Coordination Framework Announces Sudani’s Candidacy for Iraqi Premiership

 A previous session of the Iraqi Parliament (EPA)
A previous session of the Iraqi Parliament (EPA)
TT
20

Coordination Framework Announces Sudani’s Candidacy for Iraqi Premiership

 A previous session of the Iraqi Parliament (EPA)
A previous session of the Iraqi Parliament (EPA)

Hours after Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji declined his nomination as Iraq’s next prime minister by the Shiite Coordination Framework on Sunday, the pro-Iran bloc announced Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, Iraq’s former minister of labor and social affairs, as their candidate for the position.

Sudani, aged 52, is currently the leader of the al-Foraten Movement and has the allegiance of several lawmakers in Parliament. Previously, Sudani was a prominent leader in the Islamic Dawa Party which is affiliated with the State of Law Coalition.

While Sudani has held different ministerial portfolios in the previous government, this is the third time he is elected as a member of parliament. He ran independently in the last round of parliamentary elections in 2021.

Sudani’s nomination came as a result of the outcomes of a Monday meeting that took place in the residence of Al-Fateh Alliance chief Hadi Al-Amiri, who had pressured al-Araji into declining his nomination.

The announcement comes as Iraq is approaching the 10-months mark following the early parliamentary elections of October 2021, with the country yet to form its next government due to the continued disputes between the political blocs in the Iraqi parliament.

Attention is now turning to the Al-Hanana neighborhood in the city of Najaf, where the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr is based. Iraq is waiting to see whether Sadr will green light Sudani’s candidacy or not.

Although Sudani is one of 10 candidates whose names were circulated during the last period, the forces of the Coordination Framework were divided between supporters of what was termed the first line of leaders and those who opposed them.

The first line of leaders up for nomination had included Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi Al-Amiri, Haider al-Abadi and Falih Al-Fayyadh.

Although Al-Amiri officially announced his withdrawal from running for the position, Al-Maliki wrote a tweet in which he said that he would not stand in the way of any decision taken by the Coordination Framework.

As for al-Abadi and Al-Fayyadh, they did not announce their candidacy for the position, but their names were suggested as compromise candidates, especially after the conflict between al-Maliki and al-Amiri became clear.

Sadr's position on Sudani is expected to crystallize in the coming days or perhaps hours.

While it is not possible to predict what position Sadr might take, his decision will likely depend on the extent of his conviction that al-Maliki had no role in choosing Sudani, who had previously belonged to the State of Law Coalition.

If Sadr accepts Sudani, the procedures for forming the next government will proceed smoothly if the Kurds decide their position on choosing their candidate for the presidency.

But if Sadr had a negative stance on Sudani’s nomination, the next stage would be open to unexpected surprises, the least of which would be the continuation of the current government and preparations for new elections.



Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
TT
20

Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)

As war rages between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran may soon need to call upon its network of regional allies - groups it has armed and funded for years. But now, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” looks strained, fragmented, and far from ready.

On June 19, 2025, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard urged Iran’s regional allies to take action to relieve mounting pressure on Tehran. At that point, Iran was entering its second week of heavy Israeli bombardment. Strategically, an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital once seemed unthinkable, but the regional terrain has since shifted. Iran’s supply routes are now disrupted, and its key proxy groups have either been neutralized or weakened.

According to The Times of Israel, Israel launched this war after nearly two years of systematically targeting Iran’s allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel had triggered a chain of retaliation that left many of Iran’s partners damaged or demoralized. With the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon, and Hamas reduced to guerrilla tactics in Gaza, few proxies appear ready for a new confrontation.

In Gaza, Hamas has been forced into small ambushes and urban warfare, its rocket arsenal depleted and many senior leaders killed. Iranian communication channels with the group have also eroded. Israel’s targeted assassination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander linked to Palestinian factions, further strained coordination. For now, Hamas can offer little more than rhetorical support.

In Iraq, US forces have fortified their embassy in Baghdad, while withdrawing from bases such as Ain al-Asad. Iraqi factions loyal to Iran are posturing, threatening US interests should America enter the war. But most Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to drag the country into open conflict, knowing the consequences could be disastrous. Iran, too, is cautious about sacrificing Iraq’s political and economic value.

Hezbollah, reeling from the death of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2024 Israeli strike, is in disarray. Its military capacity and leadership have been significantly degraded. Though the party retains some strategic capabilities, domestic and regional pressures have so far restrained it from opening a major front.

In Yemen, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s last viable card. They now play a key role in smuggling weapons and expanding Iranian influence into Africa. Should the US directly join Israel’s war, Tehran may finally authorize the Houthis to use their stockpile of ballistic missiles, signaling a decisive and potentially catastrophic new phase of the conflict.