Nobel Prize Season Arrives amid War, Nuclear Fears, Hunger

A Nobel Prize medal replica is on display inside the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway September 19, 2022. (Reuters)
A Nobel Prize medal replica is on display inside the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway September 19, 2022. (Reuters)
TT
20

Nobel Prize Season Arrives amid War, Nuclear Fears, Hunger

A Nobel Prize medal replica is on display inside the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway September 19, 2022. (Reuters)
A Nobel Prize medal replica is on display inside the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway September 19, 2022. (Reuters)

This year's Nobel Prize season approaches as Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shattered decades of almost uninterrupted peace in Europe and raised the risks of a nuclear disaster.

The secretive Nobel committees never hint who will win the prizes in medicine, physics, chemistry, literature, economics or peace. It's anyone's guess who might win the awards being announced starting Monday.

Yet there's no lack of urgent causes deserving the attention that comes with winning the world's most prestigious prize: Wars in Ukraine and Ethiopia, disruptions to supplies of energy and food, rising inequality, the climate crisis, the ongoing fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.

The science prizes reward complex achievements beyond the understanding of most. But the recipients of the prizes in peace and literature are often known by a global audience and the choices — or perceived omissions — have sometimes stirred emotional reactions.

Members of the European Parliament have called for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the people of Ukraine to be recognized this year by the Nobel Peace Prize committee for their resistance to the Russian invasion.

While that desire is understandable, that choice is unlikely because the Nobel committee has a history of honoring figures who end conflicts, not wartime leaders, said Dan Smith, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Smith believes more likely peace prize candidates would be those fighting climate change or the International Atomic Energy Agency, a past recipient. Honoring the IAEA again would recognize its efforts to prevent a radioactive catastrophe at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant at the heart of fighting in Ukraine, and its work in fighting nuclear proliferation, Smith said.

“This is really difficult period in world history and there is not a lot of peace being made,” he said.

Promoting peace isn't always rewarded with a Nobel. India's Mohandas Gandhi, a prominent symbol of non-violence, was never so honored.

In some cases, the winners have not lived out the values enshrined in the peace prize.

Just this week the Vatican acknowledged imposing disciplinary sanctions on Nobel Peace Prize-winning Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo following allegations he sexually abused boys in East Timor in the 1990s.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won in 2019 for making peace with neighboring Eritrea. A year later a largely ethnic conflict erupted in the country's Tigray region. Some accuse Abiy of stoking the tensions, which have resulted in widespread atrocities. Critics have called for his Nobel to be revoked and the Nobel committee has issued a rare admonition to him.

The Myanmar activist Aung San Suu Kyi won in 1991 for her opposition to military rule but decades later has been viewed as failing to oppose atrocities committed against the mostly Muslim Rohingya minority.

In some years, no peace prize has been awarded. It paused them during World War I, except to honor the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1917. It didn't hand out any from 1939 to 1943 due to World War II. In 1948, the year Gandhi died, the Norwegian Nobel Committee made no award, citing a lack of a suitable living candidate.

The peace prize also does not always confer protection.

Last year journalists Maria Ressa of the Philippines and Dmitry Muratov of Russia were awarded “for their courageous fight for freedom of expression” in the face of authoritarian governments.

Following the invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has cracked down even harder on independent media, including Muratov's Novaya Gazeta, Russia’s most renowned independent newspaper. Muratov himself was attacked on a Russian train by an assailant who poured red paint over him, injuring his eyes.

The Philippines government this year ordered the shutdown of Ressa’s news organization, Rappler.

The literature prize, meanwhile, has been notoriously unpredictable.

Few had bet on last year’s winner, Zanzibar-born, UK-based writer Abdulrazak Gurnah, whose books explore the personal and societal impacts of colonialism and migration.

Gurnah was only the sixth Nobel literature laureate born in Africa, and the prize has long faced criticism that it is too focused on European and North American writers. It is also male-dominated, with just 16 women among its 118 laureates.

A clear contender is Salman Rushdie, the India-born writer and free-speech advocate who spent years in hiding after Iran’s clerical rulers called for his death over his 1988 novel “The Satanic Verses.” Rushdie, 75, was stabbed and seriously injured in August at a festival in New York state.

