What Is Left of the War on Terror?

Pedestrians react to the World Trade Center collapse, September 11, 2001. (Reuters)
Pedestrians react to the World Trade Center collapse, September 11, 2001. (Reuters)
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What Is Left of the War on Terror?

Pedestrians react to the World Trade Center collapse, September 11, 2001. (Reuters)
Pedestrians react to the World Trade Center collapse, September 11, 2001. (Reuters)

Can three planes sum up a portion of history and the future? It seems that this has already happened. While two of these planes hit the World Trade Center in New York on 9/11, the third took off around twenty years later, departing from Afghanistan as desperate Afghans chased it, with some losing their lives as they clung to it.

However, summing up a portion of history in this way could seem “disturbing,” as it is a reductionist narrative of the thousands of people and billions of dollars that were lost. It would perhaps be more sound to add a fourth plane - a drone this time, that which killed Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul last August.

Twenty-one years on from 9/11, can we say that the “terrorist groups” who had initiated this battle at its outset, like Al-Qaeda - and we can add those that followed in its footsteps with new names and slogans, like ISIS, if we want to be brutally precise - are still robust forces? And what is left of them? Where are these remains found? Are they still the number one enemy of the United States?

In Afghanistan itself, where everything began, the enemies of the United States have expanded their circle of hostile targets, with ISIS-K launching a suicide attack against the Russian embassy. On the other hand, the United States has reached a settlement with the Taliban, which had been on the opposite side of the War on Terror. Their deal left the latter back in power, but that did not prevent the United States from keeping its eyes open and taking out Zawahiri.

In an August piece published in the Rand Institute, James Dobbins argued that “this latest success demonstrated anew the efficacy of US long-range targeting capability, but this has never been in doubt. What has been questionable, and remains so, is the US ability to monitor extremist activity in a country in which it lacks both direct access and a partner on the ground.

He then added: “the Taliban’s apparent decision to host the world’s most wanted terrorist will probably lead the world to further isolate the Taliban, making it more difficult to track, let alone influence, what’s going on there.”

Iraq and Syria

In Iraq, Mosul’s historical Nuri Mosque, which ISIS had turned into its headquarters, is now under UNESCO’s control. Things don’t seem different on the military front.

The official spokesman for the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, Sabah al-Numan, affirmed two days ago that “the ISIS terrorist gangs have lost the initiative,” adding that the situation on the border with Syria has become much better and more stable.

However, while his assessment is encouraging, many observers remain worried about cells active in the country. Indeed, their fears are not baseless, as an ISIS cell was recently apprehended in Kurdistan.

The picture is not much different in Syria. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have discussed attempts by ISIS-affiliated militants to open corridors south of the Euphrates to establish lines of communication with other members.”

According to a statistic published by ISIS’s Al-Naba magazine, 26 of the 50 operations the organization launched between the first and seventh of September hit targets in the Levant, leaving 49 people dead or wounded.

Al-Qaeda boasts two headquarters, the first in Yemen, where the group managed to kill 21 Yemeni soldiers in the south this month, losing only six of their fighters in the clashes.

The second is in Somalia, where the Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda’s strongest and most active branch, killed 17.

African affiliates

Through operations and attacks of divergent scales, ISIS affiliates are active in several African countries, where they have left (in the first week of September alone) 75 people dead or wounded.

Mohamed Fawzy, an Egyptian researcher specialized in regional security affairs, tells Asharq Al-Awsat that “after 2001, terrorist attacks would rise and fall, peaking period after 2011.

However, he adds, “The organizations affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS are still active in critical strategic areas in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia, especially after the Taliban took over the Afghan state. Indeed, the Taliban’s rise has motivated many organizations to strive to replicate its model and has turned Afghan territory into a safe haven for many of these groups and their top brass.”

Who is the enemy? What is the priority?

The AP reported that the second in command at the CIA said in a closed-door meeting that fighting Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups remains a priority, but increasing funds and attention will go to countering China. Naturally, the increased focus on the latter will reduce the funds allocated for combatting terrorism.

This shift did not occur overnight, but it seems to be moving increasingly swiftly recently. In June 2021, the Pentagon announced its decision to reduce the number of American troops in the Middle East. Two months later, the decision to pull out of Afghanistan was taken.

Moreover, Russia’s war on Ukraine has compelled the US to focus more strongly on Europe, with President Joe Biden announcing the deployment of new troops shortly after that war began.

Nevertheless, Fawzy insisted that “terrorism still constitutes the greatest threat facing all countries of the world. Experiences have demonstrated that these organizations cannot be completely eliminated, especially with their adoption of novel strategies.”



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.