From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.

 

 



How Israel’s Multi-Ton Truck Bombs Ripped Through Gaza City

Destroyed buildings after Israeli military operations in Gaza City, November 12, 2025. (Reuters)
Destroyed buildings after Israeli military operations in Gaza City, November 12, 2025. (Reuters)
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How Israel’s Multi-Ton Truck Bombs Ripped Through Gaza City

Destroyed buildings after Israeli military operations in Gaza City, November 12, 2025. (Reuters)
Destroyed buildings after Israeli military operations in Gaza City, November 12, 2025. (Reuters)

In the weeks before the Gaza ceasefire on October 10, Israel widely deployed a new weapon: M113 Armored Personnel Carriers repurposed to carry between 1 and 3 tons of explosives, Reuters found.

As Israeli troops pushed toward the center of Gaza City, these powerful bombs, along with airstrikes and armor-plated bulldozers, leveled swathes of buildings, drone footage and satellite images show.

In most cases, but not all, the inhabitants fled ahead of demolitions after Israeli warnings, residents, Israeli security sources and Gaza authorities said.

Hesham Mohammad Badawi’s five-storey home on Dawla Street in the affluent Tel-al-Hawa suburb, damaged by an airstrike earlier in the war, was completely destroyed by an APC explosion on September 14, he and a relative said, leaving him and 41 family members homeless.

Badawi, who was a few hundred meters away, said he heard at least five APCs detonate in roughly five-minute intervals. He said he received no ​evacuation warning before the demolition and family members escaped “by a miracle” amid explosions and heavy gunfire.

Several buildings in the same block were demolished around that time, satellite images show.

The family is now staying with relatives in different parts of the city, Badawi said, while he lives in a tent by his former home. Israel’s military did not respond to Reuters questions about the incident. Reuters could not establish what Israel targeted in the attack or independently verify all the details of Badawi’s account of the events.

When Reuters visited in November, remains of at least one of the vehicles were strewn among large piles of rubble.

"We could not believe this was our neighborhood, this was our street," Badawi said.

To compile a detailed account of the role of APC-based bombs by the Israeli military in Tel-al-Hawa and the neighboring Sabra district in the six weeks before the ceasefire, Reuters spoke to three Israeli security sources, a retired Israeli military brigadier, an Israeli reservist, Gazan authorities and three military experts.

Seven Gaza City residents said their homes or those of neighbors were levelled or severely damaged by the explosions, which several likened to an earthquake. Analysis of Reuters footage by two of the military experts confirmed wreckage of at least two exploded APCs among the rubble at sites in Gaza City.

Israel packed 1 to 3 tons of ordnance in APCs, three military experts estimated, based on cabin space and wreckage of vehicle armor. Some of the ordnance was likely non–military ammonium nitrate or emulsion, though without chemical testing that conclusion is not certain, they said.

Such a multi-ton explosion could approach an equivalent power to Israel’s largest airborne bombs, the 2,000-pound US-made Mark 84, said two experts, who examined Reuters footage of the blast area and vehicle remains.

It could scatter vehicle fragments hundreds of meters and break close-by exterior walls and building columns. The blast wave would be strong enough to potentially collapse a multi-storey building, they said.

HIGHLY UNUSUAL

APCs generally transport troops and equipment on the battlefield. The three military experts ‌consulted by Reuters said use of ‌the vehicles as bombs was highly unusual and risked excessive damage to civilian dwellings.

In response to detailed Reuters questions for this story, Israel’s military said it was committed to the rules of war. Regarding ‌allegations of ⁠destruction of civilian ​infrastructure, it said it used ‌what it called engineering equipment only for “essential operational purposes,” without disclosing further details.

Decisions are guided by military necessity, distinction, and proportionality, it said.

In an interview with Reuters in Gaza for this story, Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem said Israel’s demolitions with armored vehicles were aimed at the large-scale displacement of the city's residents, which Israel has denied.

The reporting provides new evidence of the power of these low-tech weapons and how they came to be widely used.

Retired reservist Brigadier-General Amir Avivi, founder of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), a think tank, called the weapon an “innovation of the Gaza War.” One of the security sources said its increasing use partly responded to US restrictions on transfers of heavy Mark-84 airborne bombs and Caterpillar bulldozers.

