Former Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr Al-Qirbi reflected on the unraveling of Yemen’s political landscape following 2004, the year that marked the beginning of a complex and eventually fatal relationship between the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi movement.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat in the second and final part of an in-depth conversation, Al-Qirbi shares personal insights on the war, Iran’s influence, the Arab Spring, and how Yemen’s long-time ruler foresaw his tragic end.
According to Al-Qirbi, Saleh first began to see the Houthis as a threat around the year 2000, when they started building external alliances, including with Iran and Libya, and shifting from religious activism to overt political mobilization. This culminated in the first armed conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2004.
Al-Qirbi believes the Houthis’ turn toward Iran was a direct consequence of the wars waged against them in Yemen. “They sought a protector, and they found one in Iran,” he said, noting that Tehran’s support came not only from the government but also from religious institutions.
He recounted that he personally visited Iran twice to address Yemen’s concerns, meeting both President Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “We stressed three things: Yemenis—Sunnis and Zaydis—had coexisted peacefully for centuries; regional peace depended on non-interference; and Iran needed to stop supporting the Houthis, even indirectly.” Tehran, for its part, assured him of its commitment to Yemen’s stability but, Al-Qirbi implied, offered little practical restraint.
Talk of Succession
Reflecting on the 2006 elections, Al-Qirbi described them as a turning point: “It was the first time Saleh truly earned his win, receiving 60 percent of the vote in a competitive race.” He insisted the process was largely free and fair, with credible international observers in attendance.
These elections, however, intensified internal political strife. There was growing suspicion that Saleh was preparing his son for succession, a rumor that dogged his later years and stirred discontent among Yemenis and international stakeholders alike.
The Arab Spring: Shock and Opportunity
Yemen, like much of the Arab world, was caught off-guard by the speed and ferocity of the Arab Spring. Al-Qirbi acknowledges that while the regime anticipated regional change - particularly after 9/11 and increased US civil society activity - the spark from Tunisia was unexpected.
“Saleh wasn’t surprised by the demands for reform,” Al-Qirbi noted, “but he questioned the method. His position was that change should come through democratic institutions, not by toppling governments.”
During the mass youth sit-ins and growing opposition movements, Al-Qirbi believes Saleh recognized the West’s shifting stance. “He realized that the US and others were now saying plainly: Saleh must go.” Despite this, the president insisted any transition should occur constitutionally, not through force.
One of the most poignant moments in the interview comes when Al-Qirbi addresses Saleh’s reaction to the downfall of fellow Arab leaders like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. “It deeply affected him,” Al-Qirbi said. “These were men he knew personally. Watching them fall, especially so brutally, had a profound impact.”
Saleh, according to Al-Qirbi, was aware of the cost of clinging to power.
“He could have crushed the protests with force. He had the means, but he chose not to, fearing the chaos it might unleash.” Ultimately, Saleh agreed to a Gulf-brokered deal to step down in 2011, ushering in Vice President Abed Rabbuh Mansour Hadi as his successor.
From Vice President to Rival: The Hadi Transition
Al-Qirbi was a strong supporter of Hadi’s elevation to the presidency, arguing that his long service as vice president and his lack of overt political ambition made him a natural and unifying choice. But the relationship between the two men quickly deteriorated.
“Saleh began to feel that Hadi was sidelining him from the General People’s Congress (GPC),” Al-Qirbi said. “He felt betrayed, especially when Hadi began appointing his own loyalists to represent the party in the National Dialogue Conference.”
This rift widened dramatically as Houthi forces advanced through northern Yemen. While some accused Saleh of allying with the Houthis to settle scores with political rivals, Al-Qirbi disputes this characterization. “He never truly allied with them. At best, there was a tactical understanding, and even that crumbled once they reached Amran.”
Al-Qirbi confirms that Saleh had urged Hadi to stop the Houthi advance before they reached Sana’a, a warning that went unheeded. “Saleh expected the government to act, but it didn’t. That was a pivotal moment.”
The Fall of Sana’a and Saleh’s Final Days
When the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014, Al-Qirbi was in the city. He recalls the shock that swept through the capital as government forces surrendered without resistance. “Nobody expected it to happen so easily,” he said.
Despite forming a brief partnership with the Houthis, Saleh grew increasingly uneasy. Al-Qirbi recounts how Houthi supervisors effectively controlled ministries, sidelining GPC ministers and eroding Saleh’s influence.
By 2017, tensions reached a breaking point. As Saleh prepared to commemorate the anniversary of the GPC’s founding, Houthi forces viewed the event as a political threat. That same year, they killed him.
“Saleh anticipated it,” Al-Qirbi admits. “He understood the risks of engaging with the Houthis and sensed early on that they were not true partners.”
Al-Qirbi speaks of Saleh with a mix of admiration and reflection. “He was a flexible leader, willing to engage with enemies, and he preferred dialogue over violence. Had he been a man of force, he could have crushed the protests. But he chose restraint.”
Asked whether Saleh’s long rule prevented the building of a true Yemeni state, Al-Qirbi acknowledges both internal constraints and missed opportunities. “There were moments - after reunification, after the 1994 war, and especially after 2006 - where a stronger state could have been built. But like many revolutionary leaders, Saleh became too focused on power and too cautious to make drastic reforms.”
On Yemen’s famously complex tribal and political fabric, Al-Qirbi supports Saleh’s infamous quote likening governance in Yemen to “dancing on the heads of snakes.” He agrees, “It’s an accurate description. Balancing tribal, regional, political, and external interests is an impossible act.”
Hope for Unity?
Despite everything, Al-Qirbi remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen’s future. “Yemen must return to unity. Without it, there can be no long-term stability,” he insists. But he warns that foreign interference remains a significant obstacle. “The day Yemenis are left to negotiate among themselves is the day peace becomes possible.”
Asked whether the Houthis could be brought under the authority of a national government, he offers a realist’s view: “There are now three centers of power: Sana’a, Aden, and the internationally recognized government. None are truly sovereign in their decisions. But if dialogue is given a real chance - without outside manipulation - Yemenis will find a solution.”
