Bahsani: Yemen’s Presidential Council will Seek to Achieve Stability in North, South

 Major General Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council
Major General Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council
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Bahsani: Yemen’s Presidential Council will Seek to Achieve Stability in North, South

 Major General Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council
Major General Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council

Major General Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, confirmed that the council will lead the stage in the North and the South towards stability, calling for placing the national project above any other considerations.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Bahsani noted that a draft roadmap was currently being discussed and included a first phase of six months to stabilize the ceasefire, then a preparation stage of three months, followed by a transitional phase that extends over two years to discuss the form of the state.

He also stressed that Saudi Arabia was leading the process of rapprochement between the Yemeni legitimacy and the Houthi group, based on good neighborliness and brotherhood between the two countries, expressing his confidence that the Kingdom would continue to stand by the Presidential Leadership Council and the legitimate government.

Bahsani said, however, that the proposed draft peace map “collided at the beginning with the intransigence of the Houthi militia, which practices the Iranian method of procrastination.”

“These militias do not care about ending the war or the suffering of the people through regional and international opportunities to bring peace to Yemen. All they want from the war and the coup against the state is to control the institutions and seize power,” he underlined.

According to Bahsani, the most important axes of “the draft peace map include a first phase of six months, in which the ceasefire is established and other measures are taken without the militia’s intervention.”

Those measures seek to facilitate commercial activity and the citizens’ movement in areas controlled by the Houthis.

“As for the second phase, it will last for three months, during which the plans and programs for the transitional phase will be prepared,” he underlined.

The member of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council stated that Saudi Arabia was leading the process of rapprochement between the legitimacy and the Houthis, pointing out that neither the council nor the legitimate government participated in any direct dialogues with the Houthi militia.

He also stressed that the Saudi-Iranian agreement signed on March 10 will reflect positively on major regional files, including Yemen.

“Saudi Arabia puts all its diplomatic weight to solve this file with the Republic of Iran and to stop Tehran’s backing of the Houthi militia,” Bahsani told Asharq Al-Awsat, adding that the Houthis used this support “to kill the Yemeni people and tamper with the stability of the region as a whole, not just Yemen.”

The member of the Presidential Leadership Council emphasized that the war was not over yet, and that the Yemeni army was ready for the worst possibilities if the Houthis insisted on a new round of fighting.

With regards to the peace efforts led by Saudi Arabia, the UN envoy and a number of “brotherly and friendly” countries that took place during the past years, the Houthi group has constantly renounced these agreements, Bahsani said.

“This is what made the legitimacy demand guarantees for the implementation of any future agreements,” he added.

The Yemeni official expressed his doubts over the commitment of the Houthi group to the peace map. On the other hand, he noted that the structure of the state and the fate of the Yemenis will be decided in the North and the South during the upcoming arrangements.

“Thus, it will be a great responsibility for the brothers in the North to get rid of these militias and their weapons, and as southerners, we will be supportive of any role in this regard,” he remarked.

According to Bahsani, the Presidencial Council was able to complete many achievements since its formation, mainly restructuring and reactivating the judiciary, reviving efforts to advance the peace process and consolidate stability in the liberated governorates, and addressing many issues within the military.



Fakhri Karim: I Conveyed Talabani’s Advice to Assad on Terrorists

Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: I Conveyed Talabani’s Advice to Assad on Terrorists

Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The late Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, excelled at delivering messages subtly. In private meetings, he spoke more freely than in public statements or interviews. His chief advisor, Fakhri Karim, often joined these discussions.

Luncheons were lavish, showing Talabani's respect for different opinions, though he rarely followed doctors’ advice.

Talabani believed that Iranian leaders were smart and hoped they wouldn’t try to control Baghdad from Tehran, citing the failed attempt to manage Beirut from Damascus.

He noted that Iraq’s independent spirit makes it hard for the country to follow the US, Iran, or Türkiye. Talabani also admitted giving refuge to 80 Iraqi officers who had fought against Iran, after they were targeted by certain groups.

Talabani praised Syria’s late President Hafez al-Assad for his invaluable support, providing accommodation and passports.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim revealed he had warned President Bashar al-Assad, on behalf of Talabani, that militants allowed into Iraq to fight US forces might later turn against Syria.

This, Karim noted, did happen.

