Memoirs of Late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (Part 1): I Expressed my Objection to Hafez al-Assad to Syria’s Political, Military Role in Lebanon

Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
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Memoirs of Late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam (Part 1): I Expressed my Objection to Hafez al-Assad to Syria’s Political, Military Role in Lebanon

Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.
Saeb Salam in Damascus with President Hafez al-Assad and Abdel Halim Khaddam.

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes three episodes of the memoirs of late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam, covering important stages of the Lebanese crisis, from the entry of Syrian forces into Lebanon in 1976 to the Israeli invasion of the South in 1982.

The memoirs reflect the late premier’s frankness in evaluating the role of Arab and Lebanese leaders and his attempts to bring the views closer, to ensure Islamic-Christian consensus, and to preserve Lebanon’s position as an independent country away from conflicts.

The memoirs are issued in three parts by Hachette Antoine publishing house, and will be available in Lebanon starting June 28 and on the Antoine Online website.

In this episode, Salam presents the circumstances of the election of President Elias Sarkis and the entry of the Syrian forces. He recounts his communication during that period with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and with Lebanese and Palestinian officials.

He recounted that on May 10, 1976, immediately after the election of Elias Sarkis, a meeting was held at his office, in the presence of MPs Raymond Edde, Emile Rouhana Saqr, Jamil Kebbi, Mohammad Youssef Beydoun, Mikhail Al-Daher, Hussein Al-Husseini, Hassan Al-Rifai and Albert Mansour, who had all boycotted the elections.

“After deliberation, we issued a very calm and brief statement calling for patience; it was noticed that Raymond Edde took the loss in a very good spirit, and seemed less affected than others by what happened,” he said, as translated from the official Arabic version.

Salam continued: “But on the following Monday, we decided to step up a bit, so we gathered and issued a statement warning against the continuation of the conspiracy… This is because people have begun to get fed up with the lack of progress since Sarkis was elected, knowing that the general feeling that prevailed after his election - despite the bitterness and oppression - was hope for a breakthrough.”

He said that at that time, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) and his comrades in the resistance felt very upset, so they asked for a summit in Aramoun.

“It was decided to send Mr. Musa al-Sadr to Damascus in an attempt to convey to the Syrians our feelings of concern as a result of their military intervention, especially because of what happened in Tripoli,” he stated.

“At the end of the summit meeting, an argument erupted between me and Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled… I was very harsh on him, especially since I was in pain at his (and Karami’s) flattering stance towards Syria, and at the time of the argument I withdrew from the meeting. This caused an uproar in the newspapers and in public opinion,” Salam recounted.

The Syrian Army in Lebanon

In his memoirs Salam described the entry of the Syrian forces to Lebanon on the first of June 1976, from the north and the east of the country, under the pretext of protecting the Christians.

“Whatever the case, despite the fact that many Islamic and Palestinian parties were looking at the increasing Syrian intervention in recent months with apprehension, considering it a prelude to a massive military presence, the desperate situation led people to wish that any armies would come to stop the mass massacre and achieve salvation. The question today, after what happened, is whether salvation will be at the hands of the Syrian army, or will things escalate in Lebanon, and then in Syria, as some talk about the existence of an American-international conspiracy that aims to tear Lebanon apart, and then implicate the Syrians to tear Syria apart as well?”

Salam noted that when the entry of the Syrian army became a reality, Kamal Jumblatt and the resistance held many meetings, and issued many violent and escalatory statements with threats of confrontation.

“The difficult days were those that followed the entry of the Syrian forces, as the military and political events succeeded… and the ‘Palestinian resistance’ seemed forced to fight many battles, whether on the front with the Syrians, or with the Phalanges and their allies,” he said.

The assassination of Kamal Jumblatt and its repercussions

Salam recounted that on March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated on Mukhtara Road in the Chouf region. He said that the event constituted a great shock throughout the country.

