Rising Heat Drives Crippling Sandstorms across the Middle East

Fishermen navigate their boat on the Tigris River during a sandstorm in Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 3, 2022. (AP)
Fishermen navigate their boat on the Tigris River during a sandstorm in Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 3, 2022. (AP)
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Rising Heat Drives Crippling Sandstorms across the Middle East

Fishermen navigate their boat on the Tigris River during a sandstorm in Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 3, 2022. (AP)
Fishermen navigate their boat on the Tigris River during a sandstorm in Baghdad, Iraq, Sunday, July 3, 2022. (AP)

Over the past two months, Iraqis have been living, working and breathing in thick clouds of dust, as at least nine sandstorms - lasting up to several days each - have hit the country, blanketing everything in grit.

Hospitals have reported a surge in admissions, with thousands of patients coming in with severe respiratory illnesses, while schools and offices have had to close and flights have been grounded for days at a time.

"I can't walk outside without coughing or covering my mouth," Azzam Alwash, founder of non-governmental green group Nature Iraq, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation from his home in Baghdad.

The latest storm "kept me in the house for two days. I have asthma, so I have to stay inside to protect my lungs," he said.

Iraq, Iran, Syria and other Gulf states are no strangers to sand and dust storms (SDSs) which have historically occurred in the hot months from May to July when strong northwesterly winds carry large amounts of dust throughout parts of the region.

But these days the storms are coming earlier and more frequently, rising well above the once-normal once or twice a year, starting as early as March and spreading over a wider area.

As governments struggle to cope with the dusty onslaught, environmentalists and government officials say what's driving the threat is a combination of climate change and poor water management practices that together are turning more of the region's soil into sand.

They warn that rising temperatures and changing weather patterns suggest there's worse to come, unless governments can work together to cut climate-changing emissions and reduce the health and financial impacts of the waves of sand sweeping through the region.

"The increase in droughts is a particular concern," said Kaveh Zahedi, deputy executive secretary for sustainable development at the United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

He said affected countries should invest in early warning and forecasting systems, craft more efficient water and land management policies, and put in place insurance and social protection measures to help the most vulnerable communities recover from the storms.

A perfect storm

Travelling thousands of kilometers, each sand and dust storm can wreak havoc through a dozen countries.

They damage buildings, powerlines and other vital infrastructure, kill crops, reduce visibility for drivers and interrupt air, rail and water transportation, according to a 2019 report from the World Bank.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) loses about $13 billion a year to the effects of sandstorms, from the costs of cleanup and recovery to treating health problems and a decline in productivity, the report says.

Kaveh Madani, a research scientist focused on environmental justice, security and diplomacy at City College of New York, said the dangers posed by sand and dust storms have been overlooked by local and international governments for too long.

"This transboundary and transgenerational issue ... is only becoming more dangerous every year," said Madani, who previously served as deputy head of Iran's environment department.

"It's really disappointing to see that one of the most debilitating environmental problems of the 21st century is not being properly recognized by major intergovernmental and scientific agencies," he said in a telephone interview.

The Middle East has always been naturally burdened with strong winds, dry soil and hot weather, which combined provide the perfect conditions for sand and dust storms.

But climate experts say rising heat coupled with decades of poor water management and inefficient agricultural practices have degraded land across the region, making it easier for dust particles to be picked up and swept across vast areas.

A report released by the International Monetary Fund in March shows that, since the 1990s, the Middle East has been heating up twice as fast as the global average.

In many MENA countries, 85% of water goes to agricultural uses, according to the World Bank.

Climate experts say unsustainable agricultural practices such as overgrazing, excessive use of chemicals and machinery and excessive irrigation - often encouraged by heavily subsidized water tariffs - are helping drive desertification in the region.

Also to blame, said Madani, are the strings of dams being built on some of the region's major rivers, which can block water flowing to wetlands. Conflicts also can force farmers to flee, leaving their land to become barren and dry.

"Add to this mix the problem of deforestation, land use changes, abandoned farmlands ... and you have the recipe for more frequent and intense dust storms," he said.

Dust diplomacy

Tense political relations between some of the countries hardest hit by sandstorms hamper negotiations on how to tackle the problem, said Erik Solheim, who was executive director of the UN's Environment Program between 2016 and 2018.

But some nations have made individual efforts to fight dust storms in the region.

Saudi Arabia has committed to planting 10 billion trees within its own borders with the aim of reducing carbon emissions and reversing creeping land degradation.

Trees can revive parched land by trapping more rain in the ground and slowing the evaporation of water from the land, while their roots bind soil and prevent erosion.

In 2016, the Abu Dhabi-based Masdar Institute of Science and Technology launched a web-based modelling system that provides near-real-time maps of concentrations of atmospheric dust and other pollutants in the region.

But environmental experts who spoke with the Thomson Reuters Foundation said existing measures are not enough to prepare the region for the extreme dust storms that worsening climate change could bring.

"Unless immediate and serious action is taken in the Middle East to address the matter of dust storms, outcomes like forced migration of people can turn (storms) into a global problem rather than a regional one," Madani said.

Solheim, currently a senior advisor to the World Resources Institute think tank, is among several experts and officials calling for UN climate talks this year in Egypt and next year in the United Arab Emirates to become a forum for governments to engage in diplomacy aimed at curbing the scourge of sandstorms.

"Many other environmental issues are higher on the agenda, but sand and dust storms have hardly been talked about in climate talks," Solheim said.

"(The problem) has been seen as a secondary issue, even though it is one of the most harmful environmental issues for human beings."



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.