Syria: Small Wars, Big Battles

Boys look at opposition fighters in the countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria (AFP)
Boys look at opposition fighters in the countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria (AFP)
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Syria: Small Wars, Big Battles

Boys look at opposition fighters in the countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria (AFP)
Boys look at opposition fighters in the countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria (AFP)

Can “small wars” in the near or immediate future shake the stalemate in Syria? What are the priorities of acting states in the Syrian file? Where do the concerns of Syrians lie within their war-torn country and the three micro-states existing there? How are Syrians dealing with the “big battles” that have to do with living conditions?

A War of Drafts

Millions of Syrians turned their attention to the diplomatic confrontation in the UN Security Council in New York between the West and Russia.

World powers are in dispute over the extension of the international resolution to deliver aid across the Turkish border and “contact lines” inside Syria, with the current resolution’s mandate coming to an end tomorrow.

Moscow wants to renew the mandate for a period of six months instead of a whole year. It wants to drag Western countries to negotiations twice a year for many reasons, including the Ukraine war.

Russia also is looking to change the language of the international resolution and add electricity financing to “early recovery” projects. By this, it hopes to bring the world closer to contributing to the Syrian reconstruction file, a matter on which Western countries impose political conditions.

Moreover, Russia is trying to increase aid delivery through Syria to push for expanding relations with Damascus.

Other proposals include deleting any reference to the International Committee of the Red Cross and its efforts. This comes with the intention to “punish” the relief organization for several positions, including its support for an international plan to establish an international mechanism to follow up on the file of missing persons in Syria.

Raids and Tests

Russia has at least three times bombed positions near US forces at Al-Tanf base, southeast Syria, and elsewhere.

Moscow did not give Washington's army sufficient time under the MoU they signed in 2017 for preventing conflict between them.

Clearly, this will be repeated frequently with Ukraine entering a Western-Russian “war of attrition.”

Such a situation raises worry about pivotal military frictions between the major powers in Syria.

New Lines

For the first time, Israel bombed areas south of Tartus, near the Russian base and north of the Lebanese border. Israel said that its targeting had hit military assets for Hezbollah.

Before that, Tel Aviv bombed Damascus International Airport and put it out of business for days.

Russia has partially restricted Israel's movement in Syria, due to Tel Aviv's position on the Ukraine war.

Multiple military friction may occur in Syria (or Lebanon), if the overt war in Ukraine and the “shadow war” in Iran escalate.

Turkish Incursions

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is relying on his improved negotiating position after the Ukraine war, to brandish the “largest” military operation in northern Syria.

However, Erdogan’s threats were met with US rejection and warnings against destabilizing present contact lines in Syria. Also, Turkish plans were met with Russian mediation. Indeed, Moscow intensified its overt and secret contacts between Damascus and Ankara to “abort the military operation.”

Even Iran had its foreign minister perform shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Ankara, but the last word was for Russia. The Turkish military operation has been frozen, but Erdogan's intentions are present and open the door to a possible escalation, and a minor war.

Safe Zone

Jordan talked years ago about a “safe zone” north of its border in southern Syria.

The plan was not implemented, as Russia assigned a military role to provide stability in the governorates of Daraa, Quneitra and As-Suwayda.

A few months ago, Oman initiated normalization with Damascus, proposing a “step for step” approach.

Reports indicate a Jordanian complaint about the flow of drugs and smuggling across the border, and the escalation of assassinations and chaos in the countryside of southern Syria.

What is new is that Amman has warned of a possible escalation and has threatened to re-introduce the “safe zone” plan to put pressure on Damascus and motivate Moscow to move.

This coincided with a qualitative US arming of opposition factions residing at the Al-Tanf base near borders with Jordan.

Arab Normalization of Ties with Damascus

Bilateral normalization steps between Arab capitals and Damascus continue at a slow pace.

There are those who are linking the normalization of ties with the amnesty issued by President Bashar al-Assad for those accused of “terror crimes.”

Despite the measured normalization of ties with Damascus, there still is no consensus on its return to the Arab League at the Algiers Summit next November.

What's new? There is an Algerian proposal for Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad to come to Algeria for bilateral talks in conjunction with the summit, or to invite Syria with Turkey and others as an “observer.”

However, Algeria’s proposals remain tied to developments and wars in the months preceding the summit.

Economic War

Nothing new can be mentioned about the economic crisis in Syria and the struggles people are facing to live there. The crisis is exacerbated by hiking poverty rates and the lack of root solutions.

Iranian oil tankers had arrived in the war-torn country, and part of a power station in Aleppo resumed operations.

There is also a resumption of talks about an Arab gas pipeline.

Nevertheless, there is a spike in young people and artisans migrating abroad and regime loyalists complaining that conditions in their strongholds have not improved.