The list of possible winners includes literary giants from around the world: Kenyan writer Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Japan’s Haruki Murakami, Norway’s Jon Fosse, Antigua-born Jamaica Kincaid and France’s Annie Ernaux.

The prizes to Gurnah in 2021 and U.S. poet Louise Glück in 2020 have helped the literature prize move on from years of controversy and scandal.

In 2018, the award was postponed after sex abuse allegations rocked the Swedish Academy, which names the Nobel literature committee, and sparked an exodus of members. The academy revamped itself but faced more criticism for giving the 2019 literature award to Austria’s Peter Handke, who has been called an apologist for Serbian war crimes.

Some scientists hope the award for physiology or medicine honors colleagues instrumental in the development of the mRNA technology that went into COVID-19 vaccines, which saved millions of lives across the world.

“When we think of Nobel prizes, we think of things that are paradigm shifting, and in a way I see mRNA vaccines and their success with COVID-19 as a turning point for us,” said Deborah Fuller, a microbiology professor at the University of Washington.

Physics at times can seem arcane and difficult for the public to understand. But the last three years, the physics Nobel has honored more accessible topics: Climate change computer models, black holes and planets outside our solar system.

Some harder-to-understand topics in physics — like stopping light, quantum physics and carbon nanotubes — could capture a Nobel award this year.

The Nobel announcements kick off Monday with the prize in physiology or medicine, followed by physics on Tuesday, chemistry on Wednesday and literature on Thursday. The 2022 Nobel Peace Prize will be announced on Oct. 7 and the economics award on Oct. 10.

The prizes carry a cash award of 10 million Swedish kronor (nearly $900,000) and will be handed out on Dec. 10.



Marwan Hamadeh: Hafez al-Assad Told Us, ‘Forget Bachir Gemayel,' and he Was Assassinated 4 Days Later

Marwan Hamadeh accompanying Walid Jumblatt during a meeting with Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in December.
Marwan Hamadeh accompanying Walid Jumblatt during a meeting with Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in December.
TT
20

Marwan Hamadeh: Hafez al-Assad Told Us, ‘Forget Bachir Gemayel,' and he Was Assassinated 4 Days Later

Marwan Hamadeh accompanying Walid Jumblatt during a meeting with Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in December.
Marwan Hamadeh accompanying Walid Jumblatt during a meeting with Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in December.

For half a century, Lebanon lived under the long rule of the two Assads in Syria. Damascus held Lebanon’s fate in its hands, shaping its political landscape by producing and eliminating presidents and leaders alike. Former Lebanese MP and minister Marwan Hamadeh shares his experience with both regimes.

On December 22, a Lebanese Druze delegation, led by Walid Jumblatt, visited “the new Syria.” Marwan Hamadeh was part of that delegation, and the scene struck him. President Ahmad Sharaa now sat in the chair once occupied by Hafez al-Assad, then his son Bashar, in the People’s Palace, which had been built with the help of Rafik Hariri’s company.

The trip reminded Hamadeh of the fate of men who had defied one or both Assads, including Kamal Jumblatt, Bachir Gemayel, René Moawad, Rafik Hariri, and many others. The memories were even more intense because Hamadeh himself had narrowly survived an assassination attempt on October 1, 2004—an attack that left him wounded, killed his bodyguard, and injured his driver. At the time, the attempt was widely seen as a message to both Walid Jumblatt and Rafik Hariri.

Asharq Al-Awsat visited Hamadeh at his office at An-Nahar newspaper, where he has been based since the mid-1980s, to discuss Lebanon’s turbulent relationship with the Assad regimes. He recalled Hafez al-Assad’s chilling words in his presence: “Forget Bachir Gemayel.” Just four days later, the newly elected Lebanese president was assassinated. The perpetrator, Habib Shartouni, was a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which had close ties to the Syrian regime. Hamadeh holds Syria responsible not only for Gemayel’s assassination but also for the killing of President René Moawad, the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, and the assassination of Rafik Hariri.

