Abbas Ibrahim … The Eyes and Ears of the Lebanese State

Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)
Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)
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Abbas Ibrahim … The Eyes and Ears of the Lebanese State

Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)
Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)

In the few years that followed his appointment as general director of the Lebanese General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim managed to prove himself to be a major sponsor of successful internal and foreign mediations, especially in regards to the fierce war his agency is waging against terrorist groups. He has, at the same time, managed to persuade these groups to accept deals, taking advantage of their ambitions and fears.

Ibrahim’s name rose to prominence in successful swap deals with terror groups where he played the role of “achieving the greatest possible gain, while paying the lowest possible price.” These prices were usually paid to the “pockets” of others, not the Lebanese state, which has never paid a dime in these deals that have involved its citizens and its territory.

Ibrahim’s special ties with the contradictory sides have made him an acceptable negotiator and an in-demand mediator in several internal and foreign affairs.

Based on his position as head of the General Security, Ibrahim plays the role of the “eyes and ears of the state.” He is the president’s aide on security files and is also tasked with working on several sensitive affairs, whether through special appointment or through the nature of his work. The reality on the ground however sees him playing a central role in combating terrorist groups through the General Security, which is working at a remarkably effective rate, in cooperation with the other security agencies. He is also in charge of the Palestinian and Syrian files in Lebanon, as well as the administrative role his institution plays in managing foreigners in Lebanon, whether they are artists, expatriates or terror groups.

Some believe that since his appointment to his post in July 2011, Ibrahim succeeded in avoiding being politically affiliated to a certain party. He stayed close to the side that named him – AMAL and “Hezbollah” that appoint all Shi’ite public employees to their posts – while convincing their rivals of his centrist mediator role. This therefor enabled him to maintain his position at a distance from the rival parties in Lebanon, giving himself ample room to maneuver to fulfill his security-political role.

Despite all this, Ibrahim has had his fair share of criticism from both rival parties, whether in his counter-terrorism duty that saw him work closely with the Syrian regime and “Hezbollah” or in his adherence to official institutions and accompanying the interior minister on visits and conferences.

As usual, Ibrahim treated each side with remarkable balance. On the one hand, he repeatedly hailed the role of the “resistance”, which shuts down his critics from the pro-”Hezbollah” camp, and on the other he also praised the official security institutions, which prevents the armed group’s rivals from going too far in criticizing him.

Those close to Ibrahim acknowledge the difficulty of the centrist role he is playing. Editor-in-chief of the “General Security” magazine Mounir Akiki said that Ibrahim has more than once “called on the Lebanese to steer clear of political disputes … stressing that all sides operate under the constitution and Taef Accord.” Lebanon unfortunately, lies in an arena of regional contradictions that affects everyone, but they are all ultimately bound to return to national principles, he noted.

At the General Security, Ibrahim sought to develop the agency and eliminate corruption, which he said usually comes from the head of an institution. If the leader lacks the necessary abilities to manage the institution, then it is doomed to fail.

Upon his appointment to his position, said Akiki, Ibrahim devised a set of programs and goals under the umbrella of the law and jurisdiction. This saw cooperation between the army, Internal Security Forces and State Security agency. Each one of them has its jurisdiction and duties under law. If all three work together properly, then a safe state can be established.

Syrian crisis

Ibrahim has also played a prominent role in mediations linked to the Syrian crisis. In 2012, a pro-Syrian opposition Lebanese group was ambushed by the regime and most of its members were killed. Ibrahim, after being tasked by the political authority, managed to contact the regime and return the corpses to their loved ones. A prisoner who had been captured by the regime was also released.

He played an even more important role after the abduction in Syria of a bus of Lebanese Shi’ites who were traveling from Iran to Lebanon. Here, Ibrahim used his ties with Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan to work on releasing them. The mediation saw Ibrahim contact Turkey, Qatar and the Syrian regime to ensure their release.

Akiki attributed Ibrahim’s success in these deals to his belief in the importance of credibility, his official position and his personal relations. These factors allowed him to enter negotiations and continue with them. Ibrahim has not once made concessions at the expense of the Lebanese state, stressed Akiki.

“His smart negotiation skills, patience and knowledge of how the other side thinks, as well as the trust, credibility and direct ties that he enjoys, have built his success,” added Akiki.

He noted however that direct negotiations were never held with “terrorists”.

“I do not believe that he would accept to negotiate with them directly. There was a mediator tasked with relaying their conditions or demands to us and also relaying our own to them,” he explained.

Future ambition

Some say that Ibrahim is seeking to enter the political field in the future and that he is laying the foundation for it now. In his current role, he appears to be walking in the footsteps of Speaker Nabih Berri, who enjoys excellent ties with several main parties in Lebanon, as opposed to “Hezbollah”, which has a limited number of allies and several rivals.

On this speculation, Akiki said: “We need to wait five years (the end of Ibrahim’s term in office) to see if it will come true.”