“An immediate angry reaction from the Chouf Druze people claimed the lives of more than one hundred Christians, especially in the village of Mazraat al-Chouf, near Mukhtara,” he said.

He added: “It was clear that the country was on the verge of a great strife, perhaps greater than any other strife it knew, due to Jumblatt’s position in Lebanon, and because of the complexity of Lebanese circumstances…”

The late premier said that in view of the escalating tension, he rushed to cooperate with the Phalange Party (Kataeb), in an attempt to quell the fire of sedition.

“We have succeeded in that to the greatest extent. Especially since Walid Jumblatt, son of the late leader, immediately appeared sane and wise, and decided to bury his father the next day, after the National Movement parties had decided to postpone the burial until Sunday, inflaming the reactions,” he remarked.

The visit of Assad and Sadat

Salam recounted details of his meetings with Assad in 1977: “Before the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, I was determined to go to Egypt to meet President Anwar Sadat, after the delayed response I was waiting for from Syria regarding a meeting I requested with President Hafez al-Assad… Suddenly, as I was preparing to travel to Egypt, I received a telegram from Mr. Abdel Halim Khaddam stating that President Assad will receive us in the Syrian capital on Saturday, March 19.

“As usual, I was frank with President al-Assad, so I explained to him all my complaints about their actions in Lebanon, militarily and politically. He did not hesitate to tell me that he takes this into consideration... However, I had the feeling that he is now acting on the basis of the new reality, that is, his feeling that he has drowned the Syrian army is in the Lebanese swamp, and that this makes him anxious, and thus hardens his stance further.”

As for his meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Salam recounted:
“During the meeting, I felt that Sadat was very optimistic about his upcoming encounter with US President Jimmy Carter. I told him that I, in turn, was optimistic…

Salam said that Sadat told him that they were about to clash militarily with Israel because of its aggression in the Gulf of Suez, and that the battleships and planes were about to collide, but Carter intervened, confirming that the area was and will remain Egyptian.

“Sadat said that he insisted on playing all his cards with the Americans; because he believes that the key to resolving the conflict with Israel is entirely in the hands of America. As for the Soviets, they are only obliged to go along with Washington,” he noted in his memoirs.

“With regard to Lebanon, Anwar Sadat told me, as Lebanese President Elias Sarkis had previously confirmed during my meeting with him a few days ago, that it was the Syrians who assassinated Kamal Jumblatt,” Salam revealed.

He added: “When the meeting ended, and while President Sadat was bidding farewell to me, he warned me again that I might be assassinated, and told me that I should be aware of the Syrians.”

Salam said that the following weeks continued with political maneuvers and instability in the Islamic ranks.

“The ‘Palestinian resistance’ continued to sink into the swamp of the Lebanese situation, in parallel with growing resentment of the citizens... Meanwhile, the Syrian army was strengthening its presence in Lebanon. It was clear that Syria had become the center of gravity in the Lebanese reality. As for Israel, it was interfering from time to time.

“On the Arab level, the situation went in ups and downs... I was getting stricter towards “Abu Ammar” and his group, because I was keen on them as much as I was keen on and Lebanon as a whole, but they did not want to heed my advice.”



Türkiye’s Gas Shift Threatens Russia and Iran’s Last Big European Market

A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
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Türkiye’s Gas Shift Threatens Russia and Iran’s Last Big European Market

A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)
A worker checks the valve gears in a natural gas control center of Türkiye’s Petroleum and Pipeline Corporation, 35 km (22 miles) west of Ankara, February 14, 2012. (Reuters)

Türkiye could meet more than half of its gas needs by the end of 2028 by ramping up production and increasing US imports, in a shift that threatens to shrink the last major European market for Russian and Iranian suppliers.

Washington has publicly pressured allies, including NATO member Türkiye, to cut energy ties with Moscow and Tehran. At their White House meeting on September 25, US President Donald Trump pressed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to cut Russian energy purchases.

