Lahoud Angered France by ‘Backtracking’ on Pledge to Deploy Army in S. Lebanon

British declassified documents cite Tony Blair as telling then Lebanese President Lahoud that he was convinced of Ehud Barak’s sincerity in prioritizing the peace process.

Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
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Lahoud Angered France by ‘Backtracking’ on Pledge to Deploy Army in S. Lebanon

Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)
Israeli soldiers pull out of southern Lebanon, May 24, 2000. (Reuters)

A series of recently declassified British documents reveal details of meetings held by late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri with British officials in 1997 and 1999, as well as letters exchanged between then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Lebanese presidency.

In the first episode published by Asharq Al-Awsat on Sunday, Hariri informed Blair that Lebanon and Israel held 11 rounds of negotiations in Washington, but Tel Aviv had put forward several conditions, including “dismantling Hezbollah.”

The accounts, which were published by Asharq Al-Awsat in two episodes, quoted an official in the French presidency as saying that Paris was upset with then Lebanese President Emile Lahoud for reneging on previous promises to deploy the Lebanese army in the South after Israel’s withdrawal in May 2000.

The second episode focuses on London’s efforts to join negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv. The British documents, which were declassified in the National Archives, show that Blair’s government believed that it was possible to achieve progress in the peace process after Ehud Barak assumed the Israeli premiership, succeeding Benjamin Netanyahu.

They also recount that a special envoy of Blair met with Hafez al-Assad in this regard, and carried a message to Lahoud on the negotiations with Israel. However, the latter refused to receive him due to “stressful circumstances.”

The documents explain how Israel withdrew its forces from South Lebanon in 2000, as promised by Barak. However, Lahoud angered the French, who saw that he was reneging on his pledges to deploy the Lebanese army. This prompted Paris to freeze steps to increase the number of its troops in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In June, the UN confirmed that Israel had indeed completed its unilateral withdrawal from the South on May 24, 2000, weeks before the scheduled date in July. The step led to the collapse of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army. Many of its members and supporters fled to Israel for fear of reprisals by Hezbollah.

Lebanon later said that Israel did not complete its full withdrawal from the South, referring to its presence in the disputed Shebaa Farms.

In a letter addressed by Paris to the British Foreign Office, a copy of which was sent to Blair, detailed the French policy towards the developments in Lebanon.

South Lebanon: The French approach

The letter explained that no decision was taken over the French reinforcements to the UNIFIL. It said the UN Affairs office at the Quai d'Orsay noted that the French conditions were not met, accusing Lahoud of going back on his previous commitments to deploy the Lebanese army.

According to the letter, the director of UN Affairs said no decision had been reached in the government’s discussions regarding a possible increase in the French contribution to UNIFIL.

He continued that the prospects for Lebanon’s cooperation with the French demands were now seen as less encouraging than they were at the end of the previous week.

The letter underlined that contacts would continue between Beirut, Washington, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other regional players.

Britain offers to mediate between Lebanon and Israel

The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon came at a time when Britain was trying to mediate a negotiation track between Lebanon and Israel. However, these efforts did not bear fruit, in light of the hardening position of the Lebanese presidency, which accused the Israelis of carrying out “adventures” and violating “understandings” reached in 1996.

On March 10, 2000, Tim Barrow, the foreign minister’s private secretary, sent a letter to Philip Barton at 10 Downing Street, enclosing the text of a letter from Lahoud to Blair. Barrow said that Lahoud’s message “explains itself... There is no need to respond to it.”

The letter, dated February 16, 2000, stated: “I would like to thank you for your heartfelt message conveyed by your Special Envoy and friend Mr. (Michael) Levy. Unfortunately, due to stressful circumstances, I was unable to meet him.”

