of UN envoy Pedersen for a “step-by-step” approach.

No one talked about lifting European sanctions on Damascus, but voices mounted calling for Europe’s contribution to support “early recovery” projects in Syria in order to alleviate the burdens of the economic crisis, amid the political impasse, and for talks with Russia to extend the humanitarian aid mechanism across the border, before July 10.

What about Russia and Iran?

The Europeans exchanged information about the accuracy of Russia’s removal of some of its forces from Syria, amid assurances of actual military withdrawals of Russian pilots and forces, and estimates of the presence of about 4,000 Russian personnel in Syria.

One of the participants said: “There is information that Iran is filling the vacuum of Russian withdrawals, and that Turkey is seeking to change the equations in northern Syria.” Others spoke of the need to wait months or a year, before the effects of the Ukrainian war on Syria crystallize.

The general feeling expressed by more than one European envoy is “helplessness in the face of what is happening,” as if Syria will continue to face stagnation and suffering awaiting a breakthrough.

The only certainty put forward by one of the attendees is that the Middle East and Syria in particular, “are the graveyards of expectations.”

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.