Syria, Türkiye Normalization Takes Shape along Aleppo-Latakia Highway

Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)
Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)
TT
20

Syria, Türkiye Normalization Takes Shape along Aleppo-Latakia Highway

Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)
Children are seen at a refugee camp in Syria's Idlib on January 14. (EPA)

Open and secret political and security contacts have expanded in recent days to choose the best path to normalize relations with Damascus.

Syria and Türkiye have held security meetings in the Latakia countryside with the aim of reopening the Aleppo-Latakia highway. A Kurdish delegation from Qamishli even visited the Syrian capital to feel out the limits of the Syrian-Turkish cooperation against them.

The United States has also been mediating between Ankara and the Kurds to deter a new Turkish incursion east of the Euphrates River. Iran, meanwhile, is trying to become involved in the Russian mediation between Damascus and Ankara.

Russia

The latest in the Russian efforts is President Vladimir Putin’s insistence on paving the way for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad to meet before Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections in May.

Syria’s national security bureau chief Ali Mamlouk and Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan had already held talks. The Syrian, Turkish and Russian defense ministers also met. A meeting between the three countries’ foreign ministers was set to be held in the Russian capital, Moscow.

Moscow sought for the meeting to be held on January 11, but Ankara received “American advice” that it should not agree to attend before Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Washington on January 18.

Damascus, for its part, was not willing to hold the meeting for the sake of holding it, but wanted clear outcomes to come of it.

This led to a series of additional contacts. Russia’s presidential envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev visited Damascus for talks with Assad. Russia reiterated its desire to arrange a meeting between Assad and Erdogan, but the former tied such a meeting to Türkiye’s withdrawal from northern Syria or at least setting a timetable for the pullout.

Clearly, Damascus wants to claim some form of “symbolic achievement” before having Assad and Erdogan meet.

Ankara, for its part, informed mediators that its army will not withdraw from Syria “under any circumstance and even if the Americans pull out.” Such a position stands in contrast to its previous announcements when it used to tie it withdrawal to the political solution and the pullout of all foreign forces that entered Syria after 2011.

At this impasse, attention was shifted to the reopening of the Aleppo-Latakia highway, or M4. The route was included in de-escalation agreements reached between Moscow and Ankara over Aleppo. Talks over the highway included deploying Russian and Turkish patrols and establishing a safe zone on either side of it.

After three years, the patrols have since come to a halt and efforts to reopen the highway have stalled. Moscow is no longer exerting pressure on Ankara because it needs it in several other issues, including the war in Ukraine.

Syrian-Turkish security meetings have been held recently in Latakia’s Kasab area to reopen the highway. Türkiye has shown some flexibility in reopening it on condition that it maintain its control over it, while Syria maintains its sovereignty.

Kurdish concern

As Syria and Türkiye inch closer to normalizing their relations, Damascus again turned to the Kurds. Each side wants to feel out the respective party’s stance on the normalization. Indeed, a Kurdish delegation visited Damascus just days ago.

Russia had previously sponsored negotiations and delegations were formed, but the talks then came to a halt. Damascus now wants to feel out where the Kurds, who are allied to the US, stand, while the Kurds want to know the limits of the normalization between Damascus and Ankara.

The meetings were aimed at studying the implementation of the understanding that was signed between the two parties in wake of the sudden American troop withdrawal approved by former US President Donald Trump in late 2019. The agreement included the deployment of Syrian forces east of the Euphrates.

The Kurds are now eager to cooperate with Damascus if it means preventing a new Turkish offensive against them, while Damascus is more than ready to deal with them in their position of weakness.

American mediation

It is no secret that relations between Deputy Assistant to the US President and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk and Ankara are very bad. But a Gulf state recently hosted a secret meeting between the US official and Türkiye’s Fidan with aim of clearing the air.

What can be done to avert a new Turkish incursion east of the Euphrates? What can be done to meet some Turkish demands? What can be done to avert a catastrophe in the counter-terrorism efforts that are being carried out by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition that is partnered with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)?

In wake of the secret meeting, US State Department Special Envoy to Syria Nicholas Granger carried out a series of secret visits to Ankara and Qamishli. Talks focused on the withdrawal of the Kurdish police, Asayish, 30 kilometers deep into Syrian territory away from the Turkish border or that they lay down their arms. They also tackled the re-formation of a local councils and return of Syrian refugees.