When asked if he had expected Bashar al-Assad’s downfall or flight from Syria, Hamadeh replied: “I thought there might be a coup—a rebellion from within the Syrian army, perhaps by the Fourth Division breaking away from the command of its leader, Bashar’s brother Maher al-Assad. I believed this could happen out of concern for Syria’s sovereignty, which had fallen under Iranian influence. However, I did not anticipate the complete collapse we are seeing now, which has been evident in Syria’s failure to respond to Israeli attacks for more than a year. There hasn’t even been a statement about Gaza or anything before that. Daily airstrikes on Syria, and no reaction.”

He emphasized that the problem did not start with Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian regime has always sought to control two key decisions—if not two entire territories: Lebanon’s independent decision-making and Palestine’s independent decision-making. This, he argues, is why Syria has persistently opposed the establishment of a strong, unified Lebanese state. The dream of making Lebanon a Syrian province or western governorate predates the Assads and was not just a Ba’ath Party ambition.

Hamadeh explained: “There has always been something within Syrian political thinking that resents the separation of these districts from Syria in 1920 by France to establish Greater Lebanon. This sentiment is not just found among the Alawites. In fact, the Alawites might have accepted division, with one part for the Druze and another for different groups. But deep within Syrian national identity, this remains an unresolved issue. Even among those who see Damascus as the beating heart of Arabism and Syria as the embodiment of Arab identity on the frontiers of the Arab empire, there is this feeling. I sensed it especially during discussions about the Taif Agreement, and even before that, during the so-called ‘Tripartite Agreement,’ which I helped negotiate.”

Hamadeh recounts that the agreement was brokered between him and some of his fiercest adversaries at the time: Elie Hobeika, who represented the Lebanese Forces; Michel Samaha, later notorious for his involvement in smuggling explosives from Syrian intelligence chief Ali Mamlouk; and Assaad Shaftari, the intelligence chief of the Lebanese Forces under Hobeika. Also involved was Mohammad Abdul Hamid Beydoun, a key figure in Nabih Berri’s Amal Movement, who had previously been a leftist before shifting alliances. This shift was part of a broader migration from the Lebanese left, which had traditionally aligned with Fatah and the Palestinian resistance, towards Amal and later Hezbollah.

The Tripartite Agreement emerged after the failure of the Geneva and Lausanne conferences, which had attempted national dialogue. Those conferences only succeeded in overturning the May 17, 1983, Lebanese-Israeli agreement, which Hafez al-Assad had called an “agreement of submission.” This reversal led to a coordinated offensive against the Lebanese government, President Amin Gemayel, and the multinational peacekeeping forces, with support from the Soviet Union under Yuri Andropov.

Hamadeh explained: “The core issue was the refusal of the Lebanese establishment—particularly the Maronites—to relinquish the powers of the presidency and distribute them between the legislative and executive branches, meaning the cabinet. This focus continued until we reached the Tripartite Agreement, which was the first joint initiative between Rafik Hariri—who was not yet prime minister and was acting as a Saudi mediator—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.”

He noted that the agreement sought to broker a deal between militias rather than parliamentarians. It effectively proposed a confederation with ministers of state from six sects, rotating leadership similar to the Swiss model. In reality, this meant a permanent Syrian presence, as the fragile sectarian balance required a strong external force to keep it from unraveling.

Elie Hobeika had by then chosen the Syrian camp. At the time, there were rumors that he had maintained intelligence ties with both Israel and Syria, which might explain why his role in Bachir Gemayel’s assassination was overlooked before he fully aligned with Syrian intelligence. Eventually, intelligence maneuvers brought Hobeika over to the pro-Syrian National Forces alliance, which included Amal Movement and other factions. However, this broad coalition later collapsed under its own contradictions. As the internal conflicts intensified, Hezbollah gradually overtook Amal and effectively eliminated the National Resistance Front, replacing it with what became known as the Islamic Resistance.

The Lebanese Resistance Against Both Assads

Asked about those who resisted Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, Hamadeh said: “The Lebanese people resisted both Assads at different times and to varying degrees, depending on the sectarian composition of different regions. However, in the end, no area was spared from the oppression of either Assad. No sect avoided their brutality, not even the Shiite at certain points. The case of Imam Musa al-Sadr is worth revisiting, along with Syria’s role amid the rise of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.”

