Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
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Normalization between Syria and Türkiye … Putin’s Gift to Erdogan

Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)
Russia's President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan meet on the sidelines of the 6th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan October 13, 2022. (Reuters)

The Russian-sponsored Syrian-Turkish military meeting that was held in Moscow on Wednesday is the latest effort to achieve rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus.

It will likely culminate in a “gift” to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan from his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin: a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ahead of Turkish elections in 2023.

However, are the normalization efforts serious or simply cosmetic?

Background

Relations between Ankara and Damascus shifted in summer 2011, months after the eruption of the Syrian anti-regime protests. Türkiye became a safe haven and supporter of the opposition against Damascus.

Syria transformed into an arena of violence, chaos and division. It also became a backer of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) that is opposed to Ankara.

Russia intervened in the conflict in the regime’s favor in 2015. Soon, it had troops deployed in Syria, effectively becoming Türkiye’s neighbor. Ankara would then discover the extent of NATO’s support to it, forcing it to cooperate with Moscow to impose a new reality in Syria.

A year later, Türkiye would prioritize preventing the formation of a Kurdish entity on its southern borders. It therefore reached a series of settlements and agreements with Russia that put an end to Kurdish ambitions. It succeeded in gaining control of pockets of regions in Syria, estimated at over 20,000 square kilometers, roughly twice the size of Lebanon.

Putin pushed for rapprochement between Erdogan and Assad with the launch of the Astana talks between Russia, Iran and Türkiye in 2017 and the development of the “hostile cooperation” between Ankara and Moscow.

In early 2020, Moscow succeeded in hosting an open meeting between Syria’s national security chief Ali Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan. Mamlouk demanded that Türkiye pull out from Syrian regions and reopen the Aleppo-Latakia highway. Fidan wanted deeper cooperation against the YPG.

Putin succeeded in bringing them together, but failed in reaching a major breakthrough.

New attempt

Erdogan has repeatedly been threatening to wage a new military offensive in Syria. He also has his eyes set on the upcoming elections and growing Turkish opposition to Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Notably, Türkiye and Russia have seen their cooperation deepen in wake of the war on Ukraine.

With all of the above, Putin has been paving the way for a meeting between Erdogan and Assad before the summer.

The first step he took was have a secret meeting take place between Mamlouk and Fidan in Moscow in July 2022.

The Syrian official demanded that his country’s sovereignty be respected. He demanded a timetable for Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian regions and called on it to cease its support to opposition factions and “terrorists”. He urged Türkiye to reopen the Aleppo-Latakia and Bab al-Hawa-Idlib highways, to take measures against western sanctions and back Syria’s reconstruction.

For his part, Fidan demanded cooperation with Damascus against the YPG and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). He demanded the establishment of a security zone that excludes these groups 23 kilometers deep into Syria and the establishment of safe zones that can take in a million returning refugees. He also urged cooperation in the Constitutional Committee and resolving the Syrian crisis through United Nations Security Council resolution 2254.

Mamlouk and Fidan failed to reach an agreement and the meeting ended without a breakthrough.

Normalization or not?

In recent months Erdogan wasn’t wondering whether he will meet with Assad or not, but rather when he will meet him. He has repeatedly declared that he is ready to meet with him, listing various reasons, such as resolving differences with the majority of countries in the region before the Turkish elections.

Assad, however, is in no rush to hold a meeting that would favor his rival, whose country he views as an occupying nation.

As Türkiye and Russia intensify their cooperation in Ukraine, the Turkish elections draw near and the Syrian economic crisis deepens, Putin has pushed more and more for normalization and for a meeting to be held between him, Erdogan and Assad. The meeting would be seen as a gift to his “frenemy” and a boost for him to win the elections.

To that end, Russia has proposed holding a series of meetings that include tripartite security talks, meetings between the ministers of defense attended by intelligence officials, and a meeting between the Russian, Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers that will be capped by a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Russia is trying to offer magical remedies to bridge the divide between Türkiye and Syria. It is offering a series of military, security and political meetings, as well as amendments to the 1998 Adana agreement between Ankara and Damascus that addresses cooperation against the PKK and the possibility of a Turkish incursion 5 kilometers deep into Syria.

The amendments would merge the Adana and 2019 Sochi agreements to include the deployment of Russian-Turkish patrols, the withdrawal of the YPG 30 kilometers away from the Turkish border and the deployment of Syrian border guards along the border with Türkiye.