Meanwhile, Turkish FM Cavusoglu was keen on meeting United Nations envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen ahead of his trip to Washington to imply that he was interested in reaching a political solution in Syria.

At any rate, a breakthrough, if reached, has yet to be declared.

Türkiye has repeatedly said it had reached the limit of its patience and that it would take unilateral measures. The US has warned against any measure that would impact the SDF and the war on terror.

Iranian annoyance

Amid all these developments, Iran has expressed its annoyance with the Russian mediation between Damascus and Ankara for a number of reasons.

First, the mediation took place behind its back. In fact, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian complained of this in Damascus just days ago, revealing that he had learned of the Syrian-Turkish meetings through the media.

Second, Tehran believes that any progress in Syrian-Turkish ties may take place at the expense of Iran’s military and non-military role in Syria.

Third, the United Arab Emirates has joined efforts in Syria and offered to host or take part in the Syrian-Turkish-Russian meetings, including the upcoming trilateral summit.

Add to the above obstacles that led to the postponement of a visit by Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to Damascus that was planned for late 2022.

Meanwhile, Damascus, which wants to stand on equal footing with its allies Moscow and Tehran, has expressed its disappointment with the continued Iranian arms shipments to Damascus International Airport that has been the target of a number of Israeli strikes.

It is also upset with the delay in the arrival of three Iranian oil shipments and with draft agreements that include “sovereign concessions” related to the economy and granting Iranians in Syria the same privileges as the Syrians themselves.

These issues were discussed during Abdollahian’s visit to Damascus and some breakthroughs were reached. Tehran pledged to send oil shipments and Damascus pledged to coordinate its normalization with Ankara with Iran. Preparations to arrange for Raisi’s visit to Damascus have resumed. Amid all this, pro-Iran factions shelled the positions of “America’s allies” in the region east of the Euphrates.

The outcomes of the above-mentioned secret and open meetings will emerge on the Aleppo-Latakia highway, the battlefields in northern and eastern Syria and in air raids. Meanwhile, the Syrian people, huddled in their homes and camps, are hoping for an improvement in their living and economic conditions.



Cash Shortage Squeezes Gaza Residents

Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
TT
20

Cash Shortage Squeezes Gaza Residents

Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)

Even when food is available, many in Gaza cannot afford to buy it, as the enclave suffers from a severe cash shortage. Israel has blocked the entry of new currency into the territory since October 7, 2023, leaving residents at the mercy of money changers who have hiked exchange rates on remittances to exorbitant levels.

Palestinians in Gaza primarily rely on the Israeli shekel for daily transactions, which used to enter the strip through banks operating under the Palestinian Monetary Authority, supplied by the Bank of Israel.

Banking operations in Gaza have ground to a halt since the start of the war, and no fresh banknotes have entered the enclave, worsening an already dire humanitarian situation. Residents say they have been left at the mercy of traders who exploit the cash shortage to impose arbitrary rules on currency use.

'The Traders’ Game'

Dubbed “the traders’ game” by many in Gaza, the practice began with merchants refusing to accept worn-out banknotes and certain coins, such as the 10-shekel piece (worth about $3), which have all but vanished from local markets. Some vendors now reject older versions of bills - like the brown-hued 100-shekel note (around $28) - insisting instead on the newer yellow ones. The same rules apply to various denominations.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Hani Jahjouh, a resident of al-Shati Camp west of Gaza City, said vendors selling vegetables and essential goods - when available - often refuse worn banknotes or specific coins, claiming they are counterfeit or easily faked.

“This just adds to the burden of people already crushed by impossible living conditions,” said Jahjouh, 59. “We don’t have solutions. We don’t even know where to get the money they’re asking for.”

Only a very small number of traders accept digital payments, and even then, residents say, they impose tough conditions - such as inflated prices or demands for partial payment in cash.

Displaced Gazan Duaa Ismail, originally from Beit Hanoun in the north of the enclave, says even when goods are available, she cannot afford them due to a lack of cash.

“We’re suffering badly from a shortage of money, and that makes it even harder to get basic items like flour and sugar - when they’re even in stock,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat from a shelter in Gaza City’s Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.

