Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
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Rafik Hariri to Blair: 11 Meetings with Israel… It Requested Hezbollah’s Dissolution

Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)
Blair and Hariri shake hands in front of the Prime Minister’s residence at 10 Downing Street, in a meeting that brought them together on July 29, 2003. (Getty Images)

Asharq Al-Awsat Publishes Details of the Late Premier’s Meetings in London

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999.

According to the documents, Hariri informed his British counterpart Tony Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but the Hebrew state put forward a series of conditions, including “dissolving Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which are published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and accused him of reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the south after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the UNIFIL.

The documents confirm that the United Kingdom tried to play a role in the negotiations on the Lebanese and Syrian tracks with Israel, and believed that there was a great possibility of achieving progress in light of the promises made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001) to withdraw from South Lebanon, and the “courtesy” between him and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

They also show that a special envoy of Blair met with Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to pressure exerted on him.

The documents, which were declassified in the British National Archives, show that Blair’s reception of Hariri came at the “insistence” of French President Jacques Chirac.
While the first meeting in 1997 was normal, because it took place between two prime ministers, the second meeting in 1999 was problematic “protocol”. Once again, Chirac insisted on Blair to meet Hariri, who was then a former prime minister after he resigned in 1998, following Lahoud’s election as president to succeed President Elias Hrawi.

On July 17, 1997, Blair received his Lebanese counterpart, Rafik Hariri, at 10 Downing Street. He was then the new prime minister after he led his party, the Labor Party, that year to a landslide victory over the Conservatives. Hariri had been prime minister for years under President Elias Hrawi and was focusing his efforts on rebuilding Lebanon after the long years of civil war.

Hariri visited the prime minister for 35 minutes on July 17. He was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance, Information and Trade, Secretary General of the Council of Ministers and Lebanon’s Ambassador in London. The meeting was also attended by Derek Fatchett (Foreign Secretary of State for the Middle East), and other UK officials.

The minutes of the meeting show that Hariri clearly held then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responsible for obstructing progress in the peace talks, and argued that this policy would only lead to the growth of the influence of Hamas and the fundamentalists.

Blair asked about the situation in Lebanon. Hariri said that there was now a monitoring group looking into the April understandings in South Lebanon. The group included Americans, French, Syrians, Israelis and Lebanese. He said that nobody wanted the situation to escalate, adding that the Lebanese were trying to build infrastructure throughout the country and achieve financial stability. There have been dramatic developments over the past five years, he noted.

Hariri invited the British Prime Minister to visit Beirut to see for himself. Fatchett said he visited the Lebanese capital, pointing to significant progress compared to its previous visits the year before. Hariri said that they were now hosting the Arab Games, and that a British company had built a wonderful stadium to host it.

Blair-Hariri... A second meeting in different circumstances

Two years after Blair’s meeting with Hariri, a second meeting took place between the two men, but under different circumstances. Hariri had been outside the Lebanese government after his resignation during the term of Lahoud.
An important change also took place in Israel, with the arrival of Ehud Barak to the premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

On July 5, 1999, Philip Barton wrote to the British prime minister, saying that Hariri, the former premier, would visit him the following day because of Chirac's repeated insistence.

He added that Hariri would be accompanied by some people from his office.

A list attached to Barton’s letter comprised the proposed topics for discussion. Those included the possibility of achieving progress in the Middle East peace process in the wake of Barak’s election; the necessity to reach progress on the Syrian and Lebanese track to achieve a comprehensive peace; the negotiations with the European Union; concern over the recent escalation in southern Lebanon that caused the bombing of Beirut on June 25; and progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Lebanon.

The brief explanation provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the following:

South Lebanon

A recent escalation of violence in southern Lebanon culminated in the June 25 Israeli Air Force attacks on Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, which killed 10 civilians, and a Hezbollah attack in northern Israel that killed two. The Israeli Air Force attacks were ordered by the Netanyahu government. Barak was informed of it, but not consulted. The situation is calm, but tense, according to the explanation. Contacts resumed in the Israeli-Lebanese monitoring group set up to monitor the April 1996 understandings.
Some saw the Hezbollah attack as a reminder to both Syria and Barak that they could not be ignored in any peace negotiations…

The Middle East peace process

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it expected that Barak would implement the Wye River memorandum whenever he forms a government. The second redeployment of Israeli forces under Wye will be the starting point for renewed negotiations on all tracks in the peace process. It added that the greatest progress was likely to be made on the Syrian-Lebanese tracks (with Israel). Barak may focus his attention here, according to the explanation.