After the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982, Karim relocated to Damascus. There, he expanded his Al-Mada organization, focusing on publishing, translation, and organizing book fairs, alongside his political activities.

This allowed him to build relationships with top civilian and military officials.

In 2000, after Bashar al-Assad came to power, he met with Karim.

“I felt Assad was eager to listen, especially given my connections with many intellectuals,” recalled Karim.

“I told him dissenting voices exist but are mostly positive. You talk about modernization and renewal; this is a chance for some openness, even in elections,” Karim said he told Assad.

“Do you think anyone could really compete with you, given your position as the Baath Party's leader with all its resources?” Karim questioned.

Karim then discussed the situation of Syrian Kurds with Assad, noting that many lack identification papers, even basic travel documents. He also mentioned seeing historic Kurdish areas in the Khabur region with their names changed to Arabic, which causes sensitivities.

“I am not satisfied with this situation. Rest assured, this issue is on my agenda, and you will hear positive news about it,” Karim cited Assad as saying at the time.

In a later meeting, after the change in Iraq, Karim met Assad several times.

On one occasion, Karim recalls conveying Talabani’s greetings and concerns about armed fighters moving into Iraq and the dangers this posed to both Iraq and possibly Syria.

“We have deployed large forces to secure the borders, but what can we do? There are tribes and smugglers,” Assad complained about the situation.

“I told President Assad that as Fakhri Karim, I couldn’t share with the Americans what I know. I assured him that terrorists enter Iraq from a specific location I’m familiar with, not from all borders,” Karim recounted to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I also noted that Syria tightly controls its airspace, shooting down any foreign aircraft,” he added.

Assad then responded to Karim and said: “We’re prepared, let us know what we can do.”

In reality, Damascus was worried because there were reports suggesting that Syria’s Baath regime could be the next target for the US army at its borders. Additionally, Damascus was concerned about the sectarian divisions—Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish—in dealing with Iraq and the potential impact on Syria.

Repairing Kurdish Relations

Karim has spent years working on repairing the relationship between Kurdish leaders Talabani and Masoud Barzani.

This history began with the split that gave rise to the ‘Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’ from the ‘Kurdistan Democratic Party.’

Despite bloody conflicts and external meddling, Karim believes Kurdish leaders unify in the face of danger to their people and region, a pattern he expects to continue.

Karim believes that the Kurdish leadership, symbolized by Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, made a big mistake at the beginning by focusing only on regional issues, ignoring Baghdad’s affairs.

He thinks they should have aimed for a federal democratic system that respects citizenship rights.

Karim pointed out that without a unified Iraq, the region’s rights would be uncertain. He also criticized the Shiite-Kurdish alliance, which he sees as odd.

Additionally, he mentioned mistakes in failing to unify regional institutions and increasing corruption, with party interests often trumping competence in appointments.

Asked about the personal bond between Talabani and Barzani, Karim said: “Both have moved past their tough history, but they haven’t done enough for the future.”

“I want to highlight an act by Barzani that shows his character. When Talabani was sick, Barzani made it clear to anyone thinking of harming Talabani or his family that there would be consequences,” he revealed.

“This isn’t hearsay, it’s firsthand,” affirmed Karim.

“Barzani also refused to discuss the presidency or a successor during Talabani’s illness. I personally organized a gathering for Talabani’s family, where Barzani reassured them, ‘I’m here for you, I’m family.’ His words moved everyone, showing a strong emotional connection,” he added.

When asked about Barzani’s character, Karim said: “He's been a long-time friend, and our relationship has been politically aligned and personally warm from the start.”

“I see him as a loyal friend, and he's shown that loyalty on multiple occasions. He’s smart, decisive, and listens carefully, often changing his mind after thorough consideration,” he noted.

“Once Barzani commits to something, he finds it hard to go back on his word. There was a moment during negotiations with Saddam Hussein when he stood firm despite my advice to reconsider,” recalled Karim.

Regarding the aftermath of the independence referendum, Karim believes that the negative turn in the political landscape began during Nouri al-Maliki’s tenure.

Al-Maliki’s attempts to shift alliances and his refusal to compromise exacerbated tensions.

The referendum itself wasn’t the problem; rather, it was exploited by some to punish the Kurdistan Region.

However, Karim emphasized that holding referendums is a citizen’s right, and the purpose of the Kurdistan referendum was to affirm this right, not to declare independence.