Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Hezbollah is accused of stabbing the FPM several times in the back.

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
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Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)

A Lebanese official following the relations between former President Michel Aoun with Hezbollah said the “marriage” between them, which was held at a Maronite church in Beirut’s southern suburbs in 2006, is over.

All that is left is for them to announce the official divorce, marking an end to an alliance between two of the most opposite parties in Lebanon.

Many had believed that the understanding - signed at the Mar Mikhael church in February 2006 between then head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah - was doomed to fail.

Even though it brought two parties that could not be any more different, their understanding turned out to be a solid alliance wherein the personal relations between Aoun and Nasrallah played a big role in consolidating it, leading to a major change in Lebanon’s political identity.

However, Aoun’s political successor, his son-in-law and MP Gebran Bassil played a major role in ruining the understanding, leading to its collapse and now, divorce.

The FPM and Hezbollah achieved major gains from the alliance. Hezbollah gained sizeable Christian cover for its arsenal of weapons, while the FPM gained unlimited support in internal files that allowed it at first to control Christian shares in governments and then state institutions. The alliance also allowed Aoun to be elected president after two years of vacuum in the country’s top post.

Ironically, Aoun’s election as president marked the beginning of the end of the alliance. As soon as Aoun became head of state, he found himself at great odds with influential parliament Speaker Nabi Berri, a major ally of Hezbollah.

Aoun believed that Hezbollah’s support to him in domestic affairs must be unlimited, but the party chose to take the middle ground and avoid confronting Berri out of its keenness on the “unity of Shiite ranks.” Aoun was very disappointed, openly informing his guests that Berri was the greatest obstacle to his presidential achievements and Hezbollah did not intervene to rein in its ally.

Aoun believes that Berri was the major obstacle that hindered the success of his term as president – an argument that many agree with. Hezbollah chose to take a “hands off” approach in internal files, prioritizing its regional role.

Berri, however, did not take a “hands off” approach. He confronted Aoun’s ambitions in state institutions. The speaker is a main political player and refused to turn into an “affiliate” to Aoun, said one of the figures close to him. The lack of “political chemistry” between Aoun and Berri was obvious to them and others from the start.

Aoun’s term in office ended with a vacuum in the presidency with political parties failing to elect a successor. The way Hezbollah is approaching the vacuum has dealt a strong blow to the alliance with Aoun.

The party is clear in backing the candidacy of former minister Suleiman Franjieh, but Bassil, now head of the FPM, has strongly rejected this choice. He believes that he has made a great sacrifice by refraining from nominating himself, calling on Hezbollah to reach an understanding with him over a “third choice”.

Nasrallah and Bassil met, with the former frankly telling him that Franjieh was their choice. Bassil strongly opposed the suggestion. Nasrallah told him to think about it, but Bassil was adamant in rejecting Franjieh.

Other points of contention were related to the caretaker government. The FPM argued that the government, in its caretaker capacity, could not hold meetings amid the presidential vacuum. Hezbollah disagreed and granted the needed quorum for the cabinet meetings to be held. Bassil was furious, striking below the belt by speaking of “honest parties who renege on the agreement, vow and guarantee.” The party was forced to respond openly to the accusation, the first time it had done so since the 2006 understanding.

The relationship between Hezbollah and the FPM was based partially on the latter’s support of the party's conflict with Israel. In return, the party would support the FPM in domestic political affairs, leading to a “balanced partnership”, as Bassil has told his visitors. An imbalance in this equation will break the partnership. On whether Hezbollah’s latest positions were viewed as a stab in the back, Bassil’s visitors said: “There are many knives in the back this time.”

Hezbollah and Bassil’s ties were never completely rosy. Bassil never shied away from criticizing the party every now and then. His biggest reservation was that the party prioritized its relations with Shiites over all else. According to Bassil, this “encouraged corruption and prevented the rise of state institutions.” Bassil went so far as to tell his visitors that Hezbollah fought for Aoun to be elected president and when he finally became so, it did not support him in the battle to build the state, abandoning him before his rivals.

Bassil’s visitors said he was clear with Hezbollah over the need to agree on another presidential candidate besides Franjieh. “If they believe he is maneuvering or seeking something else in return, they are wrong and it would be a big problem if the party believes so,” they added.

Bassil has said that the relationship between the FPM and Hezbollah was perfect. “We were capable of reaching understandings with foreign parties, while in return, the resistance [Hezbollah] would perform its duty in protecting the nation,” he was quoted as saying.

