Majority of Presidential Terms in Lebanon End in Conflicts, Wars or Vacuum

Lebanese national flags fly at half-mast outside the presidential palace as Lebanon marks the two-year anniversary of the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, in Baabda Lebanon August 4, 2022. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese national flags fly at half-mast outside the presidential palace as Lebanon marks the two-year anniversary of the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, in Baabda Lebanon August 4, 2022. (Dalati & Nohra)
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Majority of Presidential Terms in Lebanon End in Conflicts, Wars or Vacuum

Lebanese national flags fly at half-mast outside the presidential palace as Lebanon marks the two-year anniversary of the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, in Baabda Lebanon August 4, 2022. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese national flags fly at half-mast outside the presidential palace as Lebanon marks the two-year anniversary of the August 2020 Beirut port explosion, in Baabda Lebanon August 4, 2022. (Dalati & Nohra)

Lebanon only twice witnessed a smooth transition of power from one president to a successor in its 79 years of independence.

Out of 12 presidents who had come to power since 1943, only twice was the transition a smooth process, underlining the extent of the complexities that have plagued the country for decades.

Presidential terms often end in conflict, vacuum or wars.

Two months before the end of President Michel Aoun’s term, vacuum appears to be the likely scenario in store.

The last time vacuum took place was in 2014 after the term of Aoun’s predecessor, Michel Suleiman, ended without political rivals agreeing to a successor. It took them over two years to agree on Aoun’s election as head of state.

The constitution stipulates that a quorum of 86 lawmakers is needed to elect a president at parliament. Of those numbers, 65 votes are needed for a candidate to be elected president.

At the current parliament, it is a hard ask for the rival parties to secure 65 votes for any candidate without them reaching a political settlement ahead of the elections.

Former minister, Professor Ibrahim Najjar told Asharq Al-Awsat that the weeks and months preceding the end of a term of a president are usually marked by “ugly practices” that spark the drive to form a new majority to replace the former one in what is seen as rotation of power.

The end of presidential terms in Lebanon have often witnessed controversies, such as foreigners being naturalized for hefty sums, the division of spoils, and preparations for family relatives to assume the political mantle.

In other words, Lebanon is a democratic state only on paper, not in practice, he added.

Furthermore, Najjar noted that ends of presidential terms in Lebanon, since the signing of the 1989 Taif Accord, have all been different.

The post-Taif period was marked by Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon. It witnessed the extension of the terms of presidents Emile Lahoud and Elias Hrawi. After the Syrian troop withdrawal in 2005, Hezbollah became the dominant player.

The Iran-backed party sought to impose Aoun as president. The period witnessed a string of political assassinations, the government headquarters in downtown Beirut were besieged by pro-Syria and Hezbollah loyalists and the parliament was suspended.

The pressure culminated in the 2008 signing of the Doha agreement that led to Michel Suleiman’s election as president instead of Aoun.

Slighted, Aoun contested Suleiman’s every move throughout his term until he was elected his successor.

His election was also an arduous task, however.

Suleiman left the presidential palace at the end of his term in 2014, but sharp political divisions hindered an agreement over his successor, leaving Lebanon in vacuum.

Aoun’s allies exerted their pressure by forcing officials to choose between heading to the “edge of hell” or the “edge of chaos”.

Revolts, vacuum and war

Since 1943 and up until the Taif, Lebanon witnessed the election of eight presidents: Beshara al-Khoury, Camille Chamoun, Fuad Chehab, Charles Helou, Suleiman Franjieh, Elias Sarkis, Bashir Gemayel and Amin Gemayel. Post-Taif, Lebanon witnessed five presidents: Rene Mouawad, Elias Hrawi, Emile Lahoud, Michel Suleiman and Michel Aoun.

Political analyst George Ghanem noted that the majority of ends of terms never witnessed a smooth transition of power.

Pre-Taif, the only smooth transition happened between Chehab and Helou, he said.

Post-Taif, the only smooth transition happened between Hrawi and Lahoud during the time of Syria’s political and security hegemony over Lebanon, he added.

Lebanon has grown accustomed for ends of presidential terms to be times of peaceful or bloody revolts, constitutional vacuum, tensions, tumult and wars, he explained.

Khoury was toppled in 1952 in a peaceful coup against the constitution. It was a period of unrest and a general strike that led to Chamoun’s election, noted Ghanem.

Chamoun, himself, was ousted in a bloody coup during which Lebanon was divided along sharp sectarian and regional lines: One camp supported Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and the other was pro-American and West.

The coup started in 1958 and only ended with Chehab assuming power, said Ghanem.