It also noted that a unilateral withdrawal of the Israelis from South Lebanon would deprive the Syrians of one of their main cards in the negotiations over the Golan Heights, specifically their (implicit) influence regarding Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

The Lebanese will not walk alone without their dominant partner. Nevertheless, we understand that Barak knows the need for Syrian cooperation to ensure a successful withdrawal from Lebanon, the British ministry reported in the documents.

The internal Lebanese situation

The British Foreign Affairs’ Ministry said that Emile Lahoud was inaugurated on November 24, 1998, to succeed Elias Hrawi. In order to enable Lahoud, the former commander of the Lebanese army, to become president, the Lebanese parliament voted to amend Article 49 of the constitution that bars senior civil servants from running for president as long as they are in office or within two years of leaving office. It added that 118 of the 128 Lebanese deputies voted for Lahoud. The ten MPs who boycotted were members of Walid Jumblatt’s party.

The documents added that Hariri was offered the opportunity to continue his work as prime minister under the new president’s rule, but he declined on constitutional grounds, as he put it.

Speculation continued in Lebanon about the reason for Hariri’s “resignation”, but it seemed likely that he did not consider that he could work with Lahoud without playing the minor role in the administration.

Dr. Salim al-Hoss was nominated prime minister on December 2. Lahoud and Hoss appointed a mini-government of 16 ministers (half of the previous government). The government included reform-minded technocrats, in an effort to tackle corruption.

The British Foreign Ministry pointed to disappointment in Lebanon with the limited performance of the Hoss government. It added that a sharp economic slowdown was remarked, noting that an anti-corruption campaign appeared to be directed specifically against political opponents of Lahoud and Hoss and away from friends of the Syrian government.



Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
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Why and How Did al-Kadhimi Return to Baghdad?

Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)
Mustafa al-Kadhimi (AP)

Mustafa al-Kadhimi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, arrived in Baghdad last Tuesday aboard a private jet. He was greeted by a security detail typically assigned by the government to former heads of state, a scene that would have been unimaginable for an Iraqi politician who faced widespread persecution for two years.

A political faction had wanted al-Kadhimi to leave Baghdad after a drone strike targeted his home in November 2021. He formally left the capital in late 2022 after a broad alliance, including political parties, judicial and governmental institutions, and activists, united to force him out of the public arena and effectively push him into exile.

The first image of al-Kadhimi, shaking hands with a security officer near his home in the Green Zone, offers a powerful snapshot of the changes unfolding in Iraq today. It also hints at the future of the country amidst a Middle East in the midst of unprecedented turmoil.

There are growing speculations surrounding the circumstances of al-Kadhimi’s return, with close associates suggesting it followed a “special invitation” to assist the Coordination Framework alliance in tackling an emerging crisis ahead of a potential second term for Donald Trump.

Critics of both the Framework and al-Kadhimi view this as further evidence of his knack for “saving the deep state.”

Did al-Kadhimi return to aid those who stripped him of the opportunity to remain secure in the public sphere, or is he seeking to help himself and his political agenda at a “golden moment”?

A newly appointed advisor to al-Kadhimi said: “The region is undergoing dangerous transformations that will affect Iraq, and all politicians must contribute to mitigating these risks.”

Meanwhile, politicians within the Coordination Framework commented: “Something will happen within the next two months... something for which the current Framework structure has no antidote.”

This answer offers little clarity about what transpired since the fall of 2022 and how the Coordination Framework and its media apparatus relentlessly targeted al-Kadhimi’s government. Now, he returns, with the political system pinning its hopes on him at a critical juncture.

“Recharging Phones”

Before al-Kadhimi’s return, signs emerged suggesting Baghdad had lost its ability to connect with key US decision-making circles, and to some extent, with its immediate regional surroundings.

Since the Democrats left their posts at the US State Department, the government of Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani has struggled to find a single Republican willing to answer the phone.

Reports indicate that a team assigned to revive communications with the Trump administration failed to establish a reliable channel, aside from ceremonial meetings with individuals uninterested in Iraq’s concerns.

The “loss of connection,” a term used by three senior figures in the government and one of the ruling parties, was underscored on November 13, when Sudani attended the Munich Security Conference without securing any meeting with an American official present at the event.

This communication breakdown coincided with a series of “unfriendly” US messages, frequently relayed by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson and US Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs Adam Boehler.

