Chirac Warned Bush against Overthrowing Saddam

Ambassador Maurice Gourdault-Montagne reveals secrets of Khomeini’s Paris reception

Late former French President Jacques Chirac (R) and former US President George W. Bush. (Getty Images)
Late former French President Jacques Chirac (R) and former US President George W. Bush. (Getty Images)
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Chirac Warned Bush against Overthrowing Saddam

Late former French President Jacques Chirac (R) and former US President George W. Bush. (Getty Images)
Late former French President Jacques Chirac (R) and former US President George W. Bush. (Getty Images)

French Diplomat Maurice Gourdault-Montagne's memoirs are unlike those of any regular ambassador that fill French libraries year after year.

The author of “The Others Don’t Think Like Us” is no ordinary ambassador. Now retired, his long diplomatic career took him to Tokyo, Beijing, Berlin and London. He was France’s sherpa to the G20 and G7 groups and later was named diplomatic advisor to former French President Jacques Chirac, a post he held for five years between 2002 and 2007.

In short, Gourdault-Montagne held important positions that allowed him to be at the heart of diplomatic and strategic developments, representing France, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. He had a front seat to international political changes, an experience that makes his new book not just a memoir, but a journey inside the comings and goings of international policy.

In 392 pages and 17 chapters, the former diplomat takes the reader behind the scenes of events that shaped the world from the 1970s to the early 21st Century.

The fourth chapter is dedicated to the war on Iraq. It sheds light on the policies of then US President George W. Bush and how Washington dealt with European capitals, most notably Paris.

Gourdault-Montagne recalled Bush’s landmark speech in 2002 during which he spoke of the “Axis of Evil” that includes Iraq. It was apparent that the president was preparing the American public for war that would be aimed at toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein under the pretext that it possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Gourdault-Montagne said then President Chirac “quickly understood the danger of such a policy that would decimate the unity of the western world and regional balances, as well as lead to a confrontation with the Muslim world.”

Moreover, he revealed that Chirac was aware that the ouster of the Saddam regime through a military operation would without a doubt tip the balance in the Muslim world in favor of the Shiites, who are seen as aligned with Iran, at the expense of the Sunnis. This, in turn, would lead to new tensions. Such concerns prompted Chirac to dedicate the second half of 2002 in opposing the US plans.

Condoleezza Rice: Abandoning war in exchange for Saddam’s ouster

Gourdault-Montagne was present at the summit that brought together Chirac and Bush in Prague in November 2002. He wrote: “The two delegations sat face-to-face. The tensions were palpable. Bush stuck to his convictions, and when he spoke, he didn’t even look at Chirac.”

Chirac informed Bush that the “war will destabilize the region and hand over power in Baghdad to the Shiites who are close to Iran. It will also increase Iran’s influence in Syria and in Lebanon (through Hezbollah). The war will not have legal grounds and will create division in the international community, cost the West its credibility and become a source of chaos that will produce a wave of terrorism that will be hard to control.”

Chirac’s warnings fell on deaf ears. Still, he wanted to learn more about Washington’s intentions. In early 2003, he dispatched Gourdault-Montagne to the US capital for talks with then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He asked her the question of the hour: “What could persuade you to abandon the war? What are your conditions?” Rice replied firmly: “For Saddam to step down.”

The French diplomat then met with then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Gourdault-Montagne would describe that meeting as one of the worst moments of his long career. He was made to wait a long time before Wolfowitz received him. The diplomat said his host showed typical American “arrogance”. He too did not listen to France’s concerns and went a step further by being offensive to it and accusing it of “maneuvering”. He added that Washington “knows what you know”, meaning Iraq possesses nuclear weapons while Paris claims ignorance over the matter.

Gourdault-Montagne returned to France with a conviction that the Americans “wanted to be free of military and diplomatic constraints. They did not want to be part of an alliance that follows UN rules and were convinced that they did not need anyone.”

Ultimately, Washington did not heed Chirac’s advice to show patience, so the French president sought to forge an international alliance against the Americans, and turned to Germany and Russia. On Russia, Gourdault-Montagne quoted Chirac as saying: “It is not a doormat on which we can wipe our feet.” Chirac enjoyed the trust and support of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The rest of the story is history: France threatened to resort to its veto power at the Security Council if Washington sought UN approval of its war on Iraq. Many still recall French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s famous speech at the council that was met with applause. Undeterred, American forces, backed British forces, invaded Iraq and overthrew the Baghdad regime and Saddam, who was executed.

Despite the deep differences between them, France and the US never severed ties. France was aware that the project of the “new Middle East” envisioned by Washington was doomed to fail. Again, Gourdault-Montagne was dispatched to Washington to meet with Rice with the message that Paris wanted to set aside their dispute and see how it can help in rebuilding Iraq and restoring stability. Rice’s reply, however, was decisive: “We don’t need you. We spent funds and paid the price in the blood of our soldiers.”

The two sides would eventually be able to work together in other areas, most notably in the Lebanese-Syrian file. They helped draft Security Council resolution 1449 that called for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. They also cooperated over Iran whereby Paris, along with London and Berlin, kicked off the first negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program. Washington would later join the talks.

Khomeini, Hezbollah and Lebanon’s stability

Gourdault-Montagne recalled how Saddam had in 1978 sent a letter to his “friend” Chirac, warning him against receiving Iran’s Imam Khomeini, who at the time, was seeking asylum in Iraq. Khomeini was weighing whether to leave Iraq for Paris or Libya’s Tripoli. Saddam asked Chirac to warn then President Giscard d'Estaing against welcoming Khomeini.

Chirac conveyed the message to the president, who did not agree with Saddam’s assessment, but rather believed that it was in France’s interest to keep the deals struck with Iran and maintain cooperation with it. And so, Khomeini was welcomed in France.

Mockingly, Gourdault-Montagne said the only thing that France ever received from Khomeini was the naming of the Tehran street where the French embassy is located after the French town of Neauphle-le-Château where the imam was hosted. “Ever since, the Iranian regime has caused us a headache and our relations with it impacted our policy in the Middle East,” said Gourdault-Montagne.

Political developments in 2003 would push Paris to reconsider resuming communication with Tehran. It was driven by the need to curb Tehran’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons and avoid an arms race in the region. It was also seeking to bolster economic cooperation with Iran and persuade it to adopt a positive policy towards Lebanon.

Gourdault-Montagne explained that France’s openness towards Tehran stemmed from its desire to reach a firm regional framework that would provide “peace, stability and prosperity” for all. Lebanon’s stability has always been a fixture in France’s regional policy. It is constantly concerned over Hezbollah’s rising influence in the country and the change in sectarian and demographic balances. Gourdault-Montagne explained that Paris believed that having a “direct channel of communication with Iran was the best way to rein in Hezbollah.”



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.