Ties Between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban... Will ISIS benefit from the Rupture?

Taliban members are seen in Kabul after the drone strike that killed Zawahiri. (Reuters)
Taliban members are seen in Kabul after the drone strike that killed Zawahiri. (Reuters)
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Ties Between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban... Will ISIS benefit from the Rupture?

Taliban members are seen in Kabul after the drone strike that killed Zawahiri. (Reuters)
Taliban members are seen in Kabul after the drone strike that killed Zawahiri. (Reuters)

After having killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri with a drone that hit the home he had been hiding in Kabul, the United States has, to a large extent, finished avenging the 9/11 attacks.

The perpetrators were killed in bloody attacks, and Osama bin Laden was then killed by Navy SEALs in May 2011 in Pakistan. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the “mastermind” behind the attacks, remains in Guantanamo Bay after being arrested in Pakistan years ago. Many of the other perpetrators are either rotting there with him or were killed by the US.

But what does eliminating Zawahiri mean? This article tries to answer that question.

A contentious, complicated relationship
The first questions that come to mind ask what Zawahiri was doing in Kabul and whether his being there a year after the Taliban had returned to power, after the collapse of former President Ashraf Ghani’s government and the withdrawal of US forces, meant that an Al-Qaeda's return to the Afghan capital had been sanctioned by the Taliban.

As we all know, the US withdrew from Afghanistan after concluding the Doha Agreement with the Taliban during former President Donald Trump’s term and implementing it under Joe Biden. That agreement stipulated, among other things, that the Taliban would not allow terrorist organizations to use Afghan soil to plan or carry out attacks against any other country again.

The Taliban thus indirectly admitted that Al-Qaeda had used Afghanistan as a base from which it planned and implemented 9/11 and promised not to let that happen again after having “learned from the mistakes of the past.”

Taliban leaders have discussed learning from past mistakes a lot since returning to power. However, many are skeptical about whether the movement has actually learned its lesson after losing power for 20 years because it had harbored terrorist organizations using its territory to carry out attacks on other countries.

The skeptics point out that the Taliban has promised, for example, to allow girls to go back to school but has not done so thus far.

On the other hand, some have defended it, pointing to the fact that it has treated its former enemies well after they remained in the country despite Ghani fleeing, though it did not allow them to take part in forming the new regime in Kabul.

Regardless of whether girls are allowed back to school and how defeated rivals are treated, the international community and the US are primarily concerned with whether the country will become a sanctuary for terrorists like it had been when the Taliban first ruled in the 1990s.

In fact, several reports have discussed the prospect of an Al-Qaeda return to Afghanistan, but they cannot be confirmed in light of the Taliban’s muteness on the matter. US officials confirmed that Taliban officials had visited the safehouse where Zawahiri was killed, meaning that he had been under their protection, or at least a wing of the movement. Indeed, the ties between the two were never severed, especially in the east, where the Haqqani Network operates.

That does not mean that the leaders of this Network, who have prominent positions in Kabul, were protecting the Al-Qaeda chief in Kabul.

In truth, it is difficult to answer this question conclusively given the lack of evidence to either deny or confirm this claim, just like it had been impossible to ascertain whether bin Laden had taken permission from former Taliban leader Mullah Omar before launching the 9/11 attacks.

Who will succeed Zawahiri?
When bin Laden was killed in 2011, Zawahiri was swiftly chosen to succeed him, surprising no one. He had headed the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and was right beneath bin Laden in Al-Qaeda’s chain of command. The he men had been close since living together in Khartoum before being expelled from Sudan in 1996.

Today, the picture is far murkier. Much of Al-Qaeda’s top brass were killed, especially in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria. Among the most prominent leaders left is Saif al-Adl, an Egyptian Al-Qaeda official who had lived in Iran after he fled Afghanistan following the US invasion in 2001 and maintains ties with the Revolutionary Guards.

Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda might choose someone else, a figure who moved to Afghanistan to live under the new regime of the Taliban, as Zawahiri had done. Such a decision would allow it to avoid choosing someone totally controlled by Iranian intelligence like Saif al-Adl, if he indeed remains in Iran like others that it has harbored within the framework of deals it has concluded with Al-Qaeda.

Regardless of who becomes the next leader, Al-Qaeda has become a decentralized organization with no central command like that led by bin Laden in the 90s. The US war on terror forced Al-Qaeda to adapt and decentralize, and its various branches, from Yemen, to Africa to Syria, have operated independently of Zawahiri and the central command for years. This is not likely to change.

What about ISIS?
Al-Qaeda’s primary competitor, ISIS, has hit its rival hard over the past few years. Today, however, ISIS seems far worse off than Al-Qaeda. It lost its so-called state in Syria and Iraq, and it has become nothing more than dispersed small cells that launch attacks against Iraqi forces, Kurdish forces east of the Euphrates, and Syrian regime forces west of the Euphrates.

In Libya, where ISIS established an “Emirate,” it has been exterminated, with only a few cells operating in the south left. The same is true for their presence in Sinai after the Egyptian army launched a campaign against it for years. Its leader in the Sahel was killed only a few months after his most prominent competitor, the leader of Al-Qaeda in the region, was exterminated.

Its Khorasan branch remains the most active, but the major problem ISIS faces there are its clashes with the new rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban, which is hosting their rivals, Al-Qaeda!



Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
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Sudan in 25 Years: One War Begets Another

Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)
Fleeing the fighting, people are transported by truck from the border town of Renk in South Sudan to a dock to continue their journey to the next destination (DPA)

