Natural Disasters Increase Displacement Rates to 34% in Yemen

Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)
Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)
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Natural Disasters Increase Displacement Rates to 34% in Yemen

Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)
Aid worker helps build camps for the displaced in Marib, Yemen (United Nations)

A majority of Yemen's internally displaced wish to return to their areas of origin, contrary to previous data from last year's beginning, according to recent data by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

According to data in the second half of 2022, 41 percent of the families interviewed planned to remain in their current displacement sites despite widespread concerns about a lack of essential services, while 28 percent had yet to decide.

According to the data, plans to stay in the sites are often linked to security concerns, less than third of the families reported plans to return (31 percent), compared to seven percent in previous data.

-Livelihood concerns

Marib, Hodeidah, and Taiz recorded the highest levels of new displacement, showing that around 41 percent of all respondent households planned to stay in their current locations at the assessment time.

The families most commonly cited insecurity in places of origin (42 percent), followed by concerns about livelihood opportunities (35 percent).

As a secondary reason for staying, the questionnaire revealed that livelihood concerns ranked highest on the list (48 percent), followed by worries about shelter in places of origin (11 percent) and security concerns (11 percent).

In response to a request to identify three potential risks while staying in displacement sites, almost all households cited a lack of essential services, such as food, health, water, and education (98 percent).

About 15 percent cited insecurity as a risk in their current locations. Only 4 percent reported a risk of hostility from host communities outside the IDP sites.

The list of highest priority needs expected during the extended stay in the current IDP sites was mainly identified as food (95 percent), water (60 percent), shelter (57 percent), and health care (53 percent).

In addition, 12 percent of families indicated the need for security in IDP sites. More than two-thirds of respondents who intend to stay reported having plans to make a living in their current displacement sites (68 percent) in agriculture, construction, and other daily work activities.

- Disasters increased displacement

According to another UNFPA report, the six months truce led to a decrease fighting, which led to an 18 percent drop in the displacement rate over the past year, but warns that natural disasters, such as severe seasonal floods and drought, disrupted livelihoods, rescue missions, and services.

According to the UN response mechanism led by the Population Fund, 447,000 individuals were assisted during 2022. Among the newly displaced, 62 percent were displaced due to the conflict, while 38 percent were displaced due to heavy rains and floods.

In turn, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix assessed current intentions for the return of IDPs in 20 IDP sites in Aden.

New displacements to and within Aden were relatively uncommon in 2022, constituting two percent of all registered new removals.

Most families arrived from Hodeidah (75 percent), and 19 percent arrived from Taiz, which indicates that most migrated families from the west coast came to Aden.



Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
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Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)

A hundred days after Ahmed al-Sharaa was sworn in as Syria’s president, US officials are still proceeding with caution regarding his administration. There are concerns about the potential for chaos, which could create fertile ground for extremist groups and allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the country.

Additionally, there are growing anxieties over Türkiye’s expanding influence across Syria and its implications for Israel.

These points were highlighted in discussions with Robert Wood, a former US ambassador who held various positions at the State Department and served at the US Mission to the United Nations; Robert Ford, former US ambassador to Syria; Henri Barkey, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former government official; and Ayman Abdel Nour, a Syrian-American political analyst and journalist.

While caution is urged in evaluating al-Sharaa’s leadership, it remains unclear whether his actions will translate into meaningful governance.

According to Wood, the current situation in Syria can be described as highly complex, especially considering recent violence, and experts are watching closely to see how al-Sharaa navigates these challenges. While his hosting of a national unity conference has drawn some positive attention, concerns remain about the broader implications of his leadership.

Ford shares a similar perspective, acknowledging that Shara's actions often align with what one would expect from a head of state. Notably, his agreement with Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is seen as a potential step toward greater internal stability, provided it is properly implemented.

However, Barkey emphasizes that Abdi controls a much larger force than other groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which likely made it necessary for al-Sharaa to strike a deal with him. If Abdi forms alliances with other minority groups, such as the Druze, he could become a key figure of opposition to al-Sharaa’s rule. Additionally, al-Sharaa faces the challenge of reducing his reliance on Turkish support, while also proving his ability to act independently on the international stage.

