Diriyah... A Starting Point, Castle of Glories, Threat to Empires

 Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Diriyah... A Starting Point, Castle of Glories, Threat to Empires

 Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Archive photo of Diriyah’s Al-Turaif ruins in Saudi Arabia (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Strong and fortified cities in the middle of the Arabian Peninsula, such as Diriyah and Uyaynah, have withstood the test of time, transforming from small towns founded in the middle of the fifth century to significant “city-states” that would later leave an impact on history.

Nestled on the banks of the Wadi Al-Ard valley, which cuts through the Tuwaiq Mountains, Diriyah occupies one of the best sites in terms of space, soil fertility, and suitability for settlement.

Diriyah was a threat and an obsession for kingdoms and empires four centuries ago. It was mentioned in Ottoman, British, and Persian archives and the writings of countrymen and travelers. It was popularly regarded in the first Saudi state as a rising power in the Arabian Peninsula.

“If an attack is not launched against it (Diriyah), then it will be able to defeat all the kingdoms,” era leaders would say, prompting a foreign invasion that would later destroy the historical city-state.

Centuries ago, Diriyah was a vital station on the caravan route that extended from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Basra.

Diriyah was famous for its beautiful stone-built homes. Teeming with mosques and schools since ancient times, Diriyah was surrounded by sprawling fields of wheat and barley and palm, peach, and fig groves.

It was also known for raising Iraqi purebred Arabian horses, whose fame reached kingdoms and other countries.

As the first capital of Saudi Arabia, Diriyah laid the building blocks for establishing the Saudi state. From Diriyah, Imam Muhammad bin Saud launched an integration project that would transform the city-state into a comprehensive state and bring the entire Arabian Peninsula under a united and stable political umbrella.

Diriyah is one of the most ancient Najdi cities, as it was founded on the banks of Wadi Hanifa in 1446.

Mani’ al-Muraydi worked hard to build and establish Diriyah as one of the strongest independent emirates of Nejd. Diriyah played a significant role in securing pilgrimage routes and transit trade from the east of the Arabian Peninsula to the west.

Several princes successively ruled the city of Diriyah until Imam Muhammad bin Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state, came to power in 1727.

As a city-state, Diriyah relied on its capabilities and good governance policies to emerge as the most suitable place for creating a state that includes most parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Prosperity and development were critical themes for Diriyah in the middle of the eighteenth century.

After recognizing education as a conduit for impacting change, Saudi imams transformed Diriyah into a center for attracting scholars and students alike. Diriyah’s Al-Turaif and Al-Bujairi neighborhoods became a prominent hub for knowledge and scholars.

Books and teaching circles spread in mosques, scholars’ homes, and public markets. This activated a writing, scientific and cultural movement.

As a capital, Diriyah attracted delegations of countries and tribes that pledged allegiance to Saudi imams. This expanded its influence and increased its strength, status, and importance, shaping it as a center for managing the state’s political, administrative, and military affairs.

Citizen Engagement with Leadership

Imam Muhammad bin Saud’s determination to achieve change in the Arabian Peninsula after he assumed power in 1727 saw him launching a unification project for Najd.

Spanning the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, Najd suffered from political divisions and significant disintegration among the people. This made unification one of the most difficult and trying challenges that would take a long time to be achieved.

The founding imam, however, gained victories after personally supervising the building of a strong army of citizens who believed in him and his new vision.

Imam Muhammad bin Saud trained the people, financed them with money and weapons, and took over their leadership. His leadership gave great moral support to the army.

The founding imam managed to convince different segments of society to join his unity project.

Imam Muhammad bin Saud would send an invitation from Diriyah to the countries and tribes affiliated with him to participate in the unification operations, and they would, in turn, promptly send a group of cavalry and soldiers to the place of battle.

After the unification of Najd, campaigns were launched toward other regions in the Arabian Peninsula under the era of Imam Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad, who was able to prepare and deploy a solid army to annex Al-Ahsa region in 1796.

Under Imam Saud bin Abd Al-Aziz, the state could unite most of the regions of the Arabian Peninsula until the state crowned the unity project by annexing the Hijaz in 1805.

Under the first Saudi state, the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed political and security stability, and economic and scientific life flourished. They had a close relationship with their wise leadership.

The people regretted the end of the first Saudi state and the return of conditions to what they were before its establishment.

Nevertheless, after seven years, they gathered and backed Imam Turki bin Abdullah in reestablishing the Saudi state in 1824. The people would later support Imam Faisal bin Turki in the unification process once again.

In 1902, King Abdulaziz returned to Riyadh with a determination to rebuild the state and advance it to the ranks of modern, developed countries after conditions there had deteriorated greatly.

A political vacuum followed the fall of the second Saudi state. But as soon as King Abdulaziz announced Saudi rule anew in the capital, Riyadh, countries and tribes offered allegiance to him, expressing their support for the unification operations he was leading.

