Turkey has, once again, started planning to launch a new military offensive in northern Syria. Its rhetoric is coupled with substantial military mobilization along the border region, making the materialization of Ankara's threat a likely possibility.
The threatened territories are currently held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Ankara considers a terrorist group due to its affiliations with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgent group.
Not being able to rely on its US ally for protection, the SDF is left with one option: doing a deal with the devil. Details about the negotiations with the Syrian regime are scant, but it seems that Damascus has agreed to deploy forces to the frontlines with Turkey. This move, however, will unlikely be enough to deter Turkey nor halt its offensive once it is launched.
The media reported conflicting information about what the two sides have agreed upon, which indicates that a final agreement is yet to be reached. SDF officials stated on July 5 that they signed a defense plan with the Syrian regime to jointly confront any possible Turkish attack.
In addition to deploying more troops, Damascus has reportedly agreed to send heavy weapons (including heavy artillery, tanks and armored vehicles) to boost the combat capabilities of the Self-Administration. Contrarily, the pro-government newspaper al-Watan reported on July 7 that negotiations have not been successful due to the SDF's unwillingness to accept Damascus’s demands.
Sources within the SDF, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the author that Damascus insisted on establishing an operations room under its leadership to be in charge of all military activities in the 30 km area threatened by Turkey. Likewise, the regime demanded to place that territory under its administrative control. But the SDF had a different plan in mind: requesting heavy military supplies and getting regime forces to play a supporting role when zero-hour hits.
Eventually, no agreement was reached due to the huge gap between what the two sides are trying to achieve. Nonetheless, the negotiating parties agreed to deploy 550 government forces to the threatened areas, as a goodwill gesture.
This is not the first time that the two sides fail to reach a deal in times of crisis. In fact, the latest round of talks is almost the exact replica of the discussions that preceded Turkey's offensives against Kurdish-held areas in 2018 and 2019.
In both cases, the negotiations were unfruitful due to the regime's attempts to leverage the crises to maximize its gains. If history is any guide, the ongoing agreement will also be unproductive. But even in the unexpected scenario that the two sides are able to find a middle ground, their agreement will unlikely deter Ankara's attack. Turkey has sent clear messages that it will not hesitate to target regime forces. That was evident in the recent Turkish drone attacks in both Tal Rifaat and Manbij against locations where regime fighters are deployed.
In case of a direct military confrontation, neither the SDF nor the regime has the ability to stop Turkey. Open-source data indicate that the presence of regime troops in northeast Syria is symbolic. In other words, those forces do not have the capability to stand their ground in the face of a Turkish-led offensive.
Despite having more troops and better equipment in Idlib, Turkey managed in 2020 to successfully wipe out a large portion of Assad's army in that area within just a couple of days by making innovative use of drones. The same applies to SDF, which was not been able to defend any of the areas targeted by Ankara in the past.
Alternatively, the regime could try to use diplomatic means to prevent a new offensive attack. In such a scenario, Damascus could broker an agreement, through Russia, to remove the SDF and its administrative structures 30 kilometers away from the Turkish-Syrian border. Theoretically, negotiating such a matter could be an easy task. Russia and Turkey already brokered a similar deal in October 2019 to expel the Kurdish People's Protection Group (YPG), which forms the backbone of the SDF, from the border region.
Likewise, President Erdogan previously stated that he would be ok with allowing regime forces to replace the SDF. However, the implementation of such a deal is harder than it sounds. Similar agreements failed in the past due to the inability of the parties involved to agree on mutually acceptable monitoring and verification mechanisms.
Notably, Turkey accused Russia of failing to implement the 2019 agreement and used that to justify its need to launch a new offensive. Hence, it will be extremely difficult for Moscow to sell the same deal to Ankara again.
Besides, Ankara is currently more desperate for a win against the Syrian Kurds now than in the recent past due to its domestic politics. Mindful of his decreasing popularity amid the economic crisis, President Erdogan is looking for any move than could help lift his image at home and drum up political support ahead of the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections.
By adopting a more aggressive posture in dealing with the Syrian Kurds, Erdogan hopes to reconnect with both his constituents and election ally, the Nationalist Movement Party.
Turkey's selection of potential target areas that have no US presence hands over the power of greenlighting or preventing a new offensive to Moscow. Hence, Ankara will likely leverage its improved position vis-à-vis Russia, due to the war in Ukraine, to get the go-ahead it needs. In the absence of tacit approval from Moscow, a Turkish offensive would likely carry an additional risk of casualties. The one-million-dollar question in such a scenario is: does Ankara think that the gains from such an adventure are worth the risks?