Diversifying supply would also strengthen Türkiye’s energy security and support its ambitions to become a regional gas hub. Ankara aims to re-export imported liquefied natural gas and its own gas production to Europe while burning Russian and Iranian gas domestically, analysts said.

" Türkiye has been signaling that it will take advantage of the (global) LNG abundance," said Sohbet Karbuz, from the Paris-based Mediterranean Organization for Energy and Climate.

Russia remains Türkiye’s largest gas supplier, but its share of the market has fallen from more than 60% two decades ago to 37% in the first half of 2025. Most European countries halted imports following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

RUSSIA'S PIPELINE CONTRACTS NEAR EXPIRY

Russia's long-term pipeline contracts with Türkiye to supply 22 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually via the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines are close to expiry. Iran's 10 bcm contract expires in the middle of next year, while Azerbaijan’s contracts, totaling 9.5 bcm, run until 2030 and 2033.

While Türkiye is likely to extend some of these contracts, it is likely to seek more flexible terms and smaller volumes to increase the diversity of its supply, Karbuz said.

At the same time, Türkiye is rapidly expanding alternative sources. State-owned TPAO is boosting output from local gas fields, while state and private companies have expanded LNG import terminals to bring gas in from the US and Algeria.

Domestic production and contracted LNG imports are set to exceed 26 bcm annually from 2028 from 15 bcm this year, according to Reuters calculations.

US LNG IMPORTS SET TO DOUBLE

That would cover more than half of Türkiye’s gas demand of around 53 bcm, reducing the gap for pipeline imports to around 26 bcm - well below the 41 bcm of current contracted supplies from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan combined.

To support this shift, Türkiye has signed a series of LNG deals with US suppliers worth $43 billion, including a 20-year agreement with Mercuria in September.

The country has built 58 bcm annual LNG import capacity, enough to cover its entire demand, according to Türkiye’s energy exchange.

Despite this, Russian gas continues to flow at full capacity, and the Kremlin has said cooperation with Ankara remains strong.

Since Türkiye needs less Russian gas, BOTAS could, in theory, stop imports from Moscow in two to three years, said Alexey Belogoryev of the Moscow-based Institute for Energy and Finance.

"However, it won't do so, because Russian gas is price-competitive and creates a surplus that BOTAS can use to pressure other suppliers," Belogoryev said.

Türkiye’s energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in a TV interview in October that Türkiye must source gas from all available suppliers, including Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, but noted that US LNG offers cheaper alternatives.

The energy ministry declined to comment on future supply deals and pricing. Russian gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom did not reply to a request for comment.

Türkiye could burn Russian and Iranian gas at home, export its own production and re-export imported LNG after Europe bans Russian energy imports by 2028, said Karbuz.

Türkiye’s BOTAS has already signed deals to supply Hungary and Romania with small volumes of gas in its bid to become a regional gas trading hub.

Beyond gas, Ankara has deep ties with Moscow. Russia's Rosatom is building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant and Moscow is also the country's top crude and diesel supplier.


Tehran Losing Rounds in Iraq, but Not the War Yet

Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
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Tehran Losing Rounds in Iraq, but Not the War Yet

Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)
Jawad Hassan Nasrallah marks anniversary of his father, former Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, in Baghdad - 2025 (Reuters)

Two years ago, Iraq’s armed factions were eager to make their presence felt in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” scenes. That enthusiasm faded in the months after October 2023 amid what officials described as highly complex negotiations between the government and those groups to keep Iraq out of the war.

There is no evidence that Iran has lost Iraq entirely, as it did in Syria. But it has begun to lose round after round to the Americans in Baghdad’s arena, while its proxies have grown accustomed to living peacefully alongside “the two most dangerous men in the world these days, Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu,” as a former Iraqi minister put it.

Politicians in Baghdad cite three “boxing rounds” that the Americans have won over the Iranians: the release of Israeli researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov from Kataib Hezbollah custody without a deal; the withdrawal of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) law that was ready for a parliamentary vote; and, before that, a long truce with US forces even during the 12-day US-Israeli attacks on Iran.