US diplomats, however, remained cautious about al-Sharaa's leadership, with some expressing skepticism about his ability to lead effectively. While he appears to be acting presidentially, concerns persist regarding his control over extremist factions within his government, as well as recent security violations in Latakia and Tartus. Experts note that despite his ascent to power, Sharaa has yet to unite the country, with some pointing to the collapse of the regime’s military as a key factor in his rise.

A significant point of criticism from Barkey is al-Sharaa’s appointment of former jihadists as governors in key areas, including Latakia and Tartus, as well as his reliance on family members and loyalists within his government.

While some US officials argue that Sharaa’s government may not be directly involved in recent incidents, uncertainty remains about who in his administration might be complicit.

For his part, Abdel Nour highlights a shift in public perception of al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Initially, Syrians—including Alawites—were relieved by Assad's ousting, but nearly 100 days into Sharaa's presidency, tensions have risen due to discrepancies between al-Sharaa’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground, particularly in relation to key figures like Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and mid-level officials.

Key Questions Raised on Accountability and Rule of Law

Ford echoed concerns about al-Sharaa’s ability to address critical issues, including accountability and the rule of law, especially following the unrest in Latakia and Tartus.

Despite al-Sharaa’s formation of a committee to investigate the incidents, Ford questions whether those responsible for violations will be held publicly accountable, stressing that such actions are crucial for maintaining trust within security forces and the broader public.

Wood acknowledged the significance of al-Sharaa’s national unity conference yet remains deeply concerned about the potential agreements Sharaa may strike with the SDF. While he sees positive signs, he underscores the importance of thorough investigations into recent killings, as the identities of those responsible remain unclear.

US Perspectives on al-Sharaa’s Leadership

Abdel Nour describes two prevalent perspectives in Washington regarding al-Sharaa’s leadership. One, held by military and security figures with experience in Iraq, doubts that the new Syrian leadership will bring significant change, regardless of its outward appearance. The other viewpoint suggests giving al-Sharaa several months to adjust to the new reality.

Fears Over ISIS Prisoners and Regional Stability

A significant concern raised by Wood is the potential release of approximately 9,500 ISIS fighters currently held in over 20 prisons across Syria, should Sharaa reach a deal with the SDF. These fighters could pose a serious security threat not only to Syria but to Iraq and the broader region.

Ford added that al-Sharaa’s past, particularly his involvement with jihadist factions like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, raises questions about his true political motivations. Ford wonders whether al-Sharaa used these groups for political leverage.

Iran’s Influence and Regional Dynamics

Both Wood and Ford emphasize the importance of monitoring Iran’s role in Syria. Ford warns that further instability could provide Iran with opportunities to rebuild its influence in certain Syrian communities, which he believes would not align with US national security interests.

Wood stresses that neighboring countries, including Israel and Türkiye, have a strong interest in a unified Syria to avoid further regional instability.

Professor Barkey cautions that while Iran's influence in Syria has not been eliminated, Tehran will likely continue to pursue ways to reassert its presence.

Türkiye-Israel Tensions and the Future of Syria

Concerns over a potential Turkish-Israeli confrontation in Syria are growing. Ford points out that Türkiye, a key player with growing ties to al-Sharaa’s government, could play a significant role in Syria’s future. He worries that a direct conflict between Turkish and Israeli forces, potentially involving airstrikes or proxy engagements, could escalate tensions in the region.

However, Barkey believes that such a scenario is unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation. Instead, he suggests that the Turkish-Israeli rivalry will remain largely political, with both countries focusing on strategic interests in the region, particularly in Syria’s south where Israel is concerned about the resurgence of Hezbollah or other new actors.

In discussions surrounding Syria’s new constitution, Ford sees little value in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee led by UN Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen. Similarly, Barkey shares Ford’s skepticism, noting that he sees limited potential for the UN to bring about meaningful change unless Arab countries step in with support.

Barkey also echoes the view held by many that US President Donald Trump was unpredictable in his decision-making. He added that Trump had a deep admiration, though not fascination, for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, viewing him as one of the “strongmen” capable of shaping the future of their countries as they see fit.

Looking ahead, Barkey remains uncertain about Syria’s future, acknowledging that the situation is highly unpredictable. He suggests that if Syria were to experience another war or a severe collapse of law and order, it is highly probable that ISIS could resurge.

The US government, Barkey speculates, is likely deeply concerned that without American forces acting as a buffer or deterrent, the stability of the region could be further jeopardized in the event of a breakdown in Syria.