In short, Bassil believed that the 2006 understanding with Hezbollah changed Lebanon's identity and if the relations with the party were to collapse, then Lebanon’s identity will again be changed.

Hezbollah’s view

In return, Hezbollah appears unconvinced of Bassil’s justifications. An official close to the party said the divorce has happened with the party and they are now awaiting the official announcement. He stressed, however, that the announcement will not be made by the party, leaving it up to Bassil.

The official disagrees with the Aounist camp’s claims that the FPM’s support for Hezbollah gave the former free reign in domestic affairs. “They are giving the party support it doesn’t need. It is already a regional power and recognized as so by the world,” he remarked.

Internally, he said the “weight” of the alliance with the FPM “cost Hezbollah several of its Christian friends and strained its relations with other parties because it was always siding with Bassil.”

Moreover, he added that the formation of governments was obstructed on numerous occasions “just so Bassil could get what he wanted. The parliament was also obstructed just so Aoun could be elected president.”

The party is clear in saying that Bassil takes issues personally. It holds him responsible for the failure to form a new government before Aoun’s term ended. At the time, Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati agreed to Bassil’s conditions, but at the very last minute, the FPM leader said he would not support the new lineup even though he was to be granted shares other than those of the president and the greatest number of seats as he demanded.

Even in rejecting Franjieh’s nomination, Hezbollah believes that Bassil is taking issues personally. The official said the MP constantly tries to undermine Franjieh’s image and influence, even calling him by his first name, without any of his titles.

The official added, however, that he has not ruled out the possibility that Bassil could take advantage of the political upheaval and possibility of the United States lifting sanctions on him to emerge as a leading candidate for the presidency. Hezbollah does not have a Plan B to deal with such a scenario, acknowledged the official.



Israel’s Messages Behind Strikes on Beirut’s Southern Suburb

Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)
Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)
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Israel’s Messages Behind Strikes on Beirut’s Southern Suburb

Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)
Men stand at the scene of an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut's southern suburbs on April 1, 2025. (AFP)

Israel’s latest airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburb, known as Dahiyeh, have moved beyond mere retaliation for rocket fire, signaling a shift in the rules of engagement. By targeting the area twice in less than a week, Tel Aviv has effectively abandoned the informal understanding that had kept the suburb off-limits since the ceasefire took effect in November.

The escalation raises questions about how Lebanon’s government and Hezbollah will respond and whether this marks the beginning of a more intense phase of conflict.

Pressure to normalize ties

Observers close to Hezbollah believe Israel’s strikes are aimed to increase pressure on Lebanon to engage in normalization talks.

Brig. Gen. Mounir Shehadeh, former Lebanese government coordinator with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), suggested that the rockets fired into Israel last Friday—which prompted the initial Israeli response—ultimately served Israeli interests.

“It was evident that these were crude, suspicious rockets, giving Israel the pretext it needed to strike deep into Lebanese territory, specifically Dahiyeh,” Shehadeh told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He pointed to Tuesday’s assassination of a Hezbollah member in the Dahiyeh strike, describing it as a significant escalation. “Unlike last week, there was no pretext for this attack,” he said. “This confirms that Israel’s objective is to pressure Lebanon into normalization.”

Shehadeh argued that the US and Israel are working to push Lebanon into political negotiations involving diplomats and politicians rather than military representatives.

“There are also growing efforts to force Hezbollah into making internal concessions, particularly to disarm in areas north of the Litani River,” he added.

He stressed that Israel is sending a clear message: no location in Lebanon is off-limits, and it will continue to act whenever and wherever it sees fit.

A different perspective

Retired Brig. Gen. George Nader offered a different interpretation of the escalation. He believes Israel does not need excuses to carry out its attacks, but argues that Lebanon should avoid giving it any justification.

“We have failed to implement international resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701, and we continue to insist that Hezbollah’s disarmament requires national dialogue,” Nader told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He questioned the relevance of such discussions, given that Lebanon’s previous government had already signed an agreement calling for the disarmament of armed groups and the dismantling of their military infrastructure, starting south of the Litani River.

“As long as the situation remains unchanged, we should expect Israeli violations and attacks to intensify,” he warned. He also cited explicit US warnings that Lebanon could face cuts in military aid and even sanctions if it fails to implement the agreement.

“We are at a crossroads,” Nader said. “Either Hezbollah acknowledges the shifting regional and international dynamics, helps the state assert full sovereignty over Lebanese territory, and surrenders its weapons—or Israel will continue the aggressive approach we are seeing today.”