Two years after the “Unity of Fronts” declaration and following Hamas’s Oct. 7 operation, Iraq’s factions were missing from the closing scenes of the “Flood.” For many, that is good news — for now.

Searching for “Plan B”

A Shiite politician who recently visited Tehran returned to Baghdad with a vague outlook ahead of campaign season for the November 2025 parliamentary elections.

The politician, who officially launched his campaign on Oct. 3, said Tehran is looking for a “Plan B” to avoid a knockout blow. “It may surprise many with what it has in store,” he said, suggesting Iran might “make up for Syria elsewhere.”

Shiite politicians in Baghdad, he added, have a habit of “reading the election book in a language the Iranians understand.”

But how accurate is such a forecast? There is no clear metric to measure Iranian influence in Iraq. Analysts remain divided over whether it has diminished to the point that, after Syria’s “domino” fell, its allied groups in Iraq have also tumbled.

In reality, Iraqi public opinion — and the partisan instruments that shape it — often revolve around narratives that are constructed, improvised, or deliberately ambiguous.

Factions Ask, Iran Doesn’t Answer

Reports of a possible war against Iran have put Baghdad’s factions under pressure. According to sources, leaders of several groups met in late September 2025 and sent a consultation request to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seeking guidance on what to expect if war breaks out.

A senior member of a faction recently added to a US terrorism list said Tehran has yet to respond.

At the same time, an IRGC team tasked with managing Shiite electoral alliances in Iraq has been holding meetings with figures in the Coordination Framework coalition. Cross-cutting sources described the team as “Iran’s election committee,” overseeing the distribution of Shiite parties across competing lists — a group that previously engineered influential coalitions in past parliaments.

But this “expert” committee failed to convince Shiite party leaders to implement Tehran’s proposed blueprint to merge lists or reshuffle candidates in key constituencies across central and southern Iraq.

Some Shiite figures accused of defying Iranian directives belong to resistance factions that briefly joined the “Al-Aqsa Flood” front before retreating to the “backyard,” seeking new sources of leverage.

Empty Spaces

In cities liberated from ISIS, Sunni parties are running relatively stable campaigns. Many sense that the loosening of Iran’s grip has allowed them to move more freely — though few dare say so aloud. There are visible efforts to remain cautious and avoid provoking the “Axis of Resistance.”

Former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi — ousted in 2023 by a Tehran-aligned coalition — is now staging a strong comeback. His associates attribute that to “personal skill and precise calculation,” though it also reflects his use of spaces left vacant by waning Iranian influence, whether by design or under US pressure.

Still, Sunni rivals seeking to counter Halbousi need alliances with Shiite power brokers to secure political “horses to bet on.” In Nineveh, Salahuddin, and Kirkuk, several Sunni figures are shaping their lists in coordination with factions loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

For that reason, Iraq’s “empty” spaces may be little more than a mirage.

According to a Shiite politician, powerful factions recently received Iranian requests to help relocate activities of allied groups from other “resistance” countries to Baghdad — and that has already begun.

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ali Larijani, secretary-general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, is overseeing arrangements to assist Tehran’s war-strained proxies. Larijani was recently in Beirut, where he said before departing: “Hezbollah is quickly regaining strength and will shift the balance.”

“Bin Laden’s Fate Is Not Inevitable”

Four Iraqi factions — Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Imam Ali, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada — were recently added to the US State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, bringing Iraq’s total to six.

A few years ago, that same list included al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq was designated in 2020, while Kataib Hezbollah has been listed since 2009. Both groups still hold seats and cabinet posts in parliament and government.

“You don’t have to share bin Laden’s fate just because you’re on that list,” said a former Iraqi minister who served in Adel Abdul Mahdi’s 2018–2019 government. “Iran-backed groups are now learning to coexist with the world’s two most dangerous men — Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu.”

