Syria... Uncertainties and the ‘Graveyard of Expectations’

A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
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Syria... Uncertainties and the ‘Graveyard of Expectations’

A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)
A Syrian boy, who works in car repair, shows his hands in the countryside of Aleppo in the north of the country on June 11. (AFP)

Did Russia withdraw some of its forces from Syria after the Ukrainian war? What is the future of Arab normalization with Damascus? How serious is the recent presidential pardon decree in Syria? What is the fate of European sanctions? And how to deal with the economic crisis and the Russian ambiguity over the decision to extend the international mechanism for humanitarian aid across the border?

These were some of the “public questions” that European envoys to the Syrian file tried to answer in an unannounced meeting in Cyprus last week, with an understanding that Syria is the “graveyard of expectations” like other countries in the Middle East.

In Larnaca, on the shores of the Mediterranean, and tens of kilometers from the two Russian bases in western Syria, the envoys held their “secret” meeting to exchange information about the Syrian situation, the prospect of European policy, and the repercussions of the Ukrainian war.

Before the start of their closed meeting, the envoys had to visit Nicosia, and hear “the complaints of the Cypriot Foreign Ministry over Turkey sending Syrians to them by sea, or by air to Turkish Cyprus, to exert pressure on them and Europe in the immigration file.”

On the following day, European envoys and government representatives, including officials from Germany, France, Sweden and Ireland, held intensive discussions, featuring an intervention by UN Envoy Geir Pedersen. Here are the most important topics:

What about the presidential pardon?

The amnesty issued by President Bashar al-Assad for “terror crimes” - which stipulated the release of around 2,000 people and the cancellation of security and arrest warrants for about 200,000 people – was described by representatives of the Syrian government as an “unprecedented step.” Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad sent written letters to some Arab foreign ministers, including Jordanian Ayman Safadi, praising the “exceptional decree.”

The participants in the Larnaca meeting expressed two diverging stances:

The first group said that the decree that held the number 19 since 2011 was a “positive step”. They argued that it differed from the previous 18 decrees “because it deals with those accused of terrorism, that is, politicians.”

One of the participants quoted Miqdad as saying in an official meeting that there was a “decision to empty the prisons of detainees.”

Others spoke of the necessity of “not closing the door to the regime,” but “encouraging it to adopt more similar moves.” They noted that the amnesty decision was taken in response to Arab requests and internal needs.”

Miqdad was informed that maintaining this path would be considered “an essential step for building confidence.”

The second opinion cautioned against welcoming the decree hastily, stressing the need to ensure that it was not a mere “propaganda step.” Participants said that “pressure must be made to allow institutions such as the International Red Cross to visit prisons and verify the actual number” of people who have been released.

One of the attendees also spoke about the presence of more than 100,000 people detained or missing in Syrian prisons, saying: “Amnesty will not change the image of Syria.”

What about Arab normalization?

There was consensus that Arab normalization with Damascus was ongoing, and the question is “not whether it will happen, but when.” One of the participants said that if the European countries chose to wait for the implementation of Resolution 2254 before normalization, the lifting of sanctions and the contribution to the reconstruction, they might miss the train, because Arab countries continue the normalization process.

There were some expectations about “non-urgent” bilateral normalization steps with Damascus, pending the Arab summit in Algeria in November, when a collective Arab decision would be taken based on the prevailing political-regional atmosphere.

Representatives of major countries, such as Germany and France, emphasized the need to avoid making any step with Damascus until progress is achieved in the implementation of international resolution 2254. They highlighted the necessity to call for security and military reforms, within the visions of UN envoy Pedersen for a “step-by-step” approach.

No one talked about lifting European sanctions on Damascus, but voices mounted calling for Europe’s contribution to support “early recovery” projects in Syria in order to alleviate the burdens of the economic crisis, amid the political impasse, and for talks with Russia to extend the humanitarian aid mechanism across the border, before July 10.

What about Russia and Iran?

The Europeans exchanged information about the accuracy of Russia’s removal of some of its forces from Syria, amid assurances of actual military withdrawals of Russian pilots and forces, and estimates of the presence of about 4,000 Russian personnel in Syria.

One of the participants said: “There is information that Iran is filling the vacuum of Russian withdrawals, and that Turkey is seeking to change the equations in northern Syria.” Others spoke of the need to wait months or a year, before the effects of the Ukrainian war on Syria crystallize.

The general feeling expressed by more than one European envoy is “helplessness in the face of what is happening,” as if Syria will continue to face stagnation and suffering awaiting a breakthrough.

The only certainty put forward by one of the attendees is that the Middle East and Syria in particular, “are the graveyards of expectations.”



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.