Helou’s term ended with problems with Palestinian freedom fighters. Franjieh’s term ended with the civil war, which erupted on April 13, 1975.

Sarkis’ term ended in 1982 with Israel’s invasion of Lebanon.

Bashir Gemayel was his successor and he was killed days after his election in 1982. He was succeeded by his brother Amin.

Amin’s term ended without the election of a successor. Aoun, then army commander, formed a military government that was boycotted by Muslim politicians, leading to a constitutional-legal dispute over its legitimacy, said Ghanem.

Another government, headed by Salim al-Hoss, was in place and it was seen as a representative of Muslims. Amin viewed it as illegal and unconstitutional because its actual prime minister was Rashid Karameh, who was assassinated.

That rendered the cabinet a caretaker one and Hoss was only named as its acting head.

Post-Taif

Mouawad was Lebanon’s first president to be elected post-Taif. He was elected in November 1989, following a vacuum that began with the end of Amin’s term.

Mouawad was assassinated 18 days into his tenure. He was succeeded by Hrawi.

Crisis erupted at the end of his term, which was extended for three years in 1995 through a controversial constitutional amendment that Syria is seen to have largely played a role in.

In 1998, Lahoud was elected Hrawi’s successor in a smooth process when Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon was almost at its peak. His term was supposed to end in 2004, but it was controversially extended with Syria’s blessing.

Lahoud’s term ended in 2007 a year after the 2006 July war between Israel and Hezbollah.

Lebanon at the time was sharply divided between the anti-Syria March 14 and pro-Syria March 8 camps.

March 14, along with their western and Arab allies, had been boycotting Lahoud over the extension of his term and his stances that favored Syria.

The period also witnessed a sharp divide between the March 14 and 8 camps over then Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s government.

Lahoud and his allies, notably Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, viewed it as unconstitutional after its Shiite ministers had resigned.

Lahoud’s term ended on November 24, 2007. He issued a statement implying that he was handing power over to then army commander Michel Suleiman, who never acknowledged it, said Ghanem.

Siniora’s government consequently carried on operating by issuing decrees that ultimately were not implemented due to the tensions, which peaked on May 7, 2008 when Hezbollah and its allies seized control of west Beirut and some regions of Mount Lebanon after bloody clashes that left Lebanon on the brink of war.

Arab countries, led by Qatar, soon mediated a settlement that led to Suleiman’s election as president on May 25, 2008, as part of the Doha agreement.

Ghanem remarked that Suleiman’s term effectively ended in 2011 with the collapse of the Doha agreement, eruption of the so-called Arab Spring revolts and the American withdrawal from Iraq.

The last three years of his term were marked with bombings and security tensions in Lebanon, which was on the verge of yet another civil war, he noted.

Suleiman’s term ended in 2014 with no successor due to sharp political disputes.

Over 2 years of presidential vacuum

A proposal was made to extend his term to avert the vacuum, but Aoun, who had been eyeing the presidency for years and had opposed Suleiman’s presidency, rejected the suggestion because he knew his Hezbollah allies would not go with it.

From 2014 and until 2016, Lebanon witnessed 45 calls for the election of a president. Quorum was only met when a political agreement was reached to elect Aoun, which took place in October 2016, two years and six months after Suleiman left office.

Observers believe that Lebanon is headed to a similar vacuum when Aoun’s term ends on October 31.

Ghanem said the situation in the country is different from what it was like in 2014.

Politically, the number of candidates then was limited by a few known figures. Now, no clear frontrunner, major or serious candidates have emerged.

The political forces are fragmented, he noted. The March 14 camp is no more, Iran is incapable of imposing its candidate the way Syria used to, and no candidate has the ability to garner enough votes to secure a win.

Moreover, Lebanon does not have an acting government, only a caretaker one and debate is raging over its constitutionality.

Ghanem expects vacuum to prevail and for quorum to remain unmet at the presidential elections sessions to prevent a candidate from any of the rival camps to be elected.



The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
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The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich

One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.

Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.

After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.

Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.

My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.

Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Arafat and Abbas

More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.

Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.

In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.

Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.

Weapons smuggled in undergarments

Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.

Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.

German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.

Black September

The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.

The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.

Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.

Several setbacks

In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.

Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.

Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.

Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.

The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Meeting at a Rome cafe

Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.

The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.

Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”

So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.

Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.

Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)

Scouting visits

Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.

In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.

Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.

Lebanese ‘wife’

Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.

Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.

Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)

Finishing touches

The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.

The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.

Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.

The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.

German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)

Night of the operation

Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.

Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.

The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)

Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.

‘Wrath of God’

Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.