In Baghdad, voices within Shiite parties have begun to ask whether the US president is deliberately delaying Israeli strikes in Iraq, leveraging American pressure on the government and decision-makers to sever ties with Tehran.

“Will Trump Protect Us from Netanyahu?”

The same former minister, who asked not to be named, said Washington has won battles inside Tehran because Iraqis responded to pressure at a moment of Iranian confusion. “For months,” he added, “Shiite factions have been asking: Will Trump really protect us from Netanyahu? It appears so.”

He sees signs of the “Plan B” Iran is developing: “New Shiite political players who stayed out of the Al-Aqsa Flood fallout are now trying to rebrand themselves — updating their radical image with a civilian face to escape the danger zone.”

It’s like a man standing in a sniper’s sights, a laser dot fixed on his chest. He cannot move right or left — any motion could be fatal. The sniper will not tire as long as the target remains frozen.

“What if the target changes his face, name, and behavior?” the former minister asked. “Some militia leaders are now toying with the idea of returning weapons to storage and shaving their beards — which could make them very useful to both Washington and Tehran.”

A Shiite politician close to the scene agrees: “A militia commander thinking that far ahead will be valuable to Iran once the storm calms.” He added that “four years with Trump is a long time — and even longer with Netanyahu. Survival demands change.”

Autumn nights are settling over Baghdad amid a blazing election summer. Even as talk grows of a new Iran-Israel war, militia leaders who once spread out maps of Tel Aviv to plan rocket strikes are now opening their offices to liberal and secular elites — for long conversations about elections whose intrigue has already begun.


Gaza Babies Forced to Share Oxygen Masks as Israel Blocks Equipment, UNICEF Says

A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
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Gaza Babies Forced to Share Oxygen Masks as Israel Blocks Equipment, UNICEF Says

A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj
A medical worker prepares to evacuate a premature baby from Al Helo International Hospital to be transported to a hospital in southern Gaza for further medical care, amid an Israeli military operation, in Gaza City October 3, 2025. REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj

Israel has repeatedly denied permission to transfer incubators from an evacuated hospital in North Gaza, a UN children's agency official said on Tuesday, adding to strain on overcrowded hospitals further south where newborn babies are now sharing oxygen masks.

Two years of war between Israel and Hamas has increased stress and malnourishment among pregnant mothers, leading to a rise in premature and underweight babies who the World Health Organization says now account for a fifth of all Gaza newborns.

Over the past month an Israeli assault on Gaza City in northern Gaza has shut hospitals in that area, worsening overcrowding in hospitals that remain open in the south.

James Elder, UNICEF spokesperson, described mothers and babies lining the corridor floors of Nasser Hospital in southern Gaza, and said that premature babies were being forced to share oxygen masks and beds. Meanwhile, vital equipment is stranded in hospitals that have been shut in the north.

"We've been trying to recover incubators from a hospital that was evacuated in the north, and we've had four missions denied simply to get those incubators," he told Reuters by video link from Gaza, referring to supplies now stuck at the damaged Al-Rantissi Children's Hospital in Gaza City.

At a hospital Elder visited in the south, meanwhile, "in one of the paediatric rooms, there were three babies and three mums on a single bed, one source of oxygen, and the mothers would rotate the oxygen 20 minutes to each child," he said. "This is the level of desperation mums have now got to."

Israel's COGAT, a military branch overseeing aid flows, did not immediately respond to a request for comment on UNICEF's remarks. Israel says it is committed to allowing aid deliveries in Gaza but must control it to prevent it being stolen by Hamas, which it blames for the crisis.

The UN humanitarian office said on Tuesday that Israel had either denied or impeded 45% of its 8,000 requested humanitarian missions within Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023.

UNICEF has called for the evacuation of ill and premature babies remaining in northern Gaza hospitals. The WHO transferred three of them last week to a hospital further south, but said one died before the mission. Only 14 of Gaza's 36 hospitals are currently even partially functional, the WHO says.