Lebanon Confronted with Test of Choices, as Riyadh Judges Projects, Not Names

A senior Arab diplomat provided a rational assessment of the situation in Lebanon. He made the assessment away from the local media, effective and ineffective Lebanese politicians and their expectations from the recent agreement that restored diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Lebanese officials often speak of “conspiracies” when it comes to expectations from foreign powers and the extent to which they can impact local Lebanese affairs. They tend to overlook the strategic aspects of Riyadh’s policies in the Arab region.

Riyadh, without a shadow of a doubt, believes that any agreement cannot be built on the ruins of the interests of another Arab country, no matter the desired results that are expected of it. Saudi Arabia boasts a foreign policy legacy and firm course of action that will not be impacted by “narrow or wide” interests.

The influential diplomat dismissed media reports of a French initiative that would see the election of a Lebanese president from the March 8 camp and appointment of a prime minister from the current opposition.

The diplomat believes that the election of a president is only the tip of the iceberg of the several problems Lebanon has been grappling with for years and that are now threatening its political composition that on the surface is based on “consensual democracy”, while in reality is based on sectarian balances.

Lebanon has long suffered from flaws in its internal and external balances that has led it to the situation where its economic resources are constantly being depleted. The situation has also alienated its natural friends, whom it could traditionally rely on to help out of its crises and make up for its financial imbalances.

Visitors of the senior diplomat often leave meetings with him with a clear conviction that Saudi Arabia will not interfere in any deal over the positions of president and prime minister. They also realize that it has not named preferred candidates for any vacancy in Lebanon.

Rather, the Kingdom will deal with any understanding based on what it believes are Lebanon’s interests and relations with its Arab surroundings. If it believes it has set off on the right path, then it will not hesitate to support and help the Lebanese people out of their crisis.

However, if some officials continue to make the same old choices, while expecting new results, then Riyadh will simply sit back, and watch developments unfold.

Many believe that a deal over the president and prime minister will not be any different than what happened after the Doha agreement that ended up with the ouster of former PM Saad Hariri from his post while he was meeting with then US President Barack Obama in Washington. They also believe that it will not be any different than what happened after the deal that saw the election of Michel Aoun as president.

While some officials are focusing their attention on presidential candidates, others prefer to focus on Lebanon’s future and role. If an agreement is reached over its future and role, then the name of a president will be a small detail in the greater picture.

Observers of Riyadh’s moves in Beirut are realizing that it is drawing up the clear broad strokes of its policy that is based on the actual interests of the Lebanese people. There can be no regional or international deal that would compromise these interests. The illness ailing Lebanon has become clear and the treatment is obvious. Riyadh had been clear in saying it would not cover for any Lebanese government that was formed by a regional agenda that goes against national and Arab interests.

Lebanon needs an economic salvation plan that would take it out of the downward spiral of financial and economic collapse. The diplomat said such a plan cannot be implemented without the cooperation of all Lebanese parties and their adoption of a real national diagnosis of the illness and its treatment.

Such a treatment should not stem from narrow factional interests. The country should not be allowed to be dragged towards axes that are alien to its natural geographic and cultural positions. The Lebanese, therefore, cannot search for “imported” solutions that are dictated from abroad.

Moreover, the diplomat believes that the Lebanese opposition is squandering a historic opportunity to create change. He is shocked at its inability to reach common understandings that would allow it to introduce the desired change. The opposition would have the ability to impose conditions if it could come up with a united vision. The other camp would have been merciless if the roles were reversed, the way the opposition is being too lenient with it right now.

A senior figure in Sudan’s dissolved ruling party has revealed that the country’s Islamist movement is preparing for a return to power once the ongoing conflict ends, even if it means supporting prolonged military rule in the interim.

The remarks, made by Ahmed Haroun, former head of the National Congress Party and one of four Sudanese figures wanted by the International Criminal Court, reflect growing confidence among Islamists following their military involvement in the war.

The war, now in its third year, pits Sudan’s army against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and has triggered massive displacement, famine, and ethnic violence. Despite the RSF holding strategic ground in Darfur and parts of southern Sudan, the army has recently gained momentum on multiple fronts.

Islamist factions claim credit for assisting in these advances, contributing fighters and logistical support.

According to military and government sources, the Islamist movement has been increasingly visible on the battlefield.

These networks, dismantled following the 2019 uprising that ousted Omar al-Bashir, have resurfaced amid the chaos of war.

A leaked party document reviewed by Reuters outlines the movement’s growing role, stating that between 2,000 and 3,000 Islamist fighters were mobilized in the conflict’s first year, with over 70,000 civilians trained for combat under the army’s call for general mobilization.

While military leadership has downplayed connections to political factions, army sources and Islamists alike acknowledge that coordination exists, particularly within elite units where Islamist-trained operatives are embedded. Islamist forces have reportedly reinforced dwindling army ranks, especially in key battles around the capital, Khartoum.

Ahmed Haroun, who escaped from prison at the onset of the conflict, proposed a governance model that preserves military control over national sovereignty and security, with a civilian prime minister emerging from future elections.

He insisted that Islamists will only return through elections, not via transitional arrangements, and argued that Sudan needs a tailored political model that accommodates military involvement due to ongoing security threats and foreign interference.

While denying the scale of Islamist involvement described in the leaked documents, Haroun admitted that supporting the army was part of a broader strategy in response to the national call for mobilization.

Military sources estimate that at least 5,000 fighters directly linked to the former ruling party are active, with many serving in specialized units or intelligence services.

Despite these developments, Haroun and other Islamist figures maintain that they do not wield authority over the army. Still, their growing influence on the battlefield and political landscape has sparked renewed concerns about the possible resurgence of Sudan’s old guard in the post-war order.

Lebanon Confronted with Test of Choices, as Riyadh Judges Projects, Not Names