The sound of gunfire, barrel bombs, and stray bullets is nothing new in Sudan. What’s new is that the violence has moved from the outskirts to the capital, Khartoum. This shift forced the government and military to relocate to a temporary capital in Port Sudan, nearly 1,000 kilometers away on the Red Sea coast.
Past conflicts were seen as rebellions against the state, but they stemmed from a deeper struggle: the “center” holds all the power and resources, while the “margins” are left with nothing.
These wars have always been about demands for rights and equality.
Under Islamist President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s wars shifted from demands for rights to a “religious war” between the Muslim north and the Christian or secular south. This led to South Sudan’s secession and the creation of a new state that joined the United Nations. But what drives the conflicts that continue to devastate Sudan?
Analysts say the root cause is the lack of a national vision and the failure to recognize Sudan’s ethnic and cultural diversity. Without a unified political and economic framework, this diversity has been ignored.
The current war, though fought between two formal armies, stems from the same issues of marginalization and exclusion. These problems sparked Sudan’s first rebellion in 1955, led by the Anya-Nya 1 forces, named after the cobra snake.
The Naivasha Agreement
Sudan’s first civil war ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement but reignited in 1983 after former President Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia law. This sparked a rebellion led by John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The conflict escalated into a “jihadist” war as Islamist forces framed it as a battle against “enemies of the faith.” The fighting lasted for years, killing more than two million people.
Unable to secure a military victory, the government signed the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya. The deal granted South Sudan the right to self-determination, with a five-year transitional period to decide between unity or independence.
John Garang briefly became Sudan’s First Vice President during this period but died in a mysterious helicopter crash. His deputy, Salva Kiir, succeeded him and led South Sudan to a 2011 referendum, where the region voted for independence. South Sudan became a new nation, taking a third of Sudan’s land, a quarter of its people, and most of its resources.
Meanwhile, conflict spread to Darfur in 2003, with rebels accusing the government of marginalization. The war turned ethnic when the government armed Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to fight African-origin rebel groups. One Janjaweed leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or Hemedti, later became the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Darfur war claimed 300,000 lives. Al-Bashir’s government was accused of war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, leading to International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Bashir and three senior officials that remain in effect.
Chasing Peace Across Capitals
In May 2006, Sudan’s government signed a peace deal in Abuja with a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Arko Minnawi. However, the movement split, and another faction, led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, rejected the deal and continued fighting from Jebel Marra in central Darfur.
Minnawi briefly joined the government as an assistant to President Omar al-Bashir but later rebelled again, claiming he was treated as a "kitchen helper" rather than a serious political partner.
Efforts to negotiate peace moved between capitals. In 2011, some groups signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in Qatar, which promised power and wealth-sharing, but fighting continued.
In 2020, Sudan’s transitional government signed a new peace agreement in Juba with key armed groups, including Minnawi’s faction and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim.
The deal gave Minnawi the role of Darfur governor and Ibrahim the post of finance minister. Despite these accords, true peace remains out of reach.
A New Southern Conflict
War broke out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, two regions given a right to “popular consultation” under the Naivasha Agreement to decide their future. The SPLM-North, an offshoot of the southern SPLM, took up arms again.
The SPLM-N split into two factions: one led by Malik Agar, now a deputy in Sudan’s Sovereign Council, who signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement; the other, led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, controls Kauda in South Kordofan and continues sporadic fighting.
Eastern Sudan also saw conflict in the 1990s, with groups like the Beja Congress and Free Lions opposing Bashir’s regime. These groups later signed the Asmara Peace Agreement, gaining shares of power and wealth.
In April 2019, months of protests forced the military to oust President Omar al-Bashir. But sit-ins continued, and a violent crackdown killed hundreds, drawing condemnation as a horrific crime against civilians.
Under public pressure, the military signed a constitutional declaration in August 2019, agreeing to share power with civilians. This led to a transitional government with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and a Sovereign Council headed by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti.
War of the Generals
On October 25, 2021, Sudan's army leader overthrew Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s civilian government in a coup. Under pressure from peaceful protests, the general later agreed to a framework agreement with civilian leaders, promising a return to civilian rule and preventing the return of the Islamist regime.
However, supporters of the former regime undermined the deal, causing tensions between the army and the RSF, leading to war.
On April 15, 2023, gunfire broke out in southern Khartoum, marking the start of the ongoing conflict. The RSF accused the army of attacking its camps, while some claim Islamist cells within the army targeted the RSF, forcing it to choose between surrender or war.
Miscalculations
The war was expected to end quickly due to the army’s stronger military. However, the RSF surprised the army by using urban warfare tactics to take control of key military bases and government buildings, including the presidential palace.
The government moved to Port Sudan, while Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was trapped for over three months before escaping.
The RSF expanded its control over Darfur, western Sudan, and the central Gezira region, holding about 70% of the country. After nearly two years of fighting, the army regained some areas, but the RSF still controls large parts of Sudan and continues fierce fighting, with the war still ongoing.
The Worst Humanitarian Crisis
The war in Sudan has killed tens of thousands and triggered what the UN calls "the worst humanitarian crisis in history." More than 11 million people are displaced within Sudan, while around 3 million have fled to neighboring countries. Over half of Sudan’s population, about 25 million people, face severe food insecurity.
Negotiations have failed, with both sides refusing to return to talks after the Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration collapsed, largely due to the army’s and its supporters' refusal to engage.
Root Causes
Former Sovereign Council member and deputy head of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination “Tagadum,” Al-Hadi Idris blames the war on Sudan’s failure to agree on a “national development plan” since independence.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he says the main reasons for the conflict are the failure to implement fair development, achieve justice, and the lack of resolution on key issues like the role of religion in politics, national identity, and military involvement in government.
Idris argues that addressing these issues is crucial to ending the war for good.
Mohamed Abdel-Hakim, a leader in the Unionist Gathering, believes the wars stem from unequal development and citizenship.
He says resolving issues like marginalization, protecting people’s rights, and replacing oppressive regimes with democratic governance is key to stopping Sudan’s long-running conflicts.
Abdel-Hakim also calls for reforming the military to create a professional, national army focused on protecting the constitution and civilian leadership, with strict oversight to prevent the army from becoming politicized.