Ismail said that during a brief ceasefire, some traders had accepted digital payments through mobile apps. “But once the war resumed, things worsened, and they stopped taking them altogether,” she said.

Salaries They Can’t Spend

The crisis has also hit public-sector employees, private workers, and international aid staff, many of whom receive salaries through bank transfers or mobile wallets but have no way of accessing their funds with banks shuttered. They are forced to rely on currency dealers or traders with access to physical cash.

Amjad Hasballah, an employee with the Palestinian Authority, said he has been cashing his monthly salary through mobile banking apps for over a year and a half, paying a steep commission to money traders in return.

“When I received my last salary in early April, the commission had reached 30%,” he said.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Hasballah explained that at the start of the war, commissions hovered around 5%, but they spiked during Ramadan, peaking at 35% around Eid al-Fitr, before dipping slightly to 30%.

“My salary is just 2,800 shekels. When I pay a 30% fee, there’s barely anything left,” he said bitterly. “At this point, the traders might as well take the whole salary and just give us pocket money.”

Caught in a Trap

Jamal Al-Mashal, a father of six who lost two children in an Israeli airstrike, said he lives off 1,000 shekels (about $280) in monthly international aid. But even that amount is slashed by up to 30% when he exchanges it through local traders.

“People in Gaza have become a cash trap for currency dealers and big traders,” he said. “They’re exploiting our desperation, and it’s like a harvest season for them - raking in profits while we suffer.”

The poorest and most vulnerable are hit hardest. Many international agencies rely on electronic payment platforms to distribute aid to these groups, who often have no access to physical currency.

No Oversight, No Restraint

The Hamas-run government has made attempts to cap commission rates at 5%, but those efforts have largely failed. Officials blame ongoing Israeli targeting of personnel involved in regulating the process.

Money changers defend the high fees, arguing that the lack of currency entering Gaza leaves them with limited options.

“We raise commission rates because there’s simply no new cash coming in,” one trader told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Once money is distributed to the public, we have no way of getting it back. What goes out doesn’t return.”

He added that while ministries and law enforcement have tried to impose limits, traders view the rules as unfair. “There have been attempts to regulate us, but we haven’t complied - they’re asking too much from us under impossible conditions,” he said.

Some municipal leaders and community elders in Gaza have recently appealed to the Palestinian Monetary Authority in Ramallah to intervene in what they describe as unchecked profiteering by traders controlling access to scarce cash.

They have called for greater oversight, including monitoring and freezing the traders’ bank accounts.

The authority has repeatedly warned against exploitation of civilians and threatened to take action. But in practice, traders continue to charge hefty commissions on money transfers with little deterrence.

The Authority has urged residents to use its Instant Payment System available through mobile banking apps, which it says offers a practical alternative to cash, promotes digital payments, and enables real-time transactions.

Cash Squeeze Tightens Further

Despite the hardship, Israel is considering new measures that could further tighten the financial stranglehold on Gaza. One proposal involves withdrawing the 200-shekel banknote (worth about $55) from circulation, on the grounds that Hamas allegedly uses it to pay salaries to its fighters.

The suggestion was reportedly made by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Bank of Israel Governor Amir Yaron, who rejected the move. Other proposals include voiding the serial numbers of banknotes believed to be inside Gaza, effectively rendering them worthless, a step that could deliver a significant financial blow to Hamas.

According to a report published Tuesday by the Israeli daily Maariv, the proposal has backing from several ministers and economists both within and outside the central bank.

The report estimated that around 10 billion shekels in high-denomination bills - 100 and 200 shekels - remain in circulation within Gaza. These notes entered the enclave over the years through official banking channels supplied by the Bank of Israel.

Economists told Maariv that Gaza residents receive an estimated 150 to 200 million shekels each month through digital transfers from aid organizations and the Palestinian Authority. That money is then converted into cash within markets dominated by Hamas and supported by a network of money changers.

Israeli security sources estimate that Hamas has accumulated up to five billion shekels since the war began and has spent nearly one billion shekels on salaries for fighters and new recruits. The sources claim Hamas has profited significantly by reselling aid and fuel at inflated prices during the conflict.