Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
TT

Russia in Syria, a Double-Edged Sword

 The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)
The presidents of Russia, Iran and Turkey in Tehran on July 19 (EPA)

What will happen if the United States decided to suddenly withdraw from northeastern Syria? What if Turkey carried out its threats and launched an attack in the north of the country?

What if a secret deal was made to hand over Deir Ezzor oil fields to Damascus in exchange for information from the latter about the missing US journalist Austin Tice?

In fact, Russia uses these scenarios to push opponents and belligerents to search for specific arrangements and to fill the American vacuum. Moscow is always trying to make a balance between the enemies. It uses Syria as a platform for negotiating goals on other issues in the region and the world. It has been doing this for years between Iran and Israel. It made some settlements in southern Syria, without reaching a final deal in the country. It doesn’t seek to stop the Iranian positioning and drones through the supply borders. It does not operate its missile systems against bombardment coming from Tel Aviv.

This equation has become known, although it is marred by several threats and limitations, the latest of which is the current tension between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid due to the latter’s statements about Russian “war crimes” in Ukraine and Moscow’s pressure on the Jewish Agency in Russia.

Therefore, the recent Israeli bombardment against Syrian targets and “Iranian drones” was a sign of Lapid’s determination to implement the “red lines.”

Since the direct intervention at the end of 2015, the Russian policy in Syria has been a “two-edged sword.” It promoted militarization between enemies and barely focused on politics. It reached compromises with foreign parties and disregarded the Syrian side. It used media and politics to cover the military option and the requirements of security proposals. In the three Syrian “states” under the “Russian umbrella,” arrangements were made between Washington and Moscow, Ankara and Moscow, Tel Aviv and Moscow, and between Tehran and Moscow.

There is also a fictional political line between the Syrian parties. It was tied in Geneva before Moscow decided to cut it off due to Switzerland’s stance in support of Ukraine.

What’s new about the “two-edged policy” is the secret Russian maneuver between Damascus and Ankara, and between Damascus and Qamishli. How?

Following a state of confusion and reluctance that prevailed over the former US administration, in the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Joe Biden’s administration showed more stability in its military survival in northeastern Syria. But it is important to stop at three developments:

First, after the attack on Ukraine, the Russian army has tried to test its US counterpart, pushing Washington to bilateral political and military dialogues and seeking to break the isolation because of Ukraine, knowing that a military agreement has been regulating their relationship in Syria since 2017.

Second, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to take advantage of the growing importance of his role because of the “Ukraine swamp” to deal a severe blow to the Kurds in northern Syria.

Third, Biden promised the family of Tice to communicate directly with President Bashar al-Assad’s team in search of information about the journalist, who has been missing for nearly a decade.

Among the ideas that are currently circulated is handing over Deir Ezzor oil to Damascus as a negotiating start, taking into consideration that Trump’s envoys had offered, in the summer of 2019, military withdrawals from northeastern Syria in exchange for the release of Tice.

In these signs, Moscow found an opportunity. It organized private security talks between Damascus and Ankara, aimed at reaching arrangements and cooperation between the two parties against the PKK and terrorism in northern Syria.

One of the options that are actually on the table is the revival of the Adana Agreement, which was signed in 1998 and allowed the Turkish army to penetrate five kilometers into the Syrian depth to chase Kurdish fighters.

Undoubtedly, Syria has changed, so did the region and the world. Russian-led negotiations aim to search for a modified version of the agreement. There is no doubt that the tripartite summit in Tehran, which was marked by the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad, gave an additional impetus to the Ankara-Damascus line under Moscow’s cover.

What is remarkable and unsurprising is that Moscow is sponsoring in parallel another agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the first line of mediation is supposed to be against the SDF main component, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.

Here, the Hmeimim base sponsored talks to implement a memorandum of understanding that was completed in October 2019 between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and the director of national security, Major General Ali Mamlouk. Back then, the SDF hesitated to implement all the terms of the memorandum after the US agreed to postpone the withdrawal and extend the stay.

Now, the SDF is ready to implement these provisions. Up to 574 Syrian soldiers have been deployed in various areas near Al-Malikiyah, the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish triangle, Ain Al-Arab (Kobani), Ain Issa and Manbij in the countryside of Aleppo, with the aim to form a deterrent force against Turkish desires.

In parallel, Western capitals are considering the need to start developing a “Plan B” in case of a military withdrawal, to prevent the recurrence of the Afghanistan experience.