He added: “I have both a strong feeling and information suggesting that the Syrian regime was involved in sidelining and making him disappear. Perhaps they feared an independent Shiite leadership that was more Lebanese, more aligned with the Arab world, and rebellious against the Palestinians—particularly the rejectionist front close to Syria. What I want to emphasize is that no one was spared from the wrath of either Assad. Take Kamel Jumblatt, whom we consider a mentor. He captivated us with his socialist ideas, his belief in Lebanese national independence, and his support for an independent Palestinian decision. He was ultimately punished for his positions—especially after telling Hafez al-Assad in their famous final meeting: ‘I will not lead Lebanon into your big Arab prison.’”

When Hafez al-Assad Said: “Forget Bashir Gemayel”

Hamadeh continued: “The hostility between us was well known, but let me take you back to the period after the siege of Beirut and the departure of Yasser Arafat and his comrades to Tunisia. Israel had Beirut under siege, and we were trapped inside. The city had little access to water, food, and electricity—until Saudi Arabia, through US President Ronald Reagan, secured minimal aid. That was when Rafik Hariri played his first role as a mediator.

“We warned the Americans that if Israel entered Beirut, we would be wiped out. The Israelis saw us as allies of ‘terrorists’ and supporters of the Palestinian resistance. In response, the Americans, through their envoy Philip Habib, arranged for us to leave Beirut safely via Sofar and then to Damascus, using vehicles from the US embassy and the Lebanese Sixth Bureau.

On September 10, 1982, we met with President Hafez al-Assad at 9 am Walid Jumblatt and I were there, along with Mohsen Dalloul, Abdullah al-Amin, and Hikmat al-Eid. At the time, I was still serving as a minister in Elias Sarkis’s government. During our discussion, Assad spoke about his ties to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and his plans for a counteroffensive against the US and the multinational forces. He assured us that he would provide weapons to help defend the Chouf region.”

“At one point, Walid Jumblatt remarked that Lebanon had a political system and that a new president, Bashir Gemayel, had been elected. He suggested that we should deal with this new reality, as had always been the case in previous transitions.

Hafez al-Assad responded sharply: ‘Who are you talking about? Bashir Gemayel?’

We said: ‘Yes, of course, he was elected.’ Assad waved his hand dismissively and said, ‘Forget Bashir Gemayel. Forget him.’”

Hamadeh said that the conversation took place on September 10, 1982. Bashir had been elected just days earlier and was still celebrating his victory. Four days later, Gemayel was assassinated.

“We were still in Damascus at the time, while Walid Jumblatt had traveled to Amman to visit his family. That’s how we learned of Bashir’s assassination,” he stated.

The Wave of Assassinations

Hamadeh added that a wave of assassinations followed. Grand Mufti Sheikh Hassan Khaled was targeted, along with several Palestinian leaders. While Israel was responsible for many of these killings—pursuing Palestinian figures even as far as Tunisia—the Syrian regime also played its part, particularly in Tripoli and elsewhere.

Lebanese political figures were also targeted. Mohammad Shuqair, an advisor to President Amine Gemayel, was assassinated, as were Sheikh Sobhi al-Saleh and MP Nazem al-Qadri, who was gunned down while at a barber shop. Later, President René Moawad was killed.

Asked if he directly accused the Syrian regime of killing René Moawad, Hamadeh replied: “I do not absolve them at all,” he replied. “Others may have been involved alongside the Syrian regime—assassinations like these are often joint operations. This was also the case with the assassination of Rafik Hariri.”

The Trap Set for Samir Geagea

Regarding the church bombing, Hamadeh explained that Geagea had nothing to do with it. At the time, Hamadeh was Minister of Health and had accompanied Prime Minister Rafik Hariri to the site.

“We were among the first to arrive, and it was clear that everything had been premeditated—not just the bombing itself, but also an attempt to block the Nahr al-Kalb Bridge and tunnel to frame the attack as part of a larger terrorist operation, possibly to create a pretext for partitioning Lebanon,” he recounted.

Shortly after, an assassination attempt targeted Deputy Prime Minister Michel El Murr, and Geagea was falsely accused. Many, including President Elias Hrawi, warned him that he should leave Lebanon for his safety, but he refused, according to Hamadeh.

The bombing was orchestrated by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence, and Rafik Hariri knew this well. That’s why some people advised Geagea to leave the country—they were planning something against him. He refused, and as a result, he spent 11 years in prison.