Saudis gave their lives and money in service of their homeland until King Abdulaziz announced the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

The current Saudi leadership, under directives of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and the direct follow-up and supervision of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has put forward a project to rehabilitate and develop Diriyah and preserve its historical and cultural heritage.

The project is considered the largest heritage project in the world and has gained local, regional, and international fame. Diriyah is destined to become one of Saudi Arabia’s most remarkable landmarks and tourist destinations. It will restore its former glories and tell the world the story of a promising small town that once turned into the capital of the first Saudi state.



US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
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US Sanctions on Syria: From Hafez al-Assad to al-Sharaa 

A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)
A customer inspects mangoes at a fruit stall in Damascus’s Al-Shaalan market, which now sells varieties that were unavailable during President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, such as kiwi, bananas, and pineapples. (AFP)

Syrians have lived under the shadow of US sanctions for 46 years, spanning generations who know no other reality. These sanctions have become woven into every aspect of daily life, from banking and international aviation to construction and food supplies. Their burden has fallen hardest on ordinary people, rather than on the symbols of the ousted Assad regime.

While lifting sanctions now would undoubtedly unlock planning and reconstruction efforts, political and security concerns persist, and Syria’s dilapidated infrastructure may impede private-sector investment.

Most importantly, we must ask whether US President Donald Trump’s move to begin lifting sanctions was as improvised as his 2018 announcement to withdraw militarily from Syria, or whether it marks a pivotal shift in US foreign policy toward Syria.

On May 13, during his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions on Syria. This triggered a period of confusion and internal reviews before his administration outlined an initial mechanism that balanced implementing his announcement with addressing his advisors’ worries over unfettered engagement with the new Syrian leadership.

Before assessing this current phase of easing sanctions, we need a historical overview of them, their context, underlying rationale, implementation methods, and what their potential impact might be for Syria and its people. Sanctions on Syria can be divided into three eras: under Hafez al-Assad, under his son Bashar, and now under interim President Ahmed al‑Sharaa.

Shift toward Iran (1979–2000)

US sanctions on Syria began in 1979, following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel and the rise of Iran’s revolution. With the end of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Damascus, Hafez al-Assad viewed Iran’s emerging regime as a counterweight to Iraq and Israel.

Washington designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979 due to its role in Lebanon and its support for fighters opposed to Israel. Consequently, the US imposed restrictions on foreign aid, defense exports, and the transfer of dual‑use goods. In November 1986, President Ronald Reagan barred Syrian planes from landing in the US.

The Iraq War (2001–2010)

Sanctions entered a new phase as US policy shifted after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, coinciding with Bashar al‑Assad’s arrival to power in July 2000. In his 2002 State of the Union, President George W. Bush labeled Iran, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and North Korea the “Axis of Evil”, prompting Iran to form a “Resistance Axis” that included Syria and Hezbollah.

With these strains came stricter measures: the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act of 2003, enforced by OFAC at the US Treasury in 2004 under Executive Order 13338, targeted Syria’s role in Lebanon and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its opposition to the US-led occupation of Iraq.

On May 7, 2025, the Trump administration signed a notice extending the national emergency concerning Syria until May 7, 2026, encompassing executive orders from 2003 to 2012.

The Syrian uprising and Caesar Act

Following Syria’s uprising in March 2011, the US imposed a wave of sanctions targeting violence and human rights abuses. President Barack Obama’s April 29, 2011 executive order froze Assad regime assets, followed by an August 2011 ban on oil, asset freezes, and broad trade prohibitions, excluding food and medicine.

However, the defining moment came with the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019, signed by Trump in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020. Targeting infrastructure, military maintenance, energy, and those funding the Assad regime, it also banned foreign investment in Syria’s reconstruction. This legislation aimed to check both Russian and Iranian influence and serve as leverage for negotiations with Moscow, permitting temporary waivers if productive talks occurred.

Though enacted long after the internal conflict began, the Act functioned less as a response to internal dynamics and more as an economic restraint on reconstruction efforts.

Al‑Sharaa after Assad

By late 2024, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime fallen and Trump back in power, Syria had not been a US priority, with internal debate over how to engage the new al‑Sharaa administration. That shifted after Trump spoke with Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 16, signaling alignment with Turkish‑Saudi policy against the hardline Israeli stance.

In Saudi Arabia, Trump began rolling back sanctions on Syria, but the fate of the Caesar Act remains uncertain, currently suspended in 180‑day increments, extendable. Although it was briefly lifted for humanitarian relief during the Feb 2023 Türkiye-Syria earthquakes and in areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its full repeal remains on hold.