Ibrahim says that he will be in the place where he will be able “to serve the most, which is what he is doing in his current post,” explained Akiki.

Profile

Abbas Ibrahim was born on March 2, 1959. He hails from the town of Kawthariyet al-Sayyad in southern Lebanon. He is married to Ghada Zeineddine and they have three children: Mohammed, Ali and Bilal.

He first enrolled in military school when he was 19 and he graduated three years later with the rank of lieutenant. Throughout the 1980s, he took part in several training courses in the military, culminating in an infantry course in the United States in 1989. This was followed by a computer course in 1996 to stay up to date with the electronic age. He also received advanced security training in the United Kingdom in 1998.

In 1989, Ibrahim was the personal bodyguard of Arab League envoy to Lebanon Lakhdar Brahimi. He was then appointed bodyguard to late President Elias al-Hrawi and remained in that post until 1992 when he was tasked with protecting then newly appointed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In 1994, he was appointed head of the counter-terrorism and espionage department at the intelligence directorate.

Between 2005 and 2008, Ibrahim was head of the intelligence bureau in the South, putting him on the frontlines of the unrest in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el-Hilweh and all of its complications. He has successfully dealt with this thorny issue, building special ties with the Palestinian leadership there, which he has since used to his advantage in his current post as head of General Security.

Commander of the Palestinian national security forces in Lebanon Sobhi Abou Arab told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ibrahim “was the first Lebanese official to enter the refugee camps and meet with all sides, including popular, organized and Islamic factions. He was the first to initiate contact out of his keenness on security and stability.” Abou Arab hailed Ibrahim’s calm approach, as well as his negotiation skills and diplomatic abilities.

Two years after his appointment as General Security chief in 2011, Ibrahim declared that he had remained at an equal distance from all sides and that he had sought to serve all citizens away from sectarian disputes. This was proven true, garnering him the trust of all sides, who have put their faith in him with the county’s most difficult and complicated files.



How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
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Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)

A report by The Atlantic said the strike that hit a region close to Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s residence in the first days of the war on Iran has returned to the spotlight a still controversial political figure even though he left office for over a decade ago.

On the first day of the Iran war, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei overshadowed news of a strike near Ahmadinejad’s home, said the report.

“Many who remembered his term in office - marked by Holocaust denial, atom-bomb fetishism, and shoving revolutionary ideology down the throats of a country already weary of it - celebrated his reported assassination,” it added. He was president from 2005 to 2013.

“Among those who have followed Ahmadinejad’s post-presidential career, however, his targeting was more of an enigma. Since leaving office, Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized the Iranian government, and as a result, Iran’s Guardian Council has formally excluded him from running for president,” said the report.

For more than a decade, he has been known more as a regime opponent than as a supporter. “I don’t understand why Israel would want to kill him in the first place,” Meir Javedanfar, who co-wrote a biography of Ahmadinejad, told The Atlantic. “Perhaps to settle scores? It makes no sense.”

Contrary to early reports, Ahmadinejad is alive, his associates revealed, requesting anonymity. “The circumstances of his survival may prove significant as the war drags on. Whatever the intent, Ahmadinejad’s associates say the strike was in effect a jailbreak operation that freed the former president from regime control.”

“Long before the war, the government had posted a small number of bodyguards near Ahmadinejad, nominally to protect a prominent citizen but also to keep tabs on him. The regime has never been sure what to do with him,” said the report.

About a month ago, after the January protests, his freedom of movement was further reduced, his phones confiscated, and the contingent of bodyguards increased from single digits to about 50. The bodyguards were based a few hundred meters from Ahmadinejad’s residence itself, at the entrance to a cul-de-sac in Narmak, in northeast Tehran. They established a checkpoint to monitor the houses and high school on that street.

“A February 28 strike hit not the residence, but the security forces nearby. In the ensuing mayhem, Ahmadinejad and his family evidently escaped their home and went underground. The government believed he had died, and his death was announced by official channels, as well as the reformist daily Sharq.”

“When rumors arose that Ahmadinejad had escaped, regime elements immediately suspected that he had been spirited away to take part in a coup,” said The Atlantic. “Ahmadinejad’s only public statement since the attack has been a brief eulogy for the supreme leader, calculated to show that Ahmadinejad was alive and to dispel speculation that he had declared himself an enemy of the state. His location is unknown to the government.”

In 2018, former Defense Minister Hussein Dehghan likened Ahmadinejad to “the door of the mosque, which can’t be burned or thrown away” without torching the mosque itself.

“Arresting Ahmadinejad could unsettle the regime,” Javedanfar said. “He knows a hell of a lot about it.”

“Ahmadinejad’s fans say that he has popular support, and that any postwar government will want him around to lend that support. If the current regime survives, it will need all the legitimacy it can get. If it does not, the United States might need someone with intimate - if outdated - knowledge of the Iranian state to be involved with what comes next. Ahmadinejad could still be useful,” the report said.