The president added: “The recent Israeli aggression clearly violated the April 1996 Understandings, the mechanism aimed at protecting against the unjustified killing of civilians and the destruction of countries’ infrastructure… As we work diligently to clear the rubble, in wake of a new and lamentable chapter in Israeli adventurism, allow me to share with you the hope for the imminent resumption of ‘peace talks’ that will eventually bring a comprehensive and just peace to the region.”

He added that while Lebanon has always paid a price for war in the Middle East, it remained hopeful and looked forward to reaping the benefits of peace, while reclaiming its unique role in the region.

“Your invaluable efforts, dear Prime Minister, for a just and lasting settlement of age-old disputes remain the cornerstone of your leadership,” he concluded.

Lahoud’s message to Blair came in response to a letter addressed by the UK Prime Minister through his personal envoy, dated February 1, 2000, over the resumption of the Lebanese-Israeli track.

Blair started his letter by thanking the Lebanese president and his government for “the kind reception you have extended to the bearer of this letter, Michael Levy”, whom he described as a trusted close friend.

He added that Levy was traveling directly from Damascus, where he was able to discuss the peace process in detail with President Hafez al-Assad.

He also expressed optimism over the imminent resumption of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, as well as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 425.

Blair underlined his confidence in Barak’s “sincerity and determination” to fulfill his commitment to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.

Wishing Lahoud success in the upcoming negotiations, Blair stressed that he, along with Robin Cook (Foreign Secretary) and Levy, were ready to help wherever they could.

The UK Prime Minister’s offer to Lahoud to help in the course of negotiations with Israel did not come out of nowhere. Blair himself had told the Lebanese president in a letter a year earlier that Barak wanted to resume negotiations with Lebanon and Syria and sought to withdraw his forces from the South.

In a letter dated July 26, 1999, Blair told Lahoud that he had the opportunity to talk at length on July 21 with Ehud Barak on his way back to Israel from Washington.

He recounted that Barak voiced his commitment to ending the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict.

Blair said he was convinced of the premier’s sincerity in prioritizing the peace process as the primary task of his new government.

He also quoted Barak as saying that peace in the region would remain fragile until a final settlement was reached with Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians, adding that he was determined to move on all tracks and advance each one wherever peace was possible.

According to Blair, Barak confirmed his intention to withdraw Israeli forces from Lebanon. He also acknowledged the complexities of the Lebanese problem while searching for a settlement with Syria.

The British premier told Lahoud that he expressed to Barak his political support for a just and secure peace. He stressed that the UK would not be lecturing the parties directly involved on how they should get there but would play whatever constructive and supportive role, “both bilaterally and with our EU partners, to help achieve this.”



Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
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Challenges of the Gaza Humanitarian Aid Pier Offer Lessons for the US Army

A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS
A truck carries humanitarian aid across Trident Pier, a temporary pier to deliver aid, off the Gaza Strip, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas, near the Gaza coast, May 19, 2024. US Army Central/Handout via REUTERS

