AANES Utilizes Half of Syrian Oil Wells, Traders Sell to Damascus at Symbolic Rates

File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)
File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

AANES Utilizes Half of Syrian Oil Wells, Traders Sell to Damascus at Symbolic Rates

File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)
File photo from the Al-Omar oil field in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. The image was captured after the conclusion of military operations and the expulsion of ISIS elements (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Over the course of twelve years of ongoing conflict in Syria, the dossier of oil and energy has remained an enigmatic puzzle. Ever since oil and gas fields slipped from the grip of government forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad at the close of 2012, control over these resources has shifted among various entities.

It wasn't until 2016 that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by an international coalition led by Washington, managed to wrest control of the oil-rich and natural gas-abundant towns and settlements of Shaddadi, Al-Hol, and Al-Jabsa, southeast of the city of Al-Hasakah, from the clutches of the terrorist group ISIS.

Later in 2017, ISIS terrorists were expelled by the SDF from oil fields in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor, located in eastern Syria. These fields used to yield a daily production of 120,000 barrels of heavy oil prior to the outbreak of the 2011 conflict.

Hassan Kocher, deputy co-chair of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the administration invests in less than half of the wells and fields in its areas of influence, approximately 150,000 barrels per day, noting that production was around 385,000 barrels per day before the 2011 war.

Kocher refuted accusations directed at the AANES and US forces of plundering Syrian oil or monopolizing these resources, citing evidence of a portion of the production being sold to regime-affiliated traders at nominal prices compared to global rates.

Since the onset of the Syrian war, the regions encompassing oil fields and their wells have come under the control of various military factions.

Following 2014, especially in the outskirts of the cities of Deir Ezzor and Al-Hasakah, these fields faced military assaults from armed radical groups and extremist Islamic organizations.

These attacks significantly impacted these fields and wells, with some being destroyed and others subjected to vandalism, leading to a decline in production.

With limited resources, the AANES managed to harness a portion equivalent to less than half of the pre-2011 production from these wells to meet the energy and fuel needs of the region’s inhabitants, disclosed Kocher.

When asked about the status of oil and gas fields post their liberation of ISIS, Kocher said: “After SDF forces liberated fields in the outskirts of Deir Ezzor (2019) and Al-Hasakah (2016), they encountered logistical obstacles that hindered the production of many wells.”

“Some of the equipment was stolen, and another portion was deliberately vandalized, aiming to undermine the region’s economy,” added Kocher.

According to the deputy co-chair, remaining wells require maintenance, restoration, experts, technicians, and significant resources that the AANES does not possess.

“Additionally, the siege imposed on our areas from all sides has significantly contributed to the decline of the oil sector,” added Kocher.

As for revenues collected from oil and gas production under the AANES, Kocher said they flow back to the structures of the administration and local councils that oversee the regions, aimed at covering the expenses of the military and security forces safeguarding their geographical borders.

“These revenues also contribute to the overall budget, enabling the provision of essential services for the region’s residents and supporting the payment of salaries for workers and employees,” clarified Kocher.

Talking about the buying and selling operations conducted with Damascus and other areas of influence, Kocher said there are “no official contracts or established methods due to the fact that all borders are besieged and closed.”

“There is also no agreement for the sale and purchase of crude oil, neither with the Syrian government nor with other entities,” added Kocher.

“Here, it is crucial to emphasize the necessity of establishing a mechanism to regulate these operations, as it would be a positive development in serving all Syrians, regardless of their geographical location, as we are a part of Syria and these resources belong to all Syrians,” he affirmed.

Buying and selling operations are conducted through traders affiliated with the regime, and the quantities extracted nowadays barely suffice for the region’s population needs.

“Despite this, a portion of the extracted oil is sold through these traders to Damascus, while another portion is bought by traders for resale to other areas,” said Kocher, asserting that the AANES does not monopolize these resources, contrary to the claims of both the government and opposing factions.

“It has become widely known that the administration’s own regions are grappling with severe crises in the distribution of household gas and diesel fuel,” noted Kocher.