Politically, Russia is proposing that a joint statement be issued with main clauses that underscore a “commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria”, “rejection of separatist agendas” and return of refugees.

Türkiye is home to some 3.7 million Syrian refugees. The issue has been one of the main headlines of the Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections. Erdogan wants to take away this card from his rivals, which is why he is pursuing rapprochement and agreement with Damascus. Ultimately, however, the return of two million refugees back to their homeland is a hard ask.

Assad wants the withdrawal of thousands of Turkish soldiers from Syria, an end to “occupations” and a halt to military and political support to the Syrian opposition. It would be difficult to envisage an alliance with Ankara against the Kurds and meeting with Erdogan before a step is taken towards fulfilling these demands.

Moscow has set the process of normalization between Damascus and Ankara in motion, with all its security, military and political demands, with the final goal being a summit between Putin, Erdogan and Assad.

Normalization will be the chief pursuit of 2023 with its anticipated impact on normalization between Arab countries and Damascus and how far the US will allow it to go ahead.



Hezbollah’s ‘Statelet’ in Syria’s Qusayr Under Israeli Fire

Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
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Hezbollah’s ‘Statelet’ in Syria’s Qusayr Under Israeli Fire

Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)

Israel has expanded its strikes against Hezbollah in Syria by targeting the al-Qusayr region in Homs.

Israel intensified its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in September and has in the process struck legal and illegal borders between Lebanon and Syria that are used to smuggle weapons to the Iran-backed party. Now, it has expanded its operations to areas of Hezbollah influence inside Syria itself.

Qusayr is located around 20 kms from the Lebanese border. Israeli strikes have destroyed several bridges in the area, including one stretching over the Assi River that is a vital connection between Qusayr and several towns in Homs’ eastern and western countrysides.

Israel has also hit main and side roads and Syrian regime checkpoints in the area.

The Israeli army announced that the latest attacks targeted roads that connect the Syrian side of the border to Lebanon and that are used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah.

Qusayr is strategic position for Hezbollah. The Iran-backed party joined the fight alongside the Syrian regime against opposition factions in the early years of the Syrian conflict, which began in 2011. Hezbollah confirmed its involvement in Syria in 2013.

Hezbollah waged its earliest battles in Syria against the “Free Syrian Army” in Qusayr. After two months of fighting, the party captured the region in mid-June 2013. By then, it was completely destroyed and its population fled to Lebanon.

A source from the Syrian opposition said Hezbollah has turned Qusayr and its countryside to its own “statelet”.

It is now the backbone of its military power and the party has the final say in the area even though regime forces are deployed there, it told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Qusayr is critical for Hezbollah because of its close proximity to the Lebanese border,” it added.

Several of Qusayr’s residents have since returned to their homes. But the source clarified that only regime loyalists and people whom Hezbollah “approves” of have returned.

The region has become militarized by Hezbollah. It houses training centers for the party and Shiite militias loyal to Iran whose fighters are trained by Hezbollah, continued the source.

Since Israel intensified its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the party moved the majority of its fighters to Qusayr, where the party also stores large amounts of its weapons, it went on to say.

In 2016, Shiite Hezbollah staged a large military parade at the al-Dabaa airport in Qusayr that was seen as a message to the displaced residents, who are predominantly Sunni, that their return home will be impossible, stressed the source.

Even though the regime has deployed its forces in Qusayr, Hezbollah ultimately holds the greatest sway in the area.

Qusayr is therefore of paramount importance to Hezbollah, which will be in no way willing to cede control of.

Lebanese military expert Brig. Gen Saeed Al-Qazah told Asharq Al-Awsat that Qusayr is a “fundamental logistic position for Hezbollah.”

He explained that it is where the party builds its rockets and drones that are delivered from Iran. It is also where the party builds the launchpads for firing its Katyusha and grad rockets.

Qazah added that Qusayr is also significant for its proximity to Lebanon’s al-Hermel city and northeastern Bekaa region where Hezbollah enjoys popular support and where its arms deliveries pass through on their way to the South.

Qazah noted that Israel has not limited its strikes in Qusayr to bridges and main and side roads, but it has also hit trucks headed to Lebanon, stressing that Israel has its eyes focused deep inside Syria, not just the border.