Israel’s military and Prime Minister’s Office also did not respond to questions about the reasons for the shift in tactics. The US State Department, White House and Department of War did not respond to Reuters questions for this story.

Before the war, Tel-al-Hawa and Sabra, a historic area of modest houses in south-central Gaza City, bustled with bakeries, shopping malls, mosques, banks and universities.

Now, large parts lie in ruins.

Satellite imagery analysis by Reuters showed that about 650 buildings in Sabra, Tel-al-Hawa and surrounding areas were destroyed in the six weeks between September 1 and October 11.

MILITARY NECESSITY?

Two international law scholars, the UN human rights office and two of the military experts who reviewed Reuters findings said use of such large explosives in dense residential urban areas may have failed one or more principles of humanitarian law that prohibit attacking civilian infrastructure and using disproportionate force.

"The basis that some of it may be booby-trapped" or once used by Hamas snipers is not enough to justify mass destruction, Ajith Sunghay, head of the UN Human Rights Office in ⁠the Occupied Palestinian Territory, told Reuters, referring to Israel’s allegation that Hamas placed improvised explosive devices in houses, which Hamas denies.

In some circumstances, buildings could lose legal protection and become targets if Israel had evidence Hamas used them for military advantage, said Afonso Seixas Nunes, Associate Professor in the School of Law at Saint Louis University.

Israel’s military did not respond to Reuters requests to provide such evidence.

If not the result of military necessity, the ‌demolition of civilian infrastructure could amount to wanton destruction of property, which is a war crime, Sunghay said.

The level of ruin reflects a broader trend: 81% of Gaza’s buildings suffered damage or destruction ‍during the war, according to the UN Satellite Center. The area including Gaza City experienced most damage since July, with approximately 5,600 newly affected structures, it said ‍in October.

In August, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told reporters Israel was packing tons of explosives into APCs because Hamas had placed explosive devices in “just about every single building” in evacuated areas.

"We detonate them, and they set off all the booby traps. That's why you see the destruction," Netanyahu said.

In response ‍to questions for this story, Qassem, the Hamas spokesman, denied booby trapping buildings, and said Hamas did not have the capacity to set devices at the scale Israel claimed.

FORCES ENTER GAZA CITY

Later in August, Israeli forces entered Gaza City with the declared aim of eliminating Hamas and freeing hostages held by fighters since the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel that triggered the war.

Israel ordered a full evacuation of the city in September.

As troops advanced, backed by tanks and airstrikes, they extensively damaged eastern suburbs before approaching central areas of the city, where most displaced people were sheltering.

Hundreds of thousands fled south. The UN estimated 600,000-700,000 people remained in the city.

Israel’s defense minister has said soldiers demolished 25 towers that Israel said had Hamas tunnels underneath or were used as lookout points. The UN human rights office says Israel has provided no evidence the buildings were military targets.

Among the destruction visible in Sabra, Tel-al-Hawa and South Rimal between September 1 and October 11, Reuters identified al-Roya tower, which housed the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, a prominent human rights office that worked with charity Christian ​Aid, and al-Roya 2, a mixture of business and flats, brought down by airstrikes on September 7 and 8.

Two wings of the Islamic University of Gaza and a mosque on the campus were destroyed. In one six-block corner of Tel-al-Hawa almost every building was demolished - more than 60 in total.

Beyond the two cases of APC explosions analyzed in detail for this story, and airstrikes on towers caught on video, Reuters could not establish what weapons Israel deployed to demolish buildings, or the total number of APCs detonated ⁠from August until the ceasefire.

Gaza’s Civil Defense spokesperson Mahmoud Basal said the army detonated hundreds of APCs in that period, as many as 20 daily. Israel’s military did not reply to a question on numbers.

BADAWI’S HOUSE

Among the buildings destroyed was Badawi’s family home of four decades, along with more than 20 neighboring buildings in the same period.

"We didn’t recognize this as our house," he said.

Two military experts said Reuters footage of the area showed remains of at least one detonated APC.

The explosion had torn one APC caterpillar track from its running gear and “physically thrown it onto the roof” of a multi-storey building, a retired senior British military bomb disposal officer said, noting that M113 tracks each weigh hundreds of kilograms.