As for accusations of plundering Syrian oil leveled by the Syrian regime and international parties against the SDF and US forces, Kocher asserted that those allegations are utterly false.

“These claims are entirely baseless, both in their entirety and in their details,” said Kocher.

“The international coalition and US forces have not intervened in the oil issue.”

“Officially, they state that their tasks are limited to combating and defeating the terrorist organization ISIS and eliminating its sleeper cells in eastern Syria.”

Regarding the AANES presenting the US-led international coalition with a project for building an oil refinery, Kocher admits the administration had submitted such a proposal.

“Given that our regions are surrounded on all sides and lack official crossings, these efforts have not succeeded in establishing such a facility,” revealed Kocher.

“To this day, oil refining continues to be carried out using primitive methods that negatively impact environmental safety, as well as the overall economic cycle of northeastern Syria due to the absence of oil investments,” he added.



Fakhri Karim: Nouri al-Maliki Saw Mosul as ‘Dagger in the Side’

Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

Fakhri Karim: Nouri al-Maliki Saw Mosul as ‘Dagger in the Side’

Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim during his interview with Editor-in-Chief of Asharq Al-Awsat Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Last February, Iraqi politician and publisher Fakhri Karim narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Baghdad, sparking many questions about the motive behind the attack.

Some speculate Karim was targeted for his role as a senior advisor to the late President Jalal Talabani between 2006 and 2014. Others think it might have been due to his efforts in managing the relationship between Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani.

There is also speculation that the attack could have been a reaction to his newspaper, Al-Mada. Known for supporting the Iraqi uprising, Al-Mada has strongly campaigned against widespread assassinations and the uncontrolled spread of weapons.

The recent attempt on Karim's life recalls a similar incident in Lebanon in 1982. During the Israeli siege of Beirut, while the city was seeing off Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters, Karim was injured in the face in an assassination attempt.

Karim had a close relationship with then PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, who supported thousands of communists escaping Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.

Born in 1942 in Baghdad to a Shiite Kurdish family, Karim joined the Communist Party in 1959. His activism led to multiple imprisonments, escapes, and living under aliases, including Ali Abdul Khaliq.

Karim worked in the party’s media and was once the deputy head of the journalists’ syndicate.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim recounted a significant episode from 1970.

The Communist Party, through leader Makram Talabani, informed President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr about a coup plot orchestrated by outspoken Iraqi officer and politician Abdel Ghani al-Rawi, with support from Iran.

Al-Bakr appreciated the intelligence and reportedly said: “We will not forget this for the party.”

Karim also mentioned that al-Bakr had previously proposed that the Communist Party join the Baath Party in the coup that brought the Baathists back to power on July 17, 1968, but the party declined.

Karim disclosed that he personally received a call from US officials urging President Jalal Talabani not to run for a second term, labeling him as “Iran’s man.”

Karim then revealed that President Barack Obama was involved in a scheme to persuade Talabani to step down in favor of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The aim was to keep Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister to appease Iran.

Karim admitted that supporting al-Maliki for the position of prime minister over Allawi, who had won the majority in parliament, was a blunder.

He stated that al-Maliki ignored Barzani’s warnings about extremist activity near Mosul that eventually culminated in ISIS’s capture of the city.

Before Mosul fell, al-Maliki reportedly said in front of President Talabani: “We need to cooperate and bring Mosul closer to the Kurdistan region because it is a hub for terrorists, nationalists, and Baathists, a dagger in our side.” Talabani reportedly found the comment inappropriate.

Karim spoke about missions assigned to him by Talabani in Tehran and Damascus, including meetings with Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who were both killed in a US airstrike in early 2020.

He expressed concerns about the future of Iraq and Kurdistan amidst political instability.

Moreover, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s exit from politics has emboldened minorities to challenge the constitution and institutions, according to Karim.

Some Iraqis now see the Federal Court as straying from its original role, comparing it to the Revolutionary Command Council.