Iraqi politicians suggest that the “deep state” sees al-Kadhimi as “the man capable of recharging the dead phones,” and potentially rescuing both al-Sudani and the Coordination Framework.

“No one knows if he’s willing to provide this service for free, or if he’ll offer it at any cost,” said a politician who opposed al-Kadhimi during his tenure as prime minister.

The Nightmare of Sanctions

The prospect of a second term for Trump brings a team that holds little affection for leaders in the Coordination Framework, ministers in the government, and officials in the judiciary.

Among them is the new National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, who has consistently seized opportunities to attack Baghdad, accusing it of “surrendering itself to Tehran.”

In Baghdad, there is a strong belief that the Republican team will not hesitate to act on Iraq once it finishes with Gaza and the war in Ukraine. The least that comes to the minds of Iraqi politicians, many of whom are disliked by Waltz, is that they will one day find their names on a sanctions list.

“Why not try al-Kadhimi’s formula, which gave Washington the confidence of a balance between it and the Iranians?” say many in Shiite parties, anxious about what lies ahead. Their list of speculations starts with sanctions on influential Shiites and ends with the potential for Trump to block the dollar.

Does al-Kadhimi possess these exceptional abilities that would make him a "steel dome," as some politicians in Baghdad envision him, now dreaming of discovering a way to protect them from a possible American storm?

“A Known Figure”

How did the Iraqi government end up in a political deadlock? Prominent politicians in the Coordination Framework offer explanations, often converging on the Syrian file. Iraq struggled to understand the new regional political philosophy and faced difficulties in shifting away from the rules of “Al-Aqsa Flood” to the post-Assad era.

“Since Trump doesn't think much about Iraq,” says David Schenker, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Washington will not engage in healthy relations with Iraq unless it aligns sufficiently with the changes in its surrounding environment.

Even among circles close to the religious establishment in Najaf, views are emerging that reflect an understanding of Iraq’s lost political position—one that sees the regime as a vital part of the Arab movement on regional issues.

Interestingly, this is all happening without any response from Tehran.

“Not because it has abandoned the Iraqi file, or is unable to influence it,” says a source familiar with the discussions surrounding al-Kadhimi’s return.

The source adds that “Tehran needs to revive Baghdad, which is reaching a dead end in foreign policy and losing vitality in its dealings with the region and the West,” though it remains unclear whether al-Kadhimi’s return is linked to this climate.

Despite a generally positive view of al-Kadhimi's tenure, many criticize al-Sudani for his delayed efforts to adapt to the region’s tumultuous changes. It was difficult to remain in the same place while a seismic shift occurred in Syria and a storm raged in Lebanon.

What role does al-Kadhimi play? Most likely, he seized the “golden opportunity.”

He sees himself as the person capable of quickly adapting to a changing Middle East, with a solid communication channel to the Arab world and experience in balancing regional dynamics.

Iraqi politicians argue that Trump’s era and the new Middle East will impose a new political equation in Baghdad, one that demands a person who can be a “reliable partner” in Arab decision-making circles to be recognized by the Americans.

For this reason, al-Kadhimi has secured his return ticket to the competitive arena—this time, not with slogans of “resistance,” but with a focus on integration into the new order.

Liberal Shiites

Al-Kadhimi’s return was preceded by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s announcement of a new alliance, and by the activities of Adnan al-Zurfi, a former candidate for the premiership whose nomination was opposed by armed factions.

Together, these elements form a growing context for the search for liberal Shiites offering a fresh alternative.

Those who favor this scenario and promote it as “the only solution” argue that Syria, under Ahmed al-Sharaa, Lebanon under Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam, are missing Iraq—a country led by liberal Shiites who know how to balance relations between Washington and Tehran without tipping the scale.

Al-Kadhimi found his way back to Baghdad after the alliance that had relentlessly targeted him crumbled.

The Coordination Framework is no longer the same as it was in 2022. Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law coalition, is searching for ways to rein in al-Sudani, while the armed factions are working hard to carve out new positions that free them from the burden of “uniting the arenas.”

Meanwhile, Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, is experimenting with silence—a stance he typically avoids, especially in an election year.

Al-Kadhimi senses that all of these figures now welcome his presence in Baghdad.

They seek from him a “good reputation” for Iraq—one that does not require drastic changes to align with the new dynamics in Syria and Lebanon. The question remains: will he offer this service for free?