Mechanisms and challenges

Trump’s administration has implemented three key executive measures: Treasury’s “GL‑25” on May 23, enabling sweeping economic coverage; a 180‑day suspension of Caesar sanctions; and a specific waiver for the Commercial Bank of Syria via the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, allowing re‑establishment of correspondent banking relationships.

GL‑25 has no set expiry and can be revoked anytime, while Caesar waivers renew every six months. An earlier GL‑24 waiver, issued in January, allowed limited official and energy sector transactions and personal transfers, but US banks have remained cautious.

The permit covers four sectors: finance, oil‑gas, maritime shipping, and aviation. US persons remain barred from transactions that may benefit Russia, Iran, or North Korea, meaning rigorous due diligence is necessary. The original executive orders remain in force, although press reports suggest possible cancellations.

Procedurally, Syria remains on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, as removal would require Congress to be notified by the US State Department. The Department of Commerce and State’s defense trade regulators have yet to remove export controls, which means that Syria still falls under International Traffic in Arms Regulations, necessitating export licenses for most goods, excluding basic food and medicine.

Furthermore, Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham is still designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Even after al‑Sharaa met Trump, the Treasury’s waiver excludes HTS leader Abu Mohammed al‑Golani, al-Sharaa's former nom de guerre, who remains sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1267, supported by a likely Russian veto of any attempt to remove HTS from global blacklists. Arms embargoes and surveillance‑tech restrictions will also persist.

The Caesar Act itself was renewed by Congress in January 2025 for five years, lasting until January 2030 unless overturned legislatively and its suspension may be extended in November 2025. But these continue as temporary waivers, not full repeals.

US politics and Congressional dynamics

Legislative repeal would require Act passage in Congress. Ironically, Trump’s allies in this are Democrats, as many Republicans, especially senators, remain wary.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jim Risch remarked that Trump lifted sanctions a bit more than what was expected, but cautioned that the sanctions could come back. US energy firms, together with Syrian‑American groups, have lobbied Trump to ease sanctions, while pro‑Israel lobby AIPAC insists any relief must hinge on demonstrable positive behavior from the new Syrian government.

Impact on economy and society

In 2018, the UN estimated at least $250 billion would be required to rebuild Syria fully, far beyond what domestic resources can furnish.

Serious barriers remain: destroyed roads, hospitals, and power networks hinder basic services. Reviving industry needs massive investment; millions displaced internally or abroad need rehousing; food, fuel, medical gear, and decent jobs are in short supply.

Even a partial lifting marks a seismic shift: essential imports like food, medicine, and technology could flow more freely; reconstruction of schools, hospitals, and roads becomes feasible; frozen international assets might be unfrozen, inviting foreign companies back to construction, energy, and trade.

The most immediate relief will come from reconnecting Syrian banks to global payment systems, especially SWIFT, dismantling the economic collapse born of widespread distrust. Yet Syria remains on the FATF grey list, deterring banks and obstructing liquidity, so regulatory frameworks must be built.

Future prospects

Ambitious domestic and regional projects have surfaced under al‑Sharaa, with some contracts bypassing competitive bids. The UAE has been granted an $800 million concession at the Port of Tartus, via a Dubai Ports World MoU, to develop multi-purpose terminals, industrial zones, dry ports, and logistics hubs.

Meanwhile, a 30‑year deal with French CMA CGM was signed to develop Latakia Port. China’s VDL company secured rights to 300,000 m² in the Adra Free Zone outside Damascus for 20 years to build industrial and commercial facilities with tax breaks, labor flexibility, and repatriable profits.

A Qatari-US-Turkish energy consortium plans a $7 billion, 5,000 MW power project.

All are seen as steps to lure foreign capital and reshape Syria’s foreign policy by leveraging international corporate interests.

Uncertain transition

The sanctions regime hinges on three pillars: Syria’s State Sponsor designation (since 1979), the Syria Accountability Act (2003), and the Caesar Act (2019). Only the first may soon shift, pending a State Department and Congressional review; the others remain entrenched.

While Syria will not likely see a flood of US investment tomorrow, the first visible presence would probably involve Turkish and Gulf investors, as the US must first verify the stability and reliability of the new Syrian leadership before enabling wider investors to return.

Damascus does not fully control its territory or armed factions, and fresh sanctions may target entities linked to coastal violence in recent months.

Thus, Caesar’s intent has transitioned from coercing the Assad regime to ensuring al‑Sharaa’s good behavior. But its six‑month renewals offer limited investor certainty, making regional neighbors the marginal beneficiaries.

Al‑Sharaa’s teams may aim to woo Trump with bold reconstruction plans akin to a Marshall Plan. But Trump isn’t easily swayed. He has yet to appoint an ambassador to Damascus; instead, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack was named envoy to Syria, indicating Syria remains an extension of Turkish policy.

Trump is unpredictable and could reverse course swiftly, but current signs still point to provisional waivers rather than a full repeal of sanctions.