What is also worth mentioning is the huge gap between “war profiteers” and “victims of war” in Syria.

There is no doubt that change will happen sooner or later at one point or another.

A “minor war” will evolve in one arena or another and victories and defeats will be measured against each other.

The “battle for living” has settled on collapses and equations that need years to be resolved and dismantled.

It will take years of steps and understandings to get Syria out of a “long dark night.”



Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
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Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s proposal for Hezbollah fighters to be merged with the army has been met with skepticism and provided fodder for political debate.

Aoun had suggested that the members be merged into the military the same way militia members, who were active during the 1975-90 civil war, were merged into the army.

The proposal has not been widely welcomed given the army’s inability to accommodate so many new members for various reasons. Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat dismissed the proposal as a “consolation prize for Hezbollah in exchange for it to lay down its weapons to the state.”

They stressed that it would be impossible for members of an ideological group, who have received ideological training, to be part of the army.

Aoun, the former commander of the army, said it wouldn’t be possible to form a new military unit for the Hezbollah members, so they should instead join the army and sit for training, similar to the training former militants sat for at the end of the civil war.

Member of the Lebanese Forces’ parliamentary bloc MP Ghayath Yazbeck said the army simply cannot accommodate 100,000 Hezbollah fighters.

“Even if Hezbollah had 25,000 fighters, it would be impossible to merge them into the army, whose wages are being paid through foreign assistance,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Moreover, Lebanon needs a national defense strategy that should be drafted by the military with the president and government, he went on to say. The strategy does not stipulate how many members of the army and security forces are needed to protect Lebanon.

“Once the borders are demarcated and the reasons for the war are removed, we can embark on a political solution in Lebanon and ultimately, the current number of officers and soldiers will be enough,” Yazbeck said.

Former Lebanese officer and expert in security and military affairs Khaled Hamadeh said Aoun is trying to appease Hezbollah with his proposal and persuade it to lay down its arms in line with the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement was negotiated with Hezbollah ally parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, so it has the party’s approval.

There are several obstacles to Hezbollah members being merged into the army, Hamadeh said.

“Yes, the Lebanese state had succeeded in stopping the civil war and making hundreds of militia fighters join the army and security forces. But we cannot compare that situation to the one we now have with Hezbollah,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

At the end of the civil war, militias leaders signed and recognized the national pact and announced the dissolution of the militias. They then voluntarily handed over their arms to the state and became part of the political process, he explained.

Today, Iran-backed Hezbollah does not acknowledge the ceasefire agreement and has not agreed to turn over its weapons, he noted. The party does not even recognize that it is part of the political process and that its military wing has been destroyed by Israel, so the idea of merging with the army is “out of place.”

Yazbeck also noted Hezbollah’s ideology, saying it was the “greatest obstacle to its fighters’ merging with the army.”

“The party views Lebanon as a geographic extension of Iran. This ideology still stands, and was demonstrated with Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s declaration that the party will not disarm and that it is not concerned with talk about the state’s monopoly over arms,” he added.

Hamadeh echoed these remarks, saying that the civil war militias were Lebanese and took their orders from their Lebanese leaders. They chose to lay down their weapons and abide by Lebanese laws and the country's constitution.

As for Hezbollah, its takes orders from Iran and “has played dangerous military or security roles inside Lebanon and beyond,” he continued.

“Hezbollah has not declared its disengagement from Tehran. It has not declared that it will transform itself into a local political party and that it will dissolve its military wing. Once it does so, then we can talk about accommodating its fighters in the military,” stressed Hamadeh.

“How can we reconcile between a military group that follows the Wilayet al-Faqih ideology (...) and another that works under the constitution and according to democratic mechanisms?” he wondered.

Moreover, he asked: “Was the experience of merging the militias into the state’s civil and security agencies so successful that we should even be repeating it?”

Yazbeck noted that civil war militants were not really merged with the army as some would like to claim.

He explained that those who joined the security and military institutions were in a fact close to the Syrian regime, which was controlling Lebanon at the time.

“The fighters who were fighting for state sovereignty and who confronted Syrian occupation were persecuted and thrown in jail, so many were forced to flee Lebanon,” he revealed.

Furthermore, the level of discipline showed by the army does not apply to Hezbollah fighters. “Militias simply do not gel with army and the army does not gel with them either,” he stated.

Ultimately, said Hamadeh, whatever happens, Hezbollah must first hand over its weapons to the state. “Only then can its members choose to sit for assessments to enter state administrations – placing them on equal footing as other Lebanese citizens,” he added.

Hezbollah members are not isolated from society, and they must be merged, however, proposing their merger in an attempt to persuade them to lay down their arms will ultimately fail, he said.

Above all else, the party must first recognize the state and its right to monopoly over arms and decisions of war and peace, he urged.