Moment of decline for Iraq’s political process

Karim responded to comments by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari to Asharq Al-Awsat previously, where Zebari stated that Talabani was prepared to support the no confidence of al-Maliki’s government, but he changed course after receiving a threatening message from Qassem Soleimani.

Karim noted that months into al-Maliki’s second term, he started to act independently, even from Shiite factions. This trend worried the highest religious authority in the country.

A meeting in Erbil gathered opposition forces, including the Iraqi List and Kurdish factions, later joined by al-Sadr. Talabani proposed withdrawing confidence from al-Maliki's government. Karim expressed concerns, but Talabani seemed unbothered. Karim also worried about potential resistance from Soleimani, prompting Talabani to suggest contacting him in Tehran.

As the plane prepared to depart, Soleimani indicated a messenger would deliver a message. The severe message demanded Talabani’s resignation if he wasn't up to the task and that he follow Soleimani’s approach. This led to a change of course and very dangerous consequences. Karim believed this marked the beginning of the decline in the political process in Iraq, leading to current events.

Al-Maliki and the Mosul dilemma

In Karim’s personal opinion, al-Maliki understood the gravity of the situation but likely thought it was a minor breach that could be rectified. Karim doubted that al-Maliki anticipated the situation turning into a major disaster leading to the occupation of a third of the country by ISIS, plunging both the people and the state into a costly predicament, the effects of which they are still grappling with.

The issue of Mosul was raised between Talabani and al-Maliki at the onset of discussions about forming the government. It was discussed in several meetings between the two leaders.

One day, al-Maliki proposed an idea that seemed strange to Karim. He suggested paying attention to the situation in Mosul and seeking a remedy for it.

“I hope we can cooperate and bring Mosul closer to the Kurdistan Region as much as possible because Mosul is a hub for terrorism, nationalists, and Baathists, hence a dagger in our side,” Karim recalled al-Maliki as saying.

Karim then responded: “We are talking about a future where we address the shortcomings we face, and you are talking about a Sunni component that is part of the political process!”

Al-Maliki then replied: “How can you speak to me like this? These are Baathists and nationalists, and, with all due respect, Sunnis.”

Karim then pointed to Talabani and said: “This man in front of you is Sunni.”

At that point, Talabani told al-Maliki that this conversation was inappropriate.

Al-Maliki: Mosul situation is under control

Karim’s words matched what Barzani, the former President of the Kurdistan Region, said at the time when he personally led the confrontation against ISIS.

Barzani said: “Before the fall of Mosul to ISIS, we received information that extremists were establishing bases in the urban area southwest of Mosul, near the Syrian border. I sent messages to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki through Sayyid Ammar al-Hakim, Dr. Roj Shaways, and US Ambassador Stephen Beecroft.”

“I told them: Inform him that he’s preoccupied with Anbar and indifferent to Mosul, which has become an open arena. I proposed a joint operation to prevent the extremists from taking over Mosul and its surroundings,” recounted Barzani.

This was in December 2013, seven months before Mosul fell to ISIS. Barzani added that al-Maliki showed no interest: “I called him at the beginning of 2014 and said, ‘My brother, the situation in Mosul is dangerous. Let’s conduct a joint operation. I cannot send the Peshmerga alone’.”

“The matter is sensitive between Kurds and Arabs, and government forces are present in the area. There's the 2nd Division of the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and other units. We’re ready to bear the heavier burden, but let it be a joint operation,” argued Barzani.

Al-Maliki then replied: “My brother, you watch over your region, don’t worry about what’s beyond it; the situation is under control.”

Barzani indicated that ISIS had not dreamed of taking control of Mosul, nor had it anticipated its fall into their hands.

The terrorist group wanted to distract army units to release their members detained in the Badush prison west of the city.

“ISIS launched shells towards the Ghazlani camp to cover the prisoners’ escape. The officers sent by al-Maliki (the ground forces commander and deputy chief of staff) fled, and the division commander joined them... This is a big and terrible issue,” said the Kurdish leader.

“The army didn't resist. Senior officers sought refuge with the Peshmerga. We rescued them and sent them to Baghdad at their request,” Barzani recounted.