It was their most challenging mission.
US Army soldiers in the 7th Transportation Brigade had previously set up a pier during training and in exercises overseas but never had dealt with the wild combination of turbulent weather, security threats and sweeping personnel restrictions that surrounded the Gaza humanitarian aid project.
Designed as a temporary solution to get badly needed food and supplies to desperate Palestinians, the so-called Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore system, or JLOTS, faced a series of setbacks over the spring and summer. It managed to send more than 20 million tons of aid ashore for people in Gaza facing famine during the Israel-Hamas war.
Service members struggled with what Col. Sam Miller, who was commander during the project, called the biggest “organizational leadership challenge” he had ever experienced.
Speaking to The Associated Press after much of the unit returned home, Miller said the Army learned a number of lessons during the four-month mission. It began when President Joe Biden announced in his State of the Union speech in March that the pier would be built and lasted through July 17, when the Pentagon formally declared that the mission was over and the pier was being permanently dismantled.
The Army is reviewing the $230 million pier operation and what it learned from the experience. One of the takeaways, according to a senior Army official, is that the unit needs to train under more challenging conditions to be better prepared for bad weather and other security issues it faced. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because assessments of the pier project have not been publicly released.
In a report released this week, the inspector general for the US Agency for International Development said Biden ordered the pier's construction even as USAID staffers expressed concerns that it would be difficult and undercut a push to persuade Israel to open “more efficient” land crossings to get food into Gaza.
The Defense Department said the pier “achieved its goal of providing an additive means of delivering high volumes of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza to help address the acute humanitarian crisis.” The US military knew from the outset “there would be challenges as part of this in this complex emergency,” the statement added.
The Biden administration had set a goal of the US sea route and pier providing food to feed 1.5 million people for 90 days. It fell short, bringing in enough to feed about 450,000 people for a month before shutting down, the USAID inspector general's report said.
The Defense Department’s watchdog also is doing an evaluation of the project.
Beefing up training Army soldiers often must conduct their exercises under difficult conditions designed to replicate war. Learning from the Gaza project — which was the first time the Army set up a pier in actual combat conditions — leaders say they need to find ways to make the training even more challenging.
One of the biggest difficulties of the Gaza pier mission was that no US troops could step ashore — a requirement set by Biden. Instead, US service members were scattered across a floating city of more than 20 ships and platforms miles offshore that had to have food, water, beds, medical care and communications.
Every day, said Miller, there were as many as 1,000 trips that troops and other personnel made from ship to boat to pier to port and back.
“We were moving personnel around the sea and up to the Trident pier on a constant basis,” Miller said. “And every day, there was probably about a thousand movements taking place, which is quite challenging, especially when you have sea conditions that you have to manage.”
Military leaders, he said, had to plan three or four days ahead to ensure they had everything they needed because the trip from the pier to their “safe haven” at Israel's port of Ashdod was about 30 nautical miles.
The trip over and back could take up to 12 hours, in part because the Army had to sail about 5 miles out to sea between Ashdod and the pier to stay a safe distance from shore as they passed Gaza City, Miller said.
Normally, Miller said, when the Army establishes a pier, the unit sets up a command onshore, making it much easier to store and access supplies and equipment or gather troops to lay out orders for the day.
Communication difficulties While his command headquarters was on the US military ship Roy P. Benavidez, Miller said he was constantly moving with his key aides to the various ships and the pier.
“I slept and ate on every platform out there,” he said.
The US Army official concurred that a lot of unexpected logistical issues came up that a pier operation may not usually include.
Because the ships had to use the Ashdod port and a number of civilian workers under terms of the mission, contracts had to be negotiated and written. Agreements had to be worked out so vessels could dock, and workers needed to be hired for tasks that troops couldn't do, including moving aid onto the shore.
Communications were a struggle.
“Some of our systems on the watercraft can be somewhat slower with bandwidth, and you’re not able to get up to the classified level,” Miller said.
He said he used a huge spreadsheet to keep track of all the ships and floating platforms, hundreds of personnel and the movement of millions of tons of aid from Cyprus to the Gaza shore.
When bad weather broke the pier apart, they had to set up ways to get the pieces moved to Ashdod and repaired. Over time, he said, they were able to hire more tugs to help move sections of the pier more quickly.
Some of the pier's biggest problems — including the initial reluctance of aid agencies to distribute supplies throughout Gaza and later safety concerns from the violence — may not apply in other operations where troops may be quickly setting up a pier to get military forces ashore for an assault or disaster response.
“There’s tons of training value and experience that every one of the soldiers, sailors and others got out of this,” Miller said. "There’s going to be other places in the world that may have similar things, but they won’t be as tough as the things that we just went through.”
When the time comes, he said, “we’re going to be much better at doing this type of thing.”
One bit of information could have given the military a better heads-up about the heavy seas that would routinely hammer the pier. Turns out, said the Army official, there was a Gaza surf club, and its headquarters was near where they built the pier.
That "may be an indicator that the waves there were big,” the official said.