The West is also advising the SDF to search for agreements and arrangements with Damascus, “because we will leave sooner or later.” As for Damascus, information indicates that no political talks will be held imminently. Military arrangements are possible, but political concessions are out of the question.

It is true that negotiations between Damascus and Qamishli in 2018, revealed differences over the future of the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, the border crossings, the language and symbols; but so far, Damascus is still reluctant to accept the Russian solutions, which Moscow repeat on every occasion.

The US conducted exercises, alerts, landings and assassinations east of the Euphrates. Israel bombed Iranian drones near Damascus. Turkish planes bombarded Kurdish targets in northern Syria, while opposition drones targeted the Hmeimim base in the west of the country.

Russian planes bombed the “Turkish region” in the northwest of the country. All of this is taking place in Syria, hours after the tripartite summit in Tehran and the Turkish mediation between Ukraine and Russia to conclude a “grain deal,” and Moscow’s success in “burying” the intra-Syrian Geneva process.

Intricate elements further complicate the Syrian puzzle, maximizing the suffering and the illusions of Syrian fates.



What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
TT

What Happens When Russian Gas to Europe Via Ukraine Stops?

A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo
A view shows a board with the logo of Russian gas producer Gazprom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 5, 2024. REUTERS/Anton Vaganov/File Photo

Austria's energy company OMV was informed by Gazprom that the Russian gas producer would halt deliveries of natural gas via Ukraine to OMV from 0500 GMT on Nov. 16 following OMV winning an arbitration case. Supplies of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine may completely stop from Jan. 1 2025 after the current five-year deal expires as Kyiv has refused to negotiate the new terms of the transit with Moscow during the war.
Here is what happens if Russian gas transit via Ukraine is completely turned off and who will be affected most, according to Reuters.
HOW BIG ARE THE VOLUMES?
Russian gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine are relatively small. Russia shipped about 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas via Ukraine in 2023 - only 8% of peak Russian gas flows to Europe via various routes in 2018-2019.
Russia spent half a century building its European gas market share, which at its peak stood at 35%.
Moscow lost its share to rivals such as Norway, the United States and Qatar since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prompting the EU to cut its dependence on Russian gas.
EU gas prices rallied in 2022 to record highs after the loss of Russian supplies. The rally won't be repeated given modest volumes and a small number of customers for the remaining volumes, according to EU officials and traders.
UKRAINIAN ROUTE
The Soviet-era Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline brings gas from Siberia via the town of Sudzha - now under control of Ukrainian military forces - in Russia's Kursk region. It then flows through Ukraine to Slovakia.
In Slovakia, the gas pipeline splits into branches going to the Czech Republic and Austria.
Austria still receives most of its gas via Ukraine, while Russia accounts for around two-thirds of Hungary's gas imports.
Slovakia takes around 3 bcm from energy giant Gazprom per year, also about two-thirds of its needs.
Czech Republic almost completely cut gas imports from the east last year, but has started taking gas from Russia in 2024.
Most other Russian gas routes to Europe are shut including Yamal-Europe via Belarus and Nord Stream under the Baltic.
The only other operational Russian gas pipeline route to Europe is the Blue Stream and TurkStream to Türkiye under the Black Sea. Türkiye sends some Russian gas volumes onward to Europe including to Hungary.
WHY DOES THE UKRAINIAN ROUTE STILL WORK?
While remaining Russian gas transit volumes are small, the issue remains a dilemma for the EU. Many EU members such as France and Germany have said they would not buy Russian gas anymore but the stance of Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, which have closer ties to Moscow, challenges the EU common approach.
The countries, who still receive Russian gas, argue it is the most economic fuel and also blame neighboring EU countries for imposing high transit fees for alternative supplies.
Ukraine still earns $0.8-$1 billion in transit fees from Russian gas transit. Russia earns over $3 billion on sales via Ukraine based on an average gas price of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, according to Reuters calculations.
Russia's gas pipeline export monopoly Gazprom plunged to a net loss of $7 billion in 2023, its first annual loss since 1999, because of the loss EU's gas markets.
Russia has said it would be ready to extend the transit deal but Kyiv has repeatedly said it won't do it.
Another option is for Gazprom to supply some of the gas via another route, for example via TurkStream, Bulgaria, Serbia or Hungary. However, capacity via these routes is limited.
The EU and Ukraine have also asked Azerbaijan to facilitate discussions with Russia regarding the gas transit deal, an Azeri presidential advisor told Reuters, who declined to give further details.