Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Hezbollah is accused of stabbing the FPM several times in the back.

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
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Lebanon: Divorce between Aoun, Hezbollah Is Final

Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)
Then FPM leader Michel Aoun and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah shake hands as they declare their understanding in February 2006. (Reuters)

A Lebanese official following the relations between former President Michel Aoun with Hezbollah said the “marriage” between them, which was held at a Maronite church in Beirut’s southern suburbs in 2006, is over.

All that is left is for them to announce the official divorce, marking an end to an alliance between two of the most opposite parties in Lebanon.

Many had believed that the understanding - signed at the Mar Mikhael church in February 2006 between then head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Michel Aoun and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah - was doomed to fail.

Even though it brought two parties that could not be any more different, their understanding turned out to be a solid alliance wherein the personal relations between Aoun and Nasrallah played a big role in consolidating it, leading to a major change in Lebanon’s political identity.

However, Aoun’s political successor, his son-in-law and MP Gebran Bassil played a major role in ruining the understanding, leading to its collapse and now, divorce.

The FPM and Hezbollah achieved major gains from the alliance. Hezbollah gained sizeable Christian cover for its arsenal of weapons, while the FPM gained unlimited support in internal files that allowed it at first to control Christian shares in governments and then state institutions. The alliance also allowed Aoun to be elected president after two years of vacuum in the country’s top post.

Ironically, Aoun’s election as president marked the beginning of the end of the alliance. As soon as Aoun became head of state, he found himself at great odds with influential parliament Speaker Nabi Berri, a major ally of Hezbollah.

Aoun believed that Hezbollah’s support to him in domestic affairs must be unlimited, but the party chose to take the middle ground and avoid confronting Berri out of its keenness on the “unity of Shiite ranks.” Aoun was very disappointed, openly informing his guests that Berri was the greatest obstacle to his presidential achievements and Hezbollah did not intervene to rein in its ally.

Aoun believes that Berri was the major obstacle that hindered the success of his term as president – an argument that many agree with. Hezbollah chose to take a “hands off” approach in internal files, prioritizing its regional role.

Berri, however, did not take a “hands off” approach. He confronted Aoun’s ambitions in state institutions. The speaker is a main political player and refused to turn into an “affiliate” to Aoun, said one of the figures close to him. The lack of “political chemistry” between Aoun and Berri was obvious to them and others from the start.

Aoun’s term in office ended with a vacuum in the presidency with political parties failing to elect a successor. The way Hezbollah is approaching the vacuum has dealt a strong blow to the alliance with Aoun.

The party is clear in backing the candidacy of former minister Suleiman Franjieh, but Bassil, now head of the FPM, has strongly rejected this choice. He believes that he has made a great sacrifice by refraining from nominating himself, calling on Hezbollah to reach an understanding with him over a “third choice”.

Nasrallah and Bassil met, with the former frankly telling him that Franjieh was their choice. Bassil strongly opposed the suggestion. Nasrallah told him to think about it, but Bassil was adamant in rejecting Franjieh.

Other points of contention were related to the caretaker government. The FPM argued that the government, in its caretaker capacity, could not hold meetings amid the presidential vacuum. Hezbollah disagreed and granted the needed quorum for the cabinet meetings to be held. Bassil was furious, striking below the belt by speaking of “honest parties who renege on the agreement, vow and guarantee.” The party was forced to respond openly to the accusation, the first time it had done so since the 2006 understanding.

The relationship between Hezbollah and the FPM was based partially on the latter’s support of the party's conflict with Israel. In return, the party would support the FPM in domestic political affairs, leading to a “balanced partnership”, as Bassil has told his visitors. An imbalance in this equation will break the partnership. On whether Hezbollah’s latest positions were viewed as a stab in the back, Bassil’s visitors said: “There are many knives in the back this time.”

Hezbollah and Bassil’s ties were never completely rosy. Bassil never shied away from criticizing the party every now and then. His biggest reservation was that the party prioritized its relations with Shiites over all else. According to Bassil, this “encouraged corruption and prevented the rise of state institutions.” Bassil went so far as to tell his visitors that Hezbollah fought for Aoun to be elected president and when he finally became so, it did not support him in the battle to build the state, abandoning him before his rivals.

Bassil’s visitors said he was clear with Hezbollah over the need to agree on another presidential candidate besides Franjieh. “If they believe he is maneuvering or seeking something else in return, they are wrong and it would be a big problem if the party believes so,” they added.

