Natural Disasters Increase Displacement Rates to 34% in Yemen

Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)
Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)
TT
20

Natural Disasters Increase Displacement Rates to 34% in Yemen

Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)
Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)

A majority of Yemen's internally displaced wish to return to their areas of origin, contrary to previous data from last year's beginning, according to recent data by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

According to data in the second half of 2022, 41 percent of the families interviewed planned to remain in their current displacement sites despite widespread concerns about a lack of essential services, while 28 percent had yet to decide.

According to the data, plans to stay in the sites are often linked to security concerns, less than third of the families reported plans to return (31 percent), compared to seven percent in previous data.

-Livelihood concerns

Marib, Hodeidah, and Taiz recorded the highest levels of new displacement, showing that around 41 percent of all respondent households planned to stay in their current locations at the assessment time.

The families most commonly cited insecurity in places of origin (42 percent), followed by concerns about livelihood opportunities (35 percent).

As a secondary reason for staying, the questionnaire revealed that livelihood concerns ranked highest on the list (48 percent), followed by worries about shelter in places of origin (11 percent) and security concerns (11 percent).

In response to a request to identify three potential risks while staying in displacement sites, almost all households cited a lack of essential services, such as food, health, water, and education (98 percent).

About 15 percent cited insecurity as a risk in their current locations. Only 4 percent reported a risk of hostility from host communities outside the IDP sites.

The list of highest priority needs expected during the extended stay in the current IDP sites was mainly identified as food (95 percent), water (60 percent), shelter (57 percent), and health care (53 percent).

In addition, 12 percent of families indicated the need for security in IDP sites. More than two-thirds of respondents who intend to stay reported having plans to make a living in their current displacement sites (68 percent) in agriculture, construction, and other daily work activities.

- Disasters increased displacement

According to another UNFPA report, the six months truce led to a decrease fighting, which led to an 18 percent drop in the displacement rate over the past year, but warns that natural disasters, such as severe seasonal floods and drought, disrupted livelihoods, rescue missions, and services.

According to the UN response mechanism led by the Population Fund, 447,000 individuals were assisted during 2022. Among the newly displaced, 62 percent were displaced due to the conflict, while 38 percent were displaced due to heavy rains and floods.

In turn, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix assessed current intentions for the return of IDPs in 20 IDP sites in Aden.

New displacements to and within Aden were relatively uncommon in 2022, constituting two percent of all registered new removals.

Most families arrived from Hodeidah (75 percent), and 19 percent arrived from Taiz, which indicates that most migrated families from the west coast came to Aden.



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
TT
20

Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.