A thick, ripped piece of metal and a wheel torn in half, both scattered at the property, were consistent with a detonation from within the APC, said Gareth Collett, a retired British Brigadier General and leading authority on explosives and bomb disposal. He said the large size of the fragments was indicative of a commercial low energy explosive.

THE RETURN OF THE M113

Bought from the US after the Yom Kippur War in the 1970s, thousands of M113s were deemed to insufficiently protect soldiers and were mothballed, military historian Yagil Henkin said.

FMC Corp, originally the M113’s primary manufacturer, did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment about its use as a weapon and potential associated human rights concerns.

BAE Systems, which currently provides maintenance for the vehicle globally, did not reply to Reuters questions about Israel's new use of the M113 other than to say it currently had no direct military sales to the country. It said equipment it sold to the US government could reach other countries indirectly.

In May, Israel posted a public tender seeking to sell an unspecified number of M113s internationally, public documents show.

The tender was later cancelled, according to an undated posting on the Ministry of Defense website. The cancellation allowed Israel to scale up repurposing M113s, one of the security sources told Reuters. The military did not respond to Reuters’ questions about the tender.

The first media reports of an APC detonating in Gaza date to mid-2024.

Use accelerated this year when Israel rationed stocks after the US paused deliveries of Mark-84 bombs over concerns about the bombs use in residential areas, the source said.

CATERPILLAR D9

The increased role of APC-based bombs also coincided with shortages in Israel of US company Caterpillar's giant D9 bulldozer, long used by Israel’s military for demolition, one of the security sources said.

Hamas heavily targeted D9s earlier in the war, killing or injuring soldiers and damaging the vehicles, the source said. Alarmed by their use to demolish homes, the US paused D9 sales to Israel in November 2024, adding to the shortage. Under President Donald Trump, D9 transfers resumed.

Caterpillar did not respond to questions from Reuters about the military ‌use of its machines in Gaza demolitions and has not publicly commented on the matter.

Amid the shortages, the military began using other methods of demolition, including APCs, another of the security sources said.

Danny Orbach, an Israeli military historian, told Reuters demolitions were normal in war, made necessary in Gaza due to tunnels and booby traps. He said Israel’s military was underprepared for the complex fighting, leading to the conclusion there was “no other way to fight such a war except destroying all buildings above ground.”

Israel's military told Reuters targets were reviewed prior to attack and the munition selected “to achieve the military objective while minimizing collateral damage” to civilians and civilian infrastructure.


What to Know about China's Drills around Taiwan

A rocket launches from Pingtan island in eastern China's Fujian province, the closest point to Taiwan. ADEK BERRY / AFP
A rocket launches from Pingtan island in eastern China's Fujian province, the closest point to Taiwan. ADEK BERRY / AFP
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What to Know about China's Drills around Taiwan

A rocket launches from Pingtan island in eastern China's Fujian province, the closest point to Taiwan. ADEK BERRY / AFP
A rocket launches from Pingtan island in eastern China's Fujian province, the closest point to Taiwan. ADEK BERRY / AFP

China's military drills around Taiwan entered their second day on Tuesday, the sixth major maneuvers Beijing has held near the self-ruled island in recent years.

AFP breaks down what we know about the drills:

What are the drills about?

The ultimate cause is China's claim that Taiwan is part of its territory, an assertion Taipei rejects.

The two have been governed separately since the end of a civil war in 1949 saw Communist fighters take over most of China and their Nationalist enemies flee to Taiwan.

Beijing has refused to rule out using force to achieve its goal of "reunification" with the island of 23 million people.

It opposes countries having official ties with Taiwan and denounces any calls for independence.

China vowed "forceful measures" after Taipei said this month that its main security backer, the United States, had approved an $11 billion arms sale to the island.

After the drills began on Monday, Beijing warned "external forces" against arming the island, but did not name Washington.

China also recently rebuked Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi after she said the use of force against Taiwan could warrant a military response from Tokyo.

What do the drills look like?

Chinese authorities have published a map showing several large zones encircling Taiwan where the operations are taking place.

Code-named "Justice Mission 2025", they use live ammunition and involve army, navy, air and rocket forces.

They simulate a blockade of key Taiwanese ports including Keelung in the north and Kaohsiung in the south, according to a Chinese military spokesperson and state media.