Bassil has said that the relationship between the FPM and Hezbollah was perfect. “We were capable of reaching understandings with foreign parties, while in return, the resistance [Hezbollah] would perform its duty in protecting the nation,” he was quoted as saying.

In short, Bassil believed that the 2006 understanding with Hezbollah changed Lebanon's identity and if the relations with the party were to collapse, then Lebanon’s identity will again be changed.

Hezbollah’s view

In return, Hezbollah appears unconvinced of Bassil’s justifications. An official close to the party said the divorce has happened with the party and they are now awaiting the official announcement. He stressed, however, that the announcement will not be made by the party, leaving it up to Bassil.

The official disagrees with the Aounist camp’s claims that the FPM’s support for Hezbollah gave the former free reign in domestic affairs. “They are giving the party support it doesn’t need. It is already a regional power and recognized as so by the world,” he remarked.

Internally, he said the “weight” of the alliance with the FPM “cost Hezbollah several of its Christian friends and strained its relations with other parties because it was always siding with Bassil.”

Moreover, he added that the formation of governments was obstructed on numerous occasions “just so Bassil could get what he wanted. The parliament was also obstructed just so Aoun could be elected president.”

The party is clear in saying that Bassil takes issues personally. It holds him responsible for the failure to form a new government before Aoun’s term ended. At the time, Berri and caretaker Prime Minister Najib Miqati agreed to Bassil’s conditions, but at the very last minute, the FPM leader said he would not support the new lineup even though he was to be granted shares other than those of the president and the greatest number of seats as he demanded.

Even in rejecting Franjieh’s nomination, Hezbollah believes that Bassil is taking issues personally. The official said the MP constantly tries to undermine Franjieh’s image and influence, even calling him by his first name, without any of his titles.

The official added, however, that he has not ruled out the possibility that Bassil could take advantage of the political upheaval and possibility of the United States lifting sanctions on him to emerge as a leading candidate for the presidency. Hezbollah does not have a Plan B to deal with such a scenario, acknowledged the official.



Winter Will Hamper, But Not Halt, Israel’s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon

A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)
A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)
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Winter Will Hamper, But Not Halt, Israel’s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon

A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)
A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)

The ground battles between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon remain intense, with no end in sight for the coming weeks. The arrival of winter will bring weather changes that could slow down operations. but won't stop the fighting.

Experts say that while winter weather, especially rain and fog, can make it harder for fighters and vehicles to move, it has a limited impact on the overall conflict. Air operations, which rely on advanced technology, are less affected.

The region’s mild winter conditions, unlike harsher winters in other countries, will not be a decisive factor in the battle.

Retired General Abdul Rahman Shheitly believes that modern military equipment is designed to work in any weather.

However, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that fog and rain can give both sides an advantage by obscuring visibility, making it harder to spot each other.

This benefits the attacking side, Israel, which has superior technology, while Hezbollah’s movements could be hindered by muddy terrain.

Shheitly also noted that weather affects displaced civilians, which could put pressure on political negotiations to end the conflict.

Retired General Hassan Jouni, former deputy chief of staff of operations in the Lebanese Armed Forces, argued that weather conditions affect the attacker more than the defender. Since Hezbollah is defending its ground, it is less impacted by the cold and rain.

The weather only slightly affects vehicle movement, and does not stop the fighting.

Jouni noted that the region doesn’t experience severe winter weather, so air operations will be unaffected by rain or cold. Modern drones, missiles, and aircraft are designed to function in such conditions, with GPS ensuring precise targeting.

Both Hezbollah and Israel rely heavily on drones. Hezbollah’s drones are noted for their accuracy and ability to avoid Israel’s Iron Dome defense, while Israel uses drones for surveillance and targeted strikes.

More than a year has passed since the conflict began after Hezbollah opened its "support front” for Hamas on October 8, 2023. The fighting, mostly limited to airstrikes during the winter of 2023, escalated with Israel’s ground operation a month ago, though its full goals remain unclear.

As the ground battles continue, Israel seems focused on creating a buffer zone in the South rather than occupying towns. Israel has destroyed over 37 villages to achieve this goal.

The next steps remain uncertain.

Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi has stated that the military is preparing for further ground operations in southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah remains determined to hold its ground and prevent Israeli advances.