They also focus on combat readiness patrols on sea and in the air, seizing "comprehensive" control over adversaries, and deterring aggression beyond the Taiwanese island chain.

China says it has deployed destroyers, frigates, fighters and bombers to simulate strikes and assaults on maritime targets.

Taipei detected 130 Chinese military aircraft near the island in the 24 hours to 6:00 am on Tuesday (2200 GMT on Monday), close to the record 153 it logged in October 2024.

It also detected 14 Chinese navy ships and eight unspecified government vessels over the same period.

AFP journalists stationed at China's closest point to Taiwan saw at least 10 rockets blast into the air on Tuesday morning.

How has Taiwan responded?

Taipei has condemned China's "disregard for international norms and the use of military intimidation".

Its military said it has deployed "appropriate forces" and "carried out a rapid response exercise".

President Lai Ching-te said China's drills were "absolutely not the actions a responsible major power should take".

But he said Taipei would "act responsibly, without escalating the conflict or provoking disputes".

US President Donald Trump has said he is not concerned about the drills.

How common are the drills?

This is China's sixth major round of maneuvers since 2022 when a visit to Taiwan by then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi enraged Beijing.

Such activities were rare before that but China and Taiwan have come close to war over the years, notably in 1958.

China last held large-scale live-fire drills in April, surprise maneuvers that Taipei condemned.

This time, Beijing is emphasizing "keeping foreign forces that might intervene at a distance from Taiwan", said Chieh Chung, a military expert at the island's Tamkang University.

What are analysts saying?

"China's main message is a warning to the United States and Japan not to attempt to intervene if the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) uses force against Taiwan," Chieh told AFP.

But the time frame signaled by Beijing "suggests a limited range of activities", said Ja Ian Chong, an associate professor at the National University of Singapore.

Falling support for China-friendly parties in Taiwan and Beijing's own army purges and slowing economy may also have motivated the drills, he said.

But the goal was still "to cow Taiwan and any others who might support them by demonstrating that Beijing's efforts to control Taiwan are unstoppable".


Why Do the Houthis in Yemen View Israel's Recognition of Somaliland as a Direct Threat?

People gather in front of a digital billboard featuring Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi, in Sanaa, Yemen, 28 December 2025. (EPA)
People gather in front of a digital billboard featuring Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi, in Sanaa, Yemen, 28 December 2025. (EPA)
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Why Do the Houthis in Yemen View Israel's Recognition of Somaliland as a Direct Threat?

People gather in front of a digital billboard featuring Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi, in Sanaa, Yemen, 28 December 2025. (EPA)
People gather in front of a digital billboard featuring Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi, in Sanaa, Yemen, 28 December 2025. (EPA)

The Iran-backed Houthi militias in Yemen view Israel's recognition of Somaliland as direct threat, warning that any Israeli presence in the separatist region will be considered a military target.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991. The region has operated autonomously since then and possesses its own currency, army and police force.

Diplomatic isolation has been the norm -- until Israel's move to recognize it as a sovereign nation, which has been criticized by the African Union, Egypt, the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council and the Saudi-based Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The European Union has insisted Somalia's sovereignty should be respected.

Houthi leader Abdelmalik al-Houthi said Israel's move was an "act of aggression on Somalia, Yemen and the security of the region."

In a statement, he added that Tel Aviv was seeking to establish "a military and intelligence foothold" in one of the world's most important waterways. He also warned that any Israeli presence in the region will be deemed a "legitimate target" for the Houthis.

Somaliland is strategically located at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden and close to the Mandeb Strait. It is one of the world's busiest waterways.

Analysts said that Israel's recognition gives it a direct outlet to the Red Sea, boosts its ability to monitor waterways and perhaps allows it to carry out military or intelligence strikes against its rivals, notably the Houthis in Yemen.

Since October 7, 2023, the Houthis had launched rocket and drone attacks against Israel and targeted ships affiliated with it in marine shipping lanes. Israel retaliated by carrying out attacks against Houthi targets in Yemen. The attacks by both sides ended with the announcement of the ceasefire in Gaza.

Political sources said the Houthis are alarmed at the prospect of Israel having a presence in Somaliland. In their view, this will lead to them being surrounded from the southwest. They also fear that Somaliland will be used as a platform